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A  behaviourally plausible decision centred perspective on the role of corporate 





The primary focus of this thesis is to answer “What is the role of corporate governance in corporate 
failures? Does poor corporate governance lead to corporate failures? If so how?”. In doing so the 
thesis examines the literature from multiple fields including corporate governance, corporate failures 
and organisational decision making, and identifies a research gap to analyse and explore the 
relationship between corporate governance practices and corporate failures through a behavioural 
lens. 
 In approaching this, a qualitative research methodology is adopted to analyse the failure of Enron 
Corporation and Nathans Finance Ltd. The research considered the case study organisations as the 
primary unit of analysis and the decision makers as the secondary unit of analysis. Based on this 
research approach, the thesis reports the analytical results drawn from extensive and triangulated 
secondary data. The thesis then interprets the results in the context of the theoretical synthesis. 
The thesis contributes towards filling a gap in the research and presents a behaviourally plausible 
decision centred model of the role of corporate governance in corporate failures. The model 
highlights the critical role of the behavioural aspects of corporate governance decision making in 
corporate failures, and focuses attention on the underexplored aspects of corporate governance 
decision making.  
The thesis also suggests a further understanding of ‘A Behavioral Theory Of The Firm’ (Cyert & March, 
2001) in relation to corporate failures. 
Keywords: Corporate governance, Coporate failure, Decision making, Behaviour, Values, Case study, 
Qulitative research.   
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Corporate governance has been a much-discussed topic in recent years with notable cases of 
corporate failure and abuse of corporate governance around the world being the primary source of 
problems in the past twenty years. These cases have included a list of prominent companies like 
Enron, WorldCom, Barings Bank etc. (Mardjono, 2005) and the failures have brought misfortune for 
those directly or indirectly associated with the corporations. A series of formal investigations and 
reports followed these failures, and considerable effort has been put in to the development of best 
corporate governance codes, practices and theory worldwide (Leung & Cooper, 2003). However, 
these developments have failed to put a halt to corporate governance failures. Why are the current 
theories, practices and codes of corporate governance unable to provide a solution to this recurring 
problem? Could it be that we simply do not understand enough about the corporate governance 
decision process? (Leblanc & Gillies, 2005).  
These failures have triggered a series of formal investigations in many developed and developing 
countries. For example, in the UK alone, there have been four significant inquiries providing 
important recommendations on corporate governance. These include Cadbury (1992), Greenbury 
(1995), Hampel (1998), and Turnbull (1999). In the United States, the government has enacted the 
Sarbanes- Oxley Act as a protective measure against corporate failure. On a further note, good 
corporate governance principles and practices have been adopted by various bodies such as the 
OECD, ASX Council and the New Zealand Securities Commission. According to Carter and Lorsch 
(2004) a majority of the good corporate governance practices are focused around the need for 
independent directors; the need to have a board leader who is not the Chief Executive Officer (CEO); 
the requirement for boards to have at least three core committees - audit, compensation, and 
corporate governance (or nomination) - the members of which should all be independent directors; 
the need for boards to be as small as is feasible and for directors to be compensated enough to 
motivate them to focus upon maximising shareholder value (Carter & Lorsch, 2004). 
However, it seems that whatever the actions taken another failure is just around the corner 
somewhere in the world. For example, legislation and the encouragement to follow best practices 
failed to prevent the recent sub-prime mortgage market debacle, the effects of which rippled out 
from the USA to world lending markets. It seems that there is a gap between best practice theory 
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and the practice. It may be that whilst board empowerment and independent action as well as 
aligning directors' interests with those of owners are important, this principled stance simply does 
not translate into practice. So, what is it that is missing and why is it that the deployment of best 
practice continues to fall short, resulting in major failures in governance?  Could it be that we simply 
do not understand how boards operate (Leblanc & Gillies, 2005)?. Perhaps the major issue in 
corporate governance research stems from our limited understanding of what really goes on in 
directors' minds and inside boardrooms (Smallman, 2007).   
The need to study the role of corporate governance decision processes in effective corporate 
governance has been widely recognised in past literature (Argyris, 2000; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975); 
however many, including Bhagat and Bolton (2008); Rutherford and Buchholtz (2007); Rutherford, 
Buchholtz, and Brown (2007); and (Donaldson, 2012); Huse (2005) recognise that the main focus in 
this context has been on studying the demographic characteristics of the board including board 
composition and size; tenure of the board members; CEO duality; and the board and CEO 
remuneration. According to Rutherford et al. (2007), the research focusing on the demographic 
content has been significant in terms of their findings, but it fails to examine the corporate 
governance decision process. However there is a significant need to examine the “intervening 
processes and behaviours” associated with corporate governance decision making (Rutherford & 
Buchholtz, 2007). 
Another dominant feature of corporate governance research has been the use of quantitative 
research methods by a majority of the corporate governance researchers (Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007). 
However according to Letza, Kirkbride, Xiuping Sun, and Smallman (2008) corporate governance is 
not a purely economic process but a social and interactive process as well. Most of the doctoral 
students and scholars in the past have carried out research using data and methods that can be 
evaluated by journal reviewers through well-established validity concepts. The usual board measures 
employed in these studies are CEO duality, insider/outsider ratio, the number of board members and 
the directors’ share ownership (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Huse, 2005; Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 
1996; Krause & Semadeni, 2013; Shi, Connelly, & Sanders, 2016). Actual board behaviour is not 
explored in these studies. A very small portion of the empirical board articles published in the leading 
scientific management journals are about actual board behaviour(Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004).  So, 
what is needed, perhaps, is to examine the processes of governance, rather than the structures. 
1.2 Current Understanding and Research Gap 
There is a significant need to study corporate governance decisions and practices, as despite best 
efforts, corporate failures have been haunting the corporate world. All kind of actions and 
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development of best practices in the field of corporate governance have failed to provide a solution 
to the problem of corporate failures. As stated previously, the current research and developments in 
corporate governance practice and research fail to acknowledge the importance of behavioural 
aspects in corporate governance decisions. There seems to be a gap between best practice theory 
and practice (Smallman, 2007).  Thereby, this study aimed to analyse and explore the relationship 
between corporate governance practices and corporate failures through a behavioural lens. This is 
depicted in the title of the study:  A behaviourally plausible decision centred perspective on the role of 
corporate governance in corporate failures. The study is decision centred as it focuses on the 
corporate governance decisions and decision making of the selected cases, and is behaviourally 
plausible as it aims to understand the behavioural context of corporate decision making.  
This research adopts a qualitative methodology to explore the role of corporate governance in 
corporate failures in the context of the behavioural aspects of decision making, thus contributing 
towards addressing the inadequacy of theory in this regard. The primary research question that 
drives this research is:  
“What is the role of corporate governance in corporate failures? Does poor 
corporate governance lead to corporate failures? If so how?”   
In doing so the study considered the case study organisation as the primary unit of analysis and the 
decision maker as the secondary unit of analysis.  
1.3 Theoretical Base 
To craft a theoretical storyline (Golden-Biddle & Locke, 2007) this study examines  literature from 
multiple fields including corporate governance, corporate failures and organisational decision 
making. In the beginning the intention was to carefully review selected works for the literature 
review. These studies were selected on the basis of frequency of citation. Some of the content was 
recommended by my supervisors. Following the concept of progressive coherence (Golden-Biddle & 
Locke, 2007) some of the sources required further analysis, where the related citations were 
followed back to retrieve further information. The objective was to construct a coherent synthesis of 
the literature and to highlight any gap that the research could contribute towards. Here the 
corporate governance literature falls into three categories that include shareholder perspective 
(Letza et al., 2008), stakeholder perspective (Letza et al., 2008)and behavioural approaches (Carter & 
Lorsch, 2004; Leblanc & Gillies, 2005) to corporate governance. For the purpose of this study  the 
model of corporate failure provided by Stead and Smallman (1999) is selected due to its ability to 
synthesise a wide literature on corporate failures. In the context of organisational decision making, ‘A 
behavioral theory of the firm’  by Cyert and March (2001) has been selected for its ability to support 
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this research in terms of intervening in decision processes. The theory was first published in 1968, 
but for the purpose of this research the 2001 edition is considered. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
As stated previously corporate governance research has been dominated by quantitative methods. 
However, this study uses qualitative methods to explore the behavioural aspects of corporate 
governance decision making in context to corporate failures. Qualitative research was selected for 
this study after consideration of its ability to explore a phenomenon or concept in a novel way, 
differently from quantitative research (Creswell, 2003). According to Creswell the unique strength of 
qualitative research is that it allows issues and ideas to emerge and does not suggest or indicate 
anything in advance. Since it is expected that new realities may emerge during data collection 
(Creswell, 2003) a qualitative research approach is justified as it facilitates explanatory inferences 
(Creswell, 2003; Hubberman & Miles, 2002). Most importantly, the qualitative research approach is 
considered suitable for research studies that focus on “what” (exploratory nature only), “how” and 
“why” components (Yin, 2009, pp. 8-9), which justifies the use of qualitative methodology for this 
research.  
This research uses a case study approach as it has the unique strength to deal with a full variety of 
evidence e.g. documents, artefacts, interviews, and observations (Yin, 1994). This research uses a 
variety of documented sources that include newspaper articles, journal articles, legal proceedings, 
court documents, books, public enquiry reports, archival records, and media reports. The research is 
based on two cases: Enron Corporation and Nathans Finance Ltd and uses the purposeful sample 
(Levrau & Berghe, 2013; Marshall, 1996) that had the potential to answer the research questions.  
Enron was a US based multinational company that went bankrupt in 2001. It was once considered 
the most innovative and successful company in America, winning awards and accolades before going  
bankrupt (Downes & Russ, 2005). Today Enron is known more for its downfall than for its past 
success  – a fall that brought havoc (Arnold & Lange, 2004) to the US economy, causing billions in 
losses. On the other hand, Nathans was formed in July 2001 as a wholly owned subsidiary of a 
vending technology company - VTL Limited. The company went bankrupt in 2007 (The Queen v K. R. 
Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011).  
The research follows a replication approach to multiple-case studies (Yin, 1994). Each individual case 
study consisted of a “whole” study, in which convergent evidence was sought regarding the facts 
and conclusions for the case; each case’s conclusions were then considered to be the information 
needing replication by the other case (Yin, 1994).  
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A qualitative research software NVivo was used to assist in analysing the data. 
1.5 Intended Contribution       
The research intends to contribute to the existing body of knowledge by exploring the role of the 
behavioural aspects of corporate governance decision-making in corporate failures. In this way the 
research aims to address the research gap identified in Chapter 2. In doing so the focus will be on 
addressing the issue of “inadequate”  (Golden-Biddle & Locke, 2007) literature to explain the role of 
corporate governance in corporate failures. The  research will focus on the processual nature of 
corporate governance (Letza et al., 2008), an area not duly represented in present literature. Further 
details on this research gap are provided in Chapter 2.   
A Behavioral Theory of the Firm by (Cyert & March, 2001), is an important part of this research. This 
research intends to contribute towards the further understanding of the theory in the context of the 
behavioural aspects of corporate governance decision making. In this way the research intends to 
explore the theory in the present context and contribute towards closing the research gap presented 
in Chapter 2. 
1.6 Thesis Structure  
This thesis comprises seven chapters including the Introduction. Chapter Two presents a review of 
the literature on corporate governance, corporate failures and organisational decision making. It 
contains a synthesis of the literature and presents a gap for the research. Chapter Three presents the 
rationale for the research methods and data analysis. Chapter Four presents the individual case 
narrative for Enron, and the narrative of Nathans’s is presented in Chapter Five. The findings of the 
research are presented in Chapter Six. Chapter Seven consists of discussion based on the findings 




As explained in Chapter 1, the current developments in corporate governance practices have failed 
to prevent corporate failures. There is a difference between best practice theory and the practice, 
along with a limited understanding of corporate governance decision making and the intervening 
processes, especially in context of the behaviour of decision makers. Accordingly, this thesis is 
undertaken to analyse and examine the process of corporate governance decision making (in the 
context of the behavioural aspects) rather than the structures.   
This chapter reviews the current literature on corporate governance and corporate failure in order to 
understand current thinking about the role of corporate governance in corporate failures. The first 
section explores corporate governance literature in terms of definition, theoretical perspectives, 
principles and practices, and behavioural aspects. The second section defines corporate failures, and 
presents the trends in corporate failure research, along with a presentation of related theoretical 
paradigms. The last section of the chapter presents the research gap and summarises the chapter.  
2.1 Corporate Governance 
This research explores the role of corporate governance in corporate failure, hence it is necessary to 
develop an understanding of the concept of corporate governance.  
2.1.1 Background 
The origin of corporate governance goes back to the 1600s, when the governance structure of the 
East India Company consisted of an executive body called the Court of Directors, who managed the 
company on behalf of the Court of Proprietors. This structure was quite similar to the present day 
corporate governance structures and also faced issues such as the separation of ownership and 
control (Cadbury, 2002). The origin of modern day corporate governance was divided into four 
phases by Hann (2001). The first part belonged to the 1980s and the highlights include the growing 
number of takeovers, mergers and acquisitions and a significant rise in executive compensation. 
Most of these developments relied on financing through junk bonds and raised the debt ratio of the 
organisations. Thus this phase marks the developments in corporate governance to deal with the 
above issues and to improve the performance of the organisations. The second phase (starting early 
1990s) consisted of changes in the regulatory framework in the context of the management of 
corporations. These changes (such as improved communication with shareholders and disclosure of 
director compensation) had a significant impact on the governance of corporations in terms of 
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meeting the regulatory requirements. The third phase (starting mid 1990s) saw the rise of electronic 
media, thus affecting the availability of information. This increased the accessibility of information 
about the operations and governance of corporations, by the shareholders. The fourth phase 
(starting from the mid to late 1990s) was the rise in institutional shareholdings, resulting in an active 
role for these institutional investors in the governance of corporations (Hann, 2001). Another 
important aspect of modern day corporate governance is the attention that this concept has 
received, primarily due to the recent corporate failures. Developments such as the Code of Best 
Practice (Cadbury, 1992); Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD, 2004); Corporate Governance 
in New Zealand Principles and Guidelines (Corporate Governance in New Zealand: Principles and 
Guidelines, 2004) constitute a significant part of present day corporate governance. The details on 
these developments are provided in the later sections of this chapter. 
2.1.2 Defining Corporate Governance  
Corporate governance has been a well-researched area in last decade (Young & Thyil, 2014), 
however according to Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright (2010) “despite the importance placed on 
corporate governance in academia and practice in recent years, there is still no universally accepted 
definition of corporate governance”. This section provides insights from the previous literature into 
the definition of corporate governance. 
According to the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, “Corporate 
governance is a system by which companies are directed and controlled. The  boards of directors are 
responsible for the governance of the company, which includes setting strategic aims, providing 
effective leadership, supervising management, and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship” 
(Cadbury, 1992). Similarly Brickley and Zimmerman (2010) “corporate governance is the system of 
laws, regulations, institutions, markets, contracts, and corporate policies and procedures that direct 
and influence the actions of the top-level decision makers in the corporation”. These definitions refer 
to corporate governance as a system and highlight that the board of directors of a company assumes 
the primary responsibility for governing the organisation and signifies that the board operates within 
the boundaries set by the regulatory and legal systems, the internal constitution of the company 
itself and the shareholders of the company.  
Forbes and Milliken (1999) also have a similar opinion on defining corporate governance and state 
that the main functions of boards are control and service functions. In terms of control functions, the 
board is legally responsible for monitoring the working of management with adequate care and 
responsibility and, under the service function, the board is required to participate actively in strategy 
formulation and providing advice accordingly (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Another similar opinion on 
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corporate governance is that it is a set of functions that include setting strategic direction, policy 
formulation, selection of the CEO, risk management and control, legislative compliance, monitoring 
performance, and reporting on stewardship (Corporate Governance: A Director's Handbook, 2004). 
On reviewing the above definitions, it becomes clear that the focus here is on corporate governance 
as a system which consists of various functions which are required to be performed to run the affairs 
of the organisation so as to meet the related expectations.  
On similar lines, Pass states that corporate governance represents the duties and responsibilities of a 
company’s board in managing the operations of the company and maintaining relationships with the 
shareholders and other stakeholders of the company (Pass, 2004). According to Pass (2004), 
corporate governance is equally responsible for maintaining relationships with other stakeholders, 
which indicates that good corporate governance needs to meet the expectations of shareholders as 
well as other stakeholders. This opinion is widely held by the supporters of the stakeholder 
perspective on corporate governance. The concept of the Stakeholder Perspective is discussed in 
detail in the coming sections. 
 According to the ASX Corporate Governance Council (ASX Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations, 2007) corporate governance is the framework of rules, relationships, systems and 
processes within and by which authority is exercised and controlled in corporations. It encompasses 
the mechanisms by which companies, and those in control, are held to account. It further states that 
corporate governance influences the way the objectives of the company are set and achieved, how 
risk is monitored and assessed, and how performance is optimised (ASX Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations, 2007).  The OECD Principles on Corporate Governance define 
corporate governance as “a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders”. Corporate Governance also “provides the structure through 
which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance are determined” (OECD, 2004).  These definitions of corporate governance 
also focus on its functions, but extend the scope to further add aspects such as the interests of 
stakeholders, the relationships between various related parties, and processes. These definitions also 
point to the qualitative aspects of corporate governance by focussing on ‘how’ the corporate 
governance functions are performed.  
The New Zealand Securities Commission defines corporate governance as “the set of structures and 
behaviours by which a company or other business entity is directed and managed” (Securities 
Commission, 2003). This definition highlights that good corporate governance depends not only on 
structural elements but on behavioural aspects as well. Conger, Lawler, and Finegold (2001) also hold 
a similar opinion on behavioural aspects and state that “…. it is behavior [sic] that counts with respect 
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to boards, not the practices per se ….”. The importance of behavioural aspects is also supported by 
Young and Thyil (2014) who observe that “Corporate governance needs to draw on behavioural 
frameworks rather than what is often seen in practice as structural approaches”. 
In summary, the literature defines corporate governance as a system that consists of a series of 
functions to be performed by the board of directors, which are guided by various rules and 
regulations. The board of directors is the pivot point of corporate governance, but good governance 
requires the management of the relational aspects of decision making including internal and external 
stakeholders. Most of the literature focuses on the structural elements of corporate governance, but 
the importance of the behavioural aspects is also evident. For the purpose of this research corporate 
governance functions include setting strategic direction, formulation of policy, managing and 
controlling risk, selecting a CEO and directors, monitoring performance, legislative compliance and 
reporting. In saying that, it does not mean that this research is limited to these functional aspects 
only. The following sections will further unfold the context of corporate governance for the purpose 
of this research.  
2.1.3 Corporate Governance - Theoretical Perspectives  
The above definitions of corporate governance broadly present it from three different perspectives. 
The first is the shareholding perspective, which consists of the narrow scope of maximising 
shareholders’ interests only. The second is the stakeholding perspective which advocates maximising 
the interest of all the stakeholders. These two perspectives challenge each other in terms of the 
fundamental purpose and scope of corporate governance. The third perspective is the behavioural 
perspective, which considers board behaviour as an essential element of corporate governance. The 
following sections further explore these perspectives in detail. 
The Shareholding Perspective 
The shareholding perspective holds that the shareholders of a company provide capital to the 
company, and in return the managers of the company are supposed to use that capital only in a way 
authorised by the shareholders (Aras & Crowther, 2016, p. 107; Hasnas, 1998; Smith, 2003). Berle 
(1931) was one of the early proponents of the shareholding perspective and stated that the interests 
of the shareholders should be the driving force for the managers of a company. Similar views were 
presented by Milton Friedman in his seminal work published in 1962. According to Friedman, “the 
corporation is an instrument of the stockholders” and “there is one and only one social responsibility 
of business- to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it 
stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engage in open and free competition, without 
deception or fraud” (Friedman, 2002, pp. 133,135).  
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) also supported the shareholding perspective, which they related back to 
the pioneer work of Adam Smith (1776) – The Wealth of Nations. They highlighted that the 
corporations have a separation of ownership and control, thereby adherence to the shareholding 
perspective will safeguard the interests of owners/shareholders. Sternberg (1995), another 
proponent of the shareholding perspective, stated that the objective of the company is the 
maximisation of owner value. However, he affirmed that the company should focus on long term 
value maximisation and that the behaviour of stakeholders is intrinsic to the long-term value 
maximisation.  
 
The Anglo-Saxon Model 
The shareholding perspective is represented by the Anglo-Saxon model (Ahmad & Omar, 2016; 
Cernat, 2004). It is the basic model of the shareholding perspective and all the other models, in this 
context, emerge from the Anglo-Saxon model (Ahmad & Omar, 2016).  The model, which is also 
referred to as the Anglo-American model, the market-centric model, the equity-based model, the 
principal-agent model and the finance model (Ahmad & Omar, 2016), is the most dominant model of 
governance (Keasey, Thompson, & Wright, 2002, p. 3).  
The model assumes that the objective of an organisation is maximisation of shareholders’ wealth and 
is based on the separation of ownership and control, which leads to an agency relationship between 
the owners/shareholders and the managers of the organisation (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The 
separation of ownership and control leads to agency problems in the form of conflict between 
owners and managers (Berle, 1931).  Agency problems arise when the agent pursues different 
objectives from the principal (Letza et al., 2008).  According to Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson 
(1997), both the principal and the agent are motivated by their own personal gain, leading to a clash 
between the self-serving agent and the profit oriented principal. Eisenhardt (1989a) states that along 
with the conflicting goals of the principal and agent, another issue is that it is difficult for the 
principal to monitor the work and behaviour of the agent. Since the model is based on the 
relationship between the principal and the agent, which is guided by relationship contract (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976), the focus of the model is on finding the most efficient contract as a measure of 
good corporate governance (Eisenhardt, 1989a). According to Eisenhardt (1989a), these measures 
aim to monitor the behaviour and output of the agent. Such measures include incentive programs for 
management (Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), information systems, budgetary and reporting 
procedures and alignment of the owner’s and agent’s interests (Eisenhardt, 1989a), and focus on 
aspects such as governance and board structure, ownership and control and rights of various 
stakeholders including shareholders etc. (Ahmad & Omar, 2016).  
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Stakeholding Perspective 
The stakeholding perspective challenges the shareholding perspective in terms of the purpose of the 
organisation (Letza, Sun, & Kirkbride, 2004) and has emerged out of the criticism of the shareholding 
perspective (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman & Reed, 1983; Mansell, 2013).The stakeholding 
perspective advocates that management has a fiduciary duty to both the shareholders and other 
stakeholders (including customers, suppliers, employees and community) who affect or are affected 
by the achievement of company’s objectives (Freeman, 2001). According to Freeman managers are 
responsible for ensuring that the legitimate interests of all the stakeholders are attended. The 
stakeholding perspective considers that stakeholders are not merely a means to an end but have the 
right to participate in determining the future direction of the company (Freeman, 2001). 
The stakeholding perspective asserts that organisations need to manage the interests of all the 
stakeholders, whether they result in improved financial performance or not. The focus here is not on 
the maximisation of owner value but on “coordinating stakeholder interests”, which indicates that at 
times there might be conflict among the interests of the shareholders and other stakeholders. 
According to the stakeholding perspective, in such situations management is required to strike an 
optimal balance, which means that at certain times the interests of the shareholders might be 
sacrificed or might not be prioritised, as was the case in the shareholding perspective (Hasnas, 1998).  
The Continental European Model 
The Continental European Model or the Continental Model is the basic model that represents the 
stakeholding perspective (Ahmad & Omar, 2016; Cernat, 2004), which is the basis of all the other 
models for governance based on the stakeholding perspective (Ahmad & Omar, 2016). It is also 
referred to as the Stakeholder Model (Letza et al., 2008; Turnbull, 1997) and presents the most 
fundamental challenge to the Anglo-Saxon Model (Keasey et al., 2002, p. 8).The model not only 
considers the interest of shareholders but the other stakeholders as well (Cernat, 2004).  
The model proposes that the organisation has a wider objective than merely the maximisation of the 
shareholders’ interest. Rather the interests of the groups who have a long term association with the 
organisation should be explicitly recognised. The wider objective of the organisation is for it to be 
equitable and socially efficient. The model is efficient in two principal ways. Firstly it helps the 
organisation in developing an ethical organisation’s reputation by providing ethical treatment to the 
stakeholders, which further results in building trust relations that lead towards profitable ventures 
and mutual cooperation. Secondly, the success of Japan’s and Germany’s organisations, which have 
adopted this model and adopted wider stakeholder interests, supports the model as a choice for 
good governance  (Keasey et al., 2002, pp. 9-11). 
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Comparison - Shareholding Vs Stakeholding Perspective  
The debate between the shareholding perspective and the stakeholding perspective (Letza et al., 
2004; Smith, 2003) has dominated the corporate governance literature since 1980s (Letza et al., 
2008). Moreover, the criticism of the shareholding perspective leads to the stakeholding perspective. 
Therefore it is important to compare these two competing perspectives before proceeding to the 
third perspective, which is comparatively new and has not been compared to the other two 
perspectives (details to follow).  
Both the shareholding and stakeholding perspectives are widely supported and recognised in the 
present literature, which is non-coherent (Golden-Biddle & Locke, 2007) in nature and is linked by 
disagreements. According to Jensen (2001), the value maximisation proposition of the shareholding 
perspective is based on 200 years of research in economics and finance, and its competing 
contender, the stakeholding perspective, belongs to the field of sociology and organisational 
behaviour. 
The shareholding perspective, although it focuses on the maximisation of shareholder value, pursues 
only legal and non-deceptive means to earn those profits. When an organisation follows legal and 
honest means to earn its profits, it automatically justifies its responsibility towards the other 
stakeholders. Moreover, shareholders supply money to the organisation and the management is 
under contract to use it in a way approved and consented to by the shareholders (Hasnas, 1998). 
However, Donaldson and Preston (1995) have responded (in advance) to the above support for the 
shareholding perspective. They state that pursuing only the interests of shareholders is normatively 
unacceptable, especially considering the legal expectations (that also include social responsibility) 
from a corporation. According to them a business cannot ignore social and ethical requirements 
(including the interests of other stakeholders) if it wants to pursue a profitable venture in the long 
run. Responding to the notion of the property rights of shareholders, the authors state that “the 
notion that property rights are embedded in human rights and that restrictions against harmful uses 
are intrinsic to the property rights concept clearly brings the interests of others (i.e., of non-owner 
stake- holders) into the picture” (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). 
But Jensen supports the shareholding perspective on the grounds that the stakeholding perspective 
is impaired by the politics of special interests and the self-interest of management. Jensen criticises 
the stakeholding perspective as incomplete in terms of providing guidance to the managers and 
leaves them in a dilemma in deciding on what is good and what is bad for the organisation. Jansen 
further states that the incomplete nature of the stakeholding perspective makes it a perfect tool for 
serving the self-interest of outsiders, managers, and the directors of the organisation. The 
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stakeholding perspective is considered to be fundamentally flawed as it fails to deliver a single-value 
objective to facilitate rational decision making (Jensen, 2001). However, referring to Jensen’s 
criticism of the stakeholding perspective, Sacconi (2004) responds that the criticism does not stand 
well against the “social contract of the firm” and that the distributive conflict among various 
stakeholders can be resolved by mutual cooperation and bargaining among the various stakeholders. 
On the other side Mansell (2013) argues that organisations can pursue the shareholding perspective, 
and can still take care of the interest of other stakeholders. According to Mansell, it is possible to 
critique the shareholding perspective without a competitive rival’s perspective. It is suggested that 
organisations can bring transparency to their operations and can adopt an ethical code of conduct 
and corporate social responsibility policies to represent the interests of other stakeholders. Mansell 
supports the shareholding perspective while rejecting the idea of a competitive perspective: 
…… theorists cited at the start of the article employ a range of ethical 
theories to oppose the orthodox shareholder view; however, it appears that 
by extending the shareholder theory rather than by rejecting it outright, the 
well-being of non-shareholders can be part of the corporate objective, and 
in many cases ought to be (Mansell, 2013). 
On the opposite side the proponents of the stakeholding perspective posit that it offers a broader 
approach to running an organization and considers a wide range of governance issues as compared 
to the shareholding perspective (Mason & Simmons, 2014). Tantalo and Priem (2016) state that 
adoption of the stakeholding perspective can help organisations move beyond the narrow 
shareholder perspective. They state that with integrated decision making organisations can 
simultaneously serve the interests of different stakeholders and managers need not trade-off 
between the interests of different stakeholders. They advocate taking advantage of opportunities to 
create shared value that serves the interest of all the stakeholders including the shareholders. They 
provide the concept of ‘stakeholder synergy’ which “allows top managers to truly create value for 
essential stakeholder groups, rather than resorting to trade-offs that only transfer existing value 
among the groups” (Tantalo & Priem, 2016).  
Amidst these contradictions, Daily, Dalton, and Cannella (2003), (Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 
2005),Letza et al. (2008), Hambrick, Werder, and Zajac (2008) and Ees, Gabrielsson, and Huse (2009) 
call for corporate governance research in new directions, including decision processes and 
behaviours. For instance, Letza et al. (2008) address the need to focus on the underlying 
philosophical issues in corporate governance, as they argue that corporate governance is not a pure 
economic issue that can be fixed between the above two perspectives. Rather it is social in context 
and processual in nature and affected by non-economic factors such as cultural and social factors. 
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The processual nature of corporate governance challenges the conventional and fixed approaches to 
governance (shareholding and stakeholding) (Letza et al., 2008) and represents a gap in corporate 
governance research.   
Behavioural Perspective 
As identified earlier, the third corporate governance perspective is the behavioural perspective. This 
perspective has been largely ignored in corporate governance research (Erakovic & Overall, 2010; 
Huse, Hoskisson, Zattoni, & Viganò, 2011; Leblanc & Gillies, 2005; Pye & Pettigrew, 2005; Roberts et 
al., 2005). However, behaviour has been recognised as an important element of corporate 
governance, for example, the shareholding perspective refers to the attitudes and behaviours of the 
principal and agent that affect their decisions (Eisenhardt, 1989a; West, 2009). Huse (1998) 
emphasised that it is most essential for the organisations to deeply understand board behaviour; 
however, the following quote from Leblanc and Gillies (2005, p. 134) indicates a lack of research in 
this regard: 
…. it is truly astonishing, given the enormous amount of work on corporate 
governance …………. how little has actually been learned about how boards 
actually function …. learning “how boards work” [sic] could have 
tremendous practical significance for the governance of corporations. 
Roberts et al. (2005) not only raise the issue of the lack of research in terms of the behavioural 
perspective, but also state that most of the behavioural research focuses on the structure, 
composition and independence of the board of directors and ignores the actual conduct of the 
directors. Similarly Huse (2005) supports the lack of research in terms of behaviour and states that 
most of the research, though aimed at focusing on the behavioural perspective, explored concepts 
like CEO duality, the size of the board, the ownership interest of the directors and the percentage of 
independent directors. The author further stressed that corporate governance research also needs to 
explore the role/behaviour of actors (decision makers/boards of directors) to gain a wider 
understanding of the behavioural perspective (Huse, 2005). According to Pye and Pettigrew (2005) a 
study of board behaviour in terms of power, politics, learning, risk assumption, change and 
adaptation can provide important insights in this context.   
However, the behavioural perspective and related research is gaining momentum (Ees et al., 2009), 
for example, International Journal of Disclosure and Governance published a special issue in 2013, 
focusing on the critical components of corporate governance that included the behaviour of boards 
of directors (Leblanc, 2013). Hambrick et al. (2008) have raised the issue of ‘Behavioural Structure’ 
and ‘Behavioural Process’ in the boardroom, while Minichilli, Gabrielsson, and Huse (2007) state that 
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the decision making culture, interaction among boards of directors, and trust levels and emotions 
can provide meaningful insights into corporate governance processes. Similarly Erakovic and Overall 
(2010) focused on the behavioural perspective in terms of inter-relationships and inter-personal 
communication in the organisations. 
Despite the above developments and research, Mostovicz, Kakabadse, and Kakabadse (2011) state 
that the current behavioural perspective fails to explain the behaviour of decision makers in the 
wake of corporate failures. The authors observe that human aspects/behaviour are still overlooked in 
the present research, and that it is important to study the factors influencing the behaviour of 
corporate decision makers (Mostovicz et al., 2011). To conclude, Ees et al. (2009) state that the 
research related to board behaviour is in its initial stages and there is a need to develop a theory 
explaining board behaviour (Ees et al., 2009). Before addressing the issue of the lack of theory 
explaining board behaviour, the following sections look into the significant developments in the field 
of corporate governance principles and practices. 
2.1.4 Corporate Governance Principles and Practices 
The issue of corporate governance has gained significance in the wake of corporate failures. As a 
result, many apex bodies and institutions have proposed sets of good corporate governance 
practices and principles. The following section provides details of these developments. 
Code of Best Practice - Cadbury Committee  
The Cadbury Committee was set up in May 1991 in the wake of the failure of several big companies. 
The committee’s report addressed various issues such as board effectiveness, board structures and 
procedures, standards of conduct, the effectiveness and value of audits, and accountability towards 
shareholders. The report averred that good corporate governance is vital for the growth of business 
and for gaining and maintaining investor confidence (Cadbury, 1992).  
The major recommendations (the code) issued by the Committee focused on the role of boards of 
directors and auditors with specific attention to ‘financial reporting and accountability’. The report 
recommended that the board should meet regularly, retain full and effective control over the 
company and monitor the executive management. It was further recommended that selection of 
non-executive directors should be impartial and that a majority of non-executive directors should be 
independent of the company. The report stated that the board is responsible for presenting a 
balanced and understandable assessment of the company (Cadbury, 1992).  The recommendations 
made by the Committee were in the form of structural changes and rules. 
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According to the Committee the “…….Code of Best Practice [is] designed to achieve the necessary 
high standards of corporate behaviour [sic]” (Cadbury, 1992). However, the emphasis of the Code 
was on structure rather than on behaviour. But the significance of understanding behavioural issues 
was apparent in the report: “Raising standards of corporate governance cannot be achieved by 
structures and rules alone. They are important because they provide a framework which will 
encourage and support good governance, but what counts is the way in which they are put to use.” 
(Cadbury, 1992). The report established the importance of structural measures, but also suggested 
the need to understand the behavioural issues by raising the concern that statutory measures 
require a minimum standard and could result in ‘compliance with the letter, rather than with the 
spirit’ of standard measures (Cadbury, 1992). 
The Code of Best Practice by the Cadbury Committee was followed by a series of developments such 
as issuance of The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003, 2006 and 2008) and The UK 
Corporate Governance Code (2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016) (European Corporate Governance Institute; 
The UK Corporate Governance Code, 2016). Despite a series of developments, the nature of 
corporate governance is “… limited to being a guide only in general terms to principles, structure and 
processes. It cannot guarantee effective board behaviour…”(The UK Corporate Governance Code, 
2012).  
The UK Corporate Governance Code (2016) states that “One of the key roles for the board includes 
establishing the culture, values and ethics of the company ……….…… The directors should lead by 
example and ensure that good standards of behaviour….”. However, the code mainly provided for 
structural issues such as division of responsibilities, board composition and the selection process. 
transparency in board operations, director remuneration etc. (The UK Corporate Governance Code, 
2016). 
Principles of Corporate Governance - OECD   
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance were first issued in 1999 and later revised in 2004 and 
2015. The principles of corporate governance provided by the OECD form the basis for corporate 
governance initiatives in both OECD and non-OECD countries. The initial focus of these principles was 
on providing a transparent corporate governance framework, ensuring a division of responsibilities 
among different supervisory. regulatory and enforcement authorities, facilitating protection of 
shareholders’ rights, encouraging active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders and 
ensuring timely and accurate disclosure on all material matters (OECD, 2004). The revised principles 
(2015) raise some behavioural issues such as the role of regulatory authorities in detecting dishonest 
corporate behaviour, freedom for shareholders and employees to raise issues of illegal and unethical 
behaviour, boards’ duty of loyalty towards the company and management of conflicts of interest. 
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However the primary focus of these principles remains on “supporting economic efficiency, 
sustainable growth and financial stability” (OECD, 2015). These principles are driven by “the 
increasing complexity of the investment chain, the changing role of stock exchanges and the 
emergence of new investors, investment strategies and trading practices” (G20/OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance). The corporate governance principles of the OECD are revised to meet the 
changing requirements, but in terms of behavioural aspects these principles have not provided any 
insights other than admitting the importance of behavioural issues in providing good corporate 
governance.  
The Sarbanes Oxley Act 
The Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) brought significant changes for the US companies. The objective of 
the Act was to “to restore shareholder trust in the stock markets by improving the reliability and 
accuracy of the financial reports” (Sneller & Langendijk, 2007). The Act primarily focused on the 
financial aspects and requires all the listed companies to have audit committees formed by 
independent directors only. The Act also forbids the external auditors of a company from providing 
any type of non-audit or consultancy services to the company (Romano, 2004). In this way, the Act 
brought changes to control any conflicts of interests affecting the reliability of the financial 
statements. 
Some of the other changes under the Act have also had a significant impact on the practices of 
companies. For example, the Act prohibits companies from providing any type of credit or loan 
facility to its executives or directors. The Act also requires the CEO and CFO of a company to certify 
the financial statements of the company in terms of fair presentation of the financial results of the 
company (Romano, 2004). The power to appoint external auditors is also given to the audit 
committee, and the management or board of the company is not involved in the process. Moreover, 
the external auditors are required to rotate their assigned employees for every company they audit. 
These changes were to ensure that the auditors do not develop a personal relation with the client 
company (Clark, 2005).  The changes brought under the Act are primarily focused on improving the 
reliability of the financial statements of a company, and the Act is silent about the behavioural 
aspects of corporate governance.  
Corporate Governance Principles and Guidelines - The Securities Commisssion New 
Zealand 
This set of principles was set out in a report by the Securities Commission, New Zealand in the year 
2004.  The principles are intended to contribute to high standards of corporate governance in New 
Zealand entities and provide recommendations on board composition (in terms of the balance of 
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independence, skills, knowledge, and experience), the use of committees by the board (to improve 
operational effectiveness), integrity, both in financial reporting and in the timely, transparent, fair 
and reasonable remuneration of directors and executives, the quality and independence of the 
external audit process, and constructive relationships with shareholders (Corporate Governance in 
New Zealand: Principles and Guidelines, 2004) . 
The focus of these principles is on “……. reporting and disclosure of corporate governance structure 
and processes, as well as on reporting of financial and other material matters”  (Corporate 
Governance in New Zealand: Principles and Guidelines, 2004). These principles were revised in 2014 
to reflect on the ethical behaviour of boards, the reporting of performance based on diversity, the 
use of committees to complement corporate governance structure, changes in accounting standards 
and a risk management framework (FMA, 2014).  
ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations 
In Australia, the ASX Council established corporate governance principles and recommendations in 
2003 which were later revised in 2007 and 2010. The principles require the companies to clearly 
establish and disclose the roles of its board of directors and the management, and the basis for 
monitoring and evaluating their performance. The principles also recommend that the companies 
have a board of an “appropriate size, composition, skills and commitment”, who should act ethically 
and adhere to the code of conduct of the company. The companies are also recommended to follow 
rigorous processes for ensuring the reliability of financial reporting, and to provide timely and 
adequate disclosure of material information. The companies are also advised to provide adequate 
remuneration to their boards of directors and other executives so as to attract experienced and 
quality people (Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations, 2014). 
As discussed above, the ASX principles mainly provide guidance in relation to the board composition, 
and other governance practices, even though the principles do not relate to the behavioural aspects 
of corporate governance, but are based on the premises that corporate governance is a dynamic 
concept that is affected by the corporate culture prevalent in an organisation (Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations, 2014). 
Review of Corporate Governance Principles and Practices 
The principles and guidelines by various bodies given above mainly focus on the structural aspects of 
corporate governance. The recommendations in all the above primarily focus on improving the 
structural elements of the corporate governance process and highlight the need to improve board 
composition (to have board members from areas of wider experience), the use of board committees 
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with primary responsibility to the board (to improve operational efficiency), transparency in 
reporting and division of responsibility.  
There is hardly any mention of the decision making aspects of boards or related processes. Even 
though the revised versions of some of these principles accept the importance of behavioural aspects 
of corporate governance, there are no guidelines or recommendations to monitor/guide/analyse the 
actual behaviour or decision making processes. Keeping in mind the significance of board behaviour, 
“it is important to place as much emphasis on board behaviour as is placed on board structure if an 
overall system of corporate governance is to be attained” (Okoye, 2015). Sharpe (2011) and Plessis 
(2008) also criticise the regulatory reforms for their primary focus on board composition and 
structure, and for ignoring the processual  and behavioural aspects of corporate governance. On a 
similar note (Carver, 2007) states that the code of best practice fails to address the real governance 
issues. Marnet (2004) has also observed that the “conventional proposals to reform corporate 
governance through legislation, codes of best practice, and the like, are necessary, but 
underestimate the pressures which reputational intermediaries face from inevitable conflicts of 
interest and bias”. The author calls for an attention towards the behavioural components of 
corporate governance. 
These new reforms are also questioned by Leblanc and Gillies (2005, p. 23), who state that despite 
the increased regulations, large and established corporations have failed which indicates that the 
new reforms have not made a significant difference. According to the authors there is still a need to 
understand how boards actually take decisions (Leblanc & Gillies, 2005, p. 104). Steckler and Clark 
(2018) observe that the “regulations and other external mandates have come to be viewed as 
necessary pre-emptive or intervening functions of governance; however, these have proven 
insufficient for ensuring improvements in accountability, transparency, or ethical decision making”. 
Further, recent literature identifies issues such as “ceremonial adoption” of regulations as a symbolic 
gesture of compliance (Shi & Connelly, 2018). For example appointing someone with vested interest 
in the organisation as an independent director. When the firms adopt certain corporate governance 
practices in response to the pressure of regulations, there is  a possibility of decoupling prescriptive 
norms from actual operations (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Hambrick & Lovelace, 2018; Markóczy, Li 
Sun, Peng, Shi, & Ren, 2013), which according to Shi and Connelly (2018) is a symbolic management 
gesture similar to “ceremonial adoption”. It is a challenge to directly observe whether or not a 
certain practice is a ceremonial adoption. However, inferences can be drawn by observing the 
changes that result after the adoption of a certain practice or norm that can help identify if a practice 
is ceremonial Shi and Connelly (2018). According to Aguilera, Judge, and Terjesen (2018) 
organisations may deviate from corporate governance practices by underconforming or 
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overconforming governance practices. The authors state that the deviant behaviour is contingent on 
the regulatory environment (degree of consistency in monitoring, and the severity of punishment) 
and the corporate governance capacity (financial, human, moral and social capital) of the firm. The 
literature have addressed the contingencies related to the regulatory environment; however the 
concept of corporate governance capacity has not been duly addressed in context of human, moral 
and social capital. 
It can be concluded based on previous discussion that the behavioural perspective of corporate 
governance has been absent from most of the research on corporate governance, and that there is 
an increase in current research to further analyse and develop these practices. It has also been found 
that there is lack of an established behavioural model to study the behavioural perspectives. Since 
this research focused on behaviourally plausible decision centred perspectives on the role of 
corporate governance, it was essential to choose a fundamental basis/theory to pursue the research 
further. The following section provides further details on that. 
2.1.5 Behavioural Perspectives and Decision Paradigms 
Since the literature on corporate governance decision making is extensive (Huse et al., 2011), here 
the objective was to select a theoretical base to facilitate the analysis of corporate governance 
decision making through behavioural perspectives. In a significant research Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 
(1992) conducted an extensive literature review and identified three modes of organisational 
decision making that included Rationality and Bounded Rationality, Politics and Power and Garbage 
Can. The authors identified that there are cognitive limits that affect the rationality of decision 
makers who aim to reach a satisfactory decision rather than an optimum decision. In terms of Politics 
and Power the authors state that organisations consist of different people who have conflicting 
goals, and that the conflict is resolved through politics and power. The Garbage Can mode refers to 
the organisation as an ambiguous place with poorly defined decision preferences (Eisenhardt & 
Zbaracki, 1992). Similarly, Choo (2001) has identified four core modes of organisational decision 
making that include Bounded Rationality, Processes (clarity of strategic goals but not of procedures 
to attain them), Political, and Anarchic (lack of clarity on goals and procedures).  
Smallman and Moore (2010) conducted a review of decision making theory and have provided six 
paradigms. The first is the classical concept of prescriptive, analytical decision making, which states 
that decision makers collect and analyse information in order to select an optimal solution. However, 
there is a subjective expectation that affects the choice of an optimum solution. The second 
paradigm, which is more realistic than the first, is Bounded Rationality, which assumes constraints on 
rational decision making. According to the authors there is enough evidence to suggest that both 
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these paradigms fail to address the mediating process related to decision making. The third is the 
contingent or adaptive view of decision making that facilitates natural dynamics in problem solving. 
The Political paradigm refers to the role of power and politics in resolving issues among the members 
of the organisation. The fifth paradigm represents the pragmatic aspect of decision making that 
attaches great significance to the context of decision making. Naturalistic decision making is the sixth 
paradigm which relates to the study of real decision situations, mainly in highly risky and volatile 
environments (Smallman & Moore, 2010). 
The literature presented a wide range of theories to choose from. Here the selection was guided by 
the primary aim of this research, which is to provide a behaviourally plausible decision centred 
perspective of corporate governance. Analysis of the different theoretical bases identified by 
Smallman and Moore (2010), Choo (2001), and Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992) made it apparent that 
A Behavioral Theory of the Firm is the appropriate choice. The choice was further confirmed by Ees et 
al. (2009), who state that most of the decision making concepts used to capture the behavioural 
dynamics of boardroom can be traced back to the pioneer work of Cyert and March- A Behavioral 
Theory of the Firm, which was first published in 1963. According to Luoma (2016), the distinctiveness 
of A Behavioral Theory of the Firm lies in its behavioural realism that links the decision model closely 
to empirical observations. Earlier, Huber and McDaniel (1986)  stated that the Carnegie School led 
the field of organisational decision making, and its pioneer work A Behavioral Theory of the Firm is 
used as the basis of many process oriented studies. Similarly, Greve (2015) notes that there is an 
increase in the use of A Behavioral Theory of the Firm as a  theoretical foundation while some other 
theories are losing prominence in the field of decision making. Huse et al. (2011) further support the 
selection of A Behavioral Theory of the Firm for the purpose of this research. They refer to the theory 
as a natural starting point for exploring the behavioural aspects of corporate governance. The 
following section discusses the theoretical significance of the theory, which further affirms the choice 
of the theory for this research. 
Theoretical Legacy of A Behavioral Theory of the Firm 
A Behavioral Theory of the Firm has greatly influenced modern research on decision making (Gavetti, 
Greve, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2012). On 09 November 2016, a search on Google Scholar provided 
22,380 citations for A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, which indicate the influence the theory has on 
decision making research. Moreover, in 2007, a well-recognised journal, Organization Science 
(Volume 18 -3), published a special issue dedicated to this contribution by Cyert and March. A 
Behavioral Theory of the Firm was originally published in 1963, and according to Argote and Greve 
(2007) is one of the most influential management books of all time, which has “inspired and 
legitimated new approaches for studying organizations; become a foundational element of 
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organisational studies in management, economics, political science, and sociology”. However, the 
particular influence of this theory is on evolutionary economics and organisational learning (Argote & 
Greve, 2007; Gavetti et al., 2012). 
However Argote and Greve (2007) note that the book has not generated a theory in terms of “a 
consistent set of defined concepts and assumptions” and derived causal predictions. It has resulted 
in many different theories that are derived on the basis of different assumptions and predictions. It 
could be that Cyert and March predicted this outcome and have named it A (not "The") Behavioural 
Theory of the Firm (Argote & Greve, 2007).  
The theory has inspired and influenced several diverse research traditions that are quite different 
from the original theory. However, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm has offered a common ground 
that connects the foundations of the theories that followed it.  In a way, “the book has been essential 
for developing a field where diversity coexists with a fruitful dialogue between perspectives” and  
“these conditions have helped the field of organizational science to make rapid progress” (Argote & 
Greve, 2007). However, Gavetti, Levinthal, and Ocasio (2007) state that the research that followed 
the Carnegie tradition has shifted away from the organisational level of analysis and decision making 
with most focusing on the organisational environment, organisational learning, adaptation and 
change. 
A Behavioral Theory of the Firm has focused on four research commitments that are quite relevant 
and important for the current research. These include “1. Focus on a small number of key economic 
decisions made by the firm …………. 2. Develop process-oriented models of the firm ……. 3. Link 
models of the firm as closely as possible to empirical observations …... 4. Develop a theory with 
generality beyond the specific firms studied”. The first and fourth commitments of the theory are 
closely related to economics, but the second and third have become milestones in studying 
organisational behaviour, and are common conventions in the field of organisation research (Argote 
& Greve, 2007). On the other hand Gavetti et al. (2007) have identified four theoretical pillars of the 
Carnegie School, that include Bounded Rationality, Specialised Decision making- Structures, 
Conflicting Interest and Cooperation and Routine Based Behaviour and Learning. Out of the four 
pillars, bounded rationality has a significant impact on the following research (Gavetti et al., 2007). 
The Attention-based view to organisational decision making also links back to A Behavioral Theory of 
the Firm and the underlying concept of bounded rationality. Ocasio (1997) defines attention as 
noticing, encoding, interpreting, and focusing of time and efforts by the decision makers in terms of 
the problems and solutions. According to the Attention-based view, the attention of the decision 
maker is a critical element of the information processing ability of the organisations (Joseph & 
Wilson, 2017; Ocasio, Laamanen, & Vaara, 2018).  
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A Behavioral Theory of the Firm has theoretically influenced many theories (Argote & Greve, 2007; 
Gavetti et al., 2007); however the main legacy of the book is that these “theoretical advances have 
found their way into the foundation of many other theories, where they have been combined with 
new concepts and mechanisms to produce new theory”. In a way, the theory has resulted in a chain 
of research commitments and contributions. However, the theory’s weakness lies in the quantitative 
testing of the main propositions of the theory, probably due to the lack of rigorous testing methods 
at that time. Though the propositions related to the theory were not tested rigorously, the book was 
ahead of its times in terms of its contributions (Argote & Greve, 2007). 
Gavetti et al. (2007), took a broader perspective and conducted a review of the Carnegie School. 
They state that “the School's creation of a constellation of closely related ideas rather than a narrow 
paradigm with strong closure properties has certainly helped it to flower and spread”. But the 
influence of the School has been broad rather than deep, and many researchers have selectively paid 
attention to some of the aspects while ignoring others. However, they note that the School still plays 
an influential role in current research though in selective and fragmented forms (Gavetti et al., 2007). 
Gavetti et al. (2012) assessed A Behavioral Theory of the Firm in the current context and stated that, 
although much of the theory proposed in 1963 is still relevant today, some original foundations of 
the theory have been revised in terms of current developments. The first shift is from standard 
operating procedures to routines, where the researchers are focusing on habitual actions rather than 
standard operating procedures based on bounded rationality. The second change is from 
expectations to representations, as decision choices are not only perceived as a reaction to short-run 
feedback, but rather, some important decisions could be the result of deliberate attempts on the 
part of the organisation to anticipate the future. The third is related to performance feedback, which 
refers to the concept of a Problemistic search. The basic proposition of A Behavioral Theory of the 
Firm was that performance below aspiration levels results in a search for solutions. Current research 
validates this concept but also observes that the rate of change in the organisation will depend on 
whether the performance is below or above the aspired levels (relative performance). It also relates 
organisational change to its problems, which provides a broader foundation to research on 
organisational learning and adaptation (Gavetti et al., 2012).  
According to Kim and Rhee (2017), relative performance is a behavioural consequence and is relative 
to a reference point. They further state that the structural position of the decision makers is the key 
factor affecting divergent behaviour. Further, according to Kacperczyk, Beckman, and Moliterno 
(2015) A Behavioral Theory of the Firm relates to the organisational problems/concerns, and does not 
address the individual level problems/concerns. According to the authors, organisational change is 
the outcome of organisational problems/concerns, whereas risk arises as the outcome of individual 
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concerns. There is a need to study the role of individual determinates of risk in context to the 
organisational determinants of risk (Kacperczyk et al., 2015). 
It has also been observed that the proposition that an organisation is a political coalition has not 
developed into a separate distinctive theory, but has influenced the research in the field of 
organisation strategy and circulation of power, with a major focus on inter relationships. In terms of 
learning and adaptation A Behavioral Theory of the Firm focused on adaptation in attention rules and 
adaptation in search rules, whereas of late learning from the external environment has been 
considered a significant factor (Gavetti et al., 2012). 
A Behavioral Theory of the Firm - The Carnegie School  
The Carnegie School belongs to the Carnegie Mellon University where the leading contributors 
worked during the initial research on behavioural theory (Luoma, 2016).  A Behavioral Theory of the 
Firm is one of the prime contributions of this school. The theory assumes “ the firm as its basic unit,… 
the prediction of firm behaviour with respect to such decisions as price, output, and resource 
allocation as its objective, and … and explicit emphasis on the actual process of organizational 
decision making as its basic research commitment” (Cyert & March, 2001, p. 19). 
The theory does not assume a single, universal goal, and emphasises that objectives and goals vary 
within the same organisation. For instance, the goal of one individual may be different from another 
in the same way as the goal of one department or sub unit may not be same as the other one. 
Organisational goals change with the entry or exit of a coalition member. The aspiration level, which 
is the function of past performance, also affects the organisational goals. The theory states that 
variation and conflict among the goals leads to bargaining among the members, which results in 
formation of the goals of the organisation. The limited bargaining power of the individuals affects the 
bargaining process, however, past bargaining experience forms the ground for the present situations. 
The goals/demand of individual members may change with experience and time. The availability of 
resources also plays a significant role. If the resources are adequate to meet the demands of all the 
members, the coalition functions feasibly (Cyert & March, 2001).  
Since the organisation as a coalition of members faces a series of member driven goals, it needs to 
allocate resources, the decision for which depends on the availability of information and internal 
expectations of the organisation. In its search for information the organisation does not focus on 
consistency or completeness of information, and no constant rules of search are followed. The 
search for information is mainly driven by situations where existing decisions do not fit. The search 
for information is unsystematic, bounded and driven by problems. In most cases a firm’s 
commitment to an action occurs in the very early stages of the search. The decision making is biased 
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due to the bias in organisational expectations and communication processes. The members of the 
coalition may alter their communication priorities in view of the consequences attached to that piece 
of information (Cyert & March, 2001). 
The theory states that decision choices and control are affected by the sequential consideration of 
alternatives, where the first suitable alternative is accepted and the search is abandoned. Only if a 
selected alternative fails to deliver the expected results is a new search is started. To deal with 
uncertainty, an organisation responds and reacts to the feedback and does not indulge in forecasting 
the environment. Organisations induce stability by using standard operating procedures and simple 
rules that are based on the past experiences (Cyert & March, 2001).  
A Behavioral Theory of the Firm is based on four relational concepts, which represent the four sub-
processes of decision making. The following Figure presents and illustrates these concepts. 




























The above figure presents the interaction and connectivity among the four sub processes of 
organisational decision making. However, it does not present the behavioural consequences of these 
sub processes. The following section discusses the four sub-processes in detail. 
1. Quasi resolution of conflict:  Similarly, to other organisational theories, A Behavioral Theory 
of the Firm assumes that an organisation is a coalition of members who have different goals. 
The difference in goals leads to conflict among members and organisations are required to 
adopt some procedures to resolve that conflict. However, the procedures will not result in a 
common goal of the organisation. The theory takes goals as independent constraints 
imposed by the members of the organisation and the conflict is resolved through local 
rationality, acceptable-level decision rules, and sequential attention to goals. The concept of 
local rationality assumes that individual members/subunits deal with a limited set of 
problems and goals. Acceptable-level decision rules and sequential attention to goals bring 
consistency to decision making (Cyert & March, 2001, pp. 164-166).   
2. Uncertainty avoidance: Uncertainty is an integral part of organisational decision making. 
Organisations have no choice but to sustain the uncertainty arising out of various 
environmental factors. This has greatly influenced decision making theory, which mainly 
focuses on problems and issues related to uncertainty and risk. According to A Behavioral 
Theory of the Firm, organisations do not design strategies to deal with uncertainty but rather 
they avoid uncertainty. Organisations prefer to focus on short-run feedback rather than 
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anticipating the long run consequences. Organisations also negotiate with the external 
environment to avoid uncertain situations. The basic approach is to adapt Feedback-react 
decision rules, where a problem is resolved as it arises, thereby solving the problems in a 
series (Cyert & March, 2001, pp. 166-168). 
3. Problemistic search: The search for a solution to the problem is driven by the problem itself. 
It is different from a search from random curiosity and for developing an understanding but 
is motivated by a problem which arises when the organisation fails or expects to fail in 
achieving its goals. The search continues till a solution is found for the problem. The solution 
could be in the form of an alternative to achieve the goals, or sometimes the goals are 
revised to match the available alternative. However, the search is simple minded and carried 
out in the neighbourhood of the current problem or existing alternative. There is bias in the 
search which arises from differences in training, experience, expectations and information 
access (communication bias) within the organisation (Cyert & March, 2001, pp. 169-171). The 
problemistic search by the organisation is related to the problems faced by the organisations 
and the related solution. According to the Attention-based view, decision makers could be 
selective/biased in terms of their attention structure and pay specialised attention to certain 
aspects (Joseph & Wilson, 2017). The work cited by Hallen and Pahnke (2016) and Van 
Knippenberg, Dahlander, Haas, and George (2015) supports that the information search by 
the decision makers is limited in terms of their ability to access, attend and process 
information or economising of efforts due to large number of decisions.  
4. Organizational learning: Similarly, to the individual, organisations learn and adapt their 
behaviour time. The adaptation happens in three different phases that include adaptation of 
goals, adaptation in attention rules, and adaptation in search rules. Organisation goals are in 
the form of aspiration levels which change with the experience of the organisation or that of 
similar organisations. With time, organisations also learn to pay attention to some parts of 
the environment and ignore other parts. Since the search is problem oriented, it is assumed 
that search rules also change with time. The experiences of an organisation will alter the way 
it searches for solutions, or will change the order in which various solutions to a problem are 
considered (Cyert & March, 2001, pp. 171-174). According to Hu, He, Blettner, and Bettis 
(2017),and (Nason, Bacq, & Gras, 2018) the adaptation and learning from feedback is based 
on economic/historic references and/or social references.  
Values as Drivers of Behaviour 
The previous sections have established the need for further research into the behavioural aspects of 
corporate governance. This section aims to further explore and narrow down the concept of 
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behaviour for the purpose of this research. Different studies have linked decision making behaviour 
to different factors. For example, a review of literature by (Harrison & Murray, 2012) indicates that 
personal qualities of the leader affect his decision behaviour, whereas Minichilli et al. (2007) relate  
board room decision making to the culture, trust and emotions of the decision makers. Lipman-
Blueman (2005, pp. 21-22) relates the destructive behaviour (with conscious or unconscious 
engagement) of top leaders to dysfunctional personal characteristics. Research by Erickson, Shaw, 
and Agabe (2007) relates the decision making behaviours to the ethics and competencies of leaders.  
What all the above researchers seem to follow is the Trait Approach that relates effective leadership 
to the personal characteristics and abilities of the leader. The Trait Approach provides that effective 
and successful leaders possess certain traits; however, possession of those traits does not necessarily 
lead to effective leadership (Erickson et al., 2007). While the Trait Approach relates decision 
behaviour to the inner self of the decision maker, the Contingency Approach suggests that leadership 
behaviour is a function of context and situations (Fiedler, 1972). On the basis of the empirical 
literature review of decision making literature, Ford and Richardson (1994) recognise the above two 
as the basic approaches to studying decision behaviours. They divide the variables affecting decision 
behaviour into individual factors (traits) and situational factors (context). This research is based on 
the individual factor approach as it explores the behavioural perspectives related to individual 
decision makers. The objective here is to analyse the factors associated with the decision makers, as 
context has an external locus of control. 
In terms of individual factors, a growing body of literature considers the values of the decision maker 
to be an important factor to study decision behaviour (Ford & Richardson, 1994; Fritzsche & Oz, 
2007; Groot & Steg, 2008; Hemingway & Maclagan, 2004; Mumford, Helton, Decker, Connelly, & Van 
Doorn, 2003; Reed, Vidaver-Cohen, & Colwell, 2011; Rohan, 2000; Schwartz, 2016; Tagiuri, 1965). 
According to Suar and Khuntia (2010), values are an intrinsic determinant of human behaviour and 
are the “prime driver of personal, social and professional choices”. As per Groot and Steg (2008) 
values play a significant role in shaping behaviour. On a similar note, Guth and Tagiuri (1965), state 
that “consciously or unconsciously, personal values are one of the determinants of the manager’s 
concept of what his company’s strategy ought to be”. Similarly, values are considered to influence 
people in their perception and interpretation of decision situations, thereby affecting their decisions, 
choices and behaviours (Gandal, Roccas, Sagiv, & Wrzesniewski, 2005). According to Licht (2001) 
values guide the selection or evaluation of behaviour, people, and events. 
For Schwartz (2009) and Schwartz (1992), values are the beliefs about desirable goals, that transcend 
specific actions and situations, serve as a standard and vary in relative importance. According to 
Rokeach (1973, p. 5), “A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end state of 
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existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state 
of existence”.  Both Schwartz and Rokeach define values as beliefs that are related to desirable goals 
and act as evaluating standards. Values are also considered to be a “conception of the desirable 
which orient toward action” (Bengtson & Lovejoy, 1973), and as a “permanent perceptual framework 
which shapes and influences the general nature of an individual’s behaviour” (England, 1967).  
Considering the above literature, this research assumes values to be the drivers of behaviour. For the 
purpose of this research values are defined as the conception of the desirable, on the basis of which 
selection from available alternatives is made. The choice of values as the drivers of behaviour is 
justified by Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, and Knafo (2002) as they state that “ traits describe what people 
are like rather than the intentions behind their behaviour. Values refer to what people consider 
important, the goals they wish to pursue”. 
2.2 Corporate Failure 
2.2.1 Defining Corporate Failure 
This section aims to define the concept of corporate failure. According to Mellahi and Wilinson 
(2004) there is lack of consensus in the literature on defining corporate failure (Cohen et al., 2010). 
Amankwah-Amoah (2016) defines corporate failure as discontinuance of a business or its ownership. 
It is also referred to as “a stage when an organisation ceases operation, loses its corporate identity, 
loses the capacity to govern itself” (Hager, Galaskiewicz, Bielefeld, & Pins, 1996). Marks and 
Vansteenkiste (2008) also consider ccorporate failure as an absolute end of an organisation but they 
provide a broader opinion on that. They state that corporate failure is “when an entire company goes 
out of business or a plant, office, or other unit is closed. Second is the effective end of an 
organization’s activities, community, and culture when an entity is acquired by and integrated into 
another firm or when a department or business unit is dissolved through an internal restructuring” 
(Marks & Vansteenkiste, 2008). 
On the other hand, some authors do not consider failure to be the end of an organisation. For 
example,  Mellahi and Wilkinson (2010) propose that “an organization fails when its ability to 
compete deteriorates as a consequence of actual or anticipated performance below a critical 
threshold that threatens its viability”. Where Amankwah-Amoah (2016) consider failure as an 
absolute end of an organisation,  Mellahi and Wilkinson (2010) propose that an organisation may 
continue with a failing performance. However Anheier (1999, p. 276) recognise that corporate failure 
can fall into any of these categories, and states that organisational failure “can be the absolute end, 
or dissolution, of a firm. However, it can also lead to persistently low performance or profound 
reorganisation”. The author further states that the literature classifies corporate failure into two 
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types: Transformation and Closure. Transformation refers to merger, loss of independent control, 
and change of ownership. Closure denotes bankruptcy, and loss of corporate charter (Anheier, 1999, 
p. 276).  
On the other side Gillespie and Dietz (2009) define corporate failure as “a single major incident, or 
cumulative series of incidents, resulting from the action (or inaction) of organizational agents that 
threatens the legitimacy of the organization and has the potential to harm the well-being of one or 
more of the organization's stakeholders”. In defining corporate failure Gillespie and Dietz (2009) 
assume that corporate failure has an internal locus of control even though external factors and the 
environment may form the context. 
For the purpose of this research corporate failure is considered to be the end of the organisation in 
the form of liquidation (not voluntary) or bankruptcy. The research aimed to analyse what Lane 
(2016) termed an “Unexpected failure”. Hence it analysed the failure of companies, which were 
supposed to be performing well (in disclosure statements) and whose end was largely unexpected in 
the years preceding failure. The research also assumed failure as a series of incidents, with an 
internal locus of control (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009). The concept of an inner locus of control, which is 
called an inner context by Pye and Pettigrew (2005), is also supported by Huse (2005) who considers 
corporate governance decision makers to be an important aspect of corporate governance.  
2.2.2 Corporate Failure Research - Trends and Perspectives 
Corporate failures over the last two decades have motivated many researchers to analyse corporate 
failures. For example, in June 2005, the renowned journal, Long Range Planning (Volume 38 - 3) 
published a special issue focusing on organisational failure. The central theme was to look into the 
causes and processes of organizational failures and the learning from failures. This was followed by a 
special issue of Group and Organisation Management (Volume 35-5), which was published in 2010. 
The central theme of this issue was managing and coping with organisation failure. 
According to Mellahi and Wilkinson (2010), there has been a call for more research in the field of 
corporate failures by scholars from various disciplines such as business management, strategic 
management, business history, economics, and political science and law. On a similar note Hamilton 
(2006), states that most of the organisational research analyses the birth and growth of 
organisations, whereas the decline and death of organisations are less explored aspects.  
Amankwah-Amoah (2016) states that research on corporate failures is categorised between 
deterministic and voluntarist perspectives. The deterministic perspective assumes that managers and 
leaders are powerless and have no control over the impact of a changing environment. The 
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voluntaristic perspective, driven from organisation psychology literature, assumes that organisational 
failure is fundamentally related to the actions/inactions and perceptions of the managers 
(Amankwah-Amoah, 2016). Similarly, Mellahi, Jackson, and Sparks (2002), provided the Industrial 
Organisation perspective and the Organisational Studies perspective. The Industrial Organisation 
perspective, similarly to the deterministic perspective, considers managers of failing organisation to 
be the victims of the external environment with no control over that. This perspective states that 
organisation failure does not necessarily mean ineffective or inefficient management. Whereas, 
according to the Organisational Studies perspective, failure has an internal locus of control, and is 
related to the ineffective management (Mellahi et al., 2002). This research has analysed corporate 
failures from the voluntaristic perspective through a behavioural lens, with a focus on decision 
makers. 
2.2.3 Corporate Failure - Theoretical Perspective 
Pioneer work by Shrivastava, Mitroff, Miller, and Miclani (1988) has provided a model of industrial 
crisis (failure) that depicts the stages in corporate failure. The model assumes that an organisational 
crisis is triggered by specific events that can be identified according to place, time and participants. 
These specific events are termed triggering events and are preceded by warning signals (Shrivastava 
et al., 1988). If the warnings are not duly addressed during the incubation period (Turner, 1976), they 
lead to failure. The failure results in extensive damage, and with time, affected stakeholders recover 
from the crisis. However, the recovery does not necessarily imply elimination of the causes of failure. 
Turner (1976), presents six stages of corporate failure, which he termed failure of foresight. Stage 
one is notionally the normal stage where set rules and norms are adhered to. The second stage is the 
incubation stage, during which issues/events at odds with established rules and norms go unnoticed 
and accumulate. In the third stage, a precipitating event attracts attention due to its immediate 
effect. The precipitating event leads to stage four which comprises the onset of unanticipated 
consequences. In stage five actions are taken to resolve the immediate effects of the event, and in 
stage six rules, norms, beliefs are adjusted as per the newly learned experience of failure (Turner, 
1976). 
The model of corporate failure by Weitzel and Jonsson (1989) consists of five stages. In the first stage 
the organization is blind to the early signs of failure. In the second stage the organisation, though it 
recognises the need for change, fails to act. An action is taken in the third stage but the action is not 
a suitable option for the existing problem, which leads to the fourth stage of crisis, followed by the 
fifth stage of dissolution (Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989). The models proposed by Turner (1976), 
Shrivastava et al. (1988), and Weitzel and Jonsson (1989), although they vary in terms of the stages 
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of failures, all agree that signs of failure exist in the very early stages (Drennan, 2004), which when 
ignored trigger failure. 
A similar model was proposed by Stead and Smallman (1999), on the basis of the synthesis of 
corporate failure literature. According to the authors, corporate failure has five stages which include 
Pre-conditions, Trigger, Crisis, Recovery, and Learning. In the first stage of Pre-conditions, there exist 
established beliefs, precautionary norms, and a regulatory framework. Pre-conditions may arise out 
of an accumulated unnoticed set of events that are at odds with the established beliefs and norms 
about the problems and related measures (Stead & Smallman, 1999). According to Turner (1976), 
factors such as rigidities in institutional beliefs, decoy phenomena, neglecting outside complaints, 
information handling issues, failure to comply with relevant regulations, and rejection of emergent 
danger lead to pre-conditions to failure. Trigger is the ‘precipitating event’ (Turner, 1976) which is 
identifiable according to place, time and participants (Shrivastava et al., 1988). The triggering event is 
difficult to ignore but it often follows warning signals. The Crisis event follows the trigger, and 
represents the onset of the crisis, which will bring direct and indirect, anticipated and unanticipated 
consequences (Stead & Smallman, 1999). These consequences result in extensive damage 
(Shrivastava et al., 1988). After the crisis, the organisations try to limit the effects of the crisis in the 
recovery stage, so as to control the damage. Some initial adjustments are made for immediate 
rescue. The last stage of learning refers to the steps taken to avoid a further occurrence of similar 
events, leading to a shift in the beliefs of the organisation and precautionary norms. The above 
details on the models of corporate failure establish that corporate failure originates from pre-
conditions or early warning signals that are often ignored by the failing organisations. This calls for 
further research in this context and this research is going to analyse corporate failures from the 
perspective of pre-conditions. 
2.3 Research Gap and Chapter Summary 
The chapter reviewed literature related to corporate governance and corporate failures, with 
additional focus on the decision making and behavioural aspects. In doing so, the chapter presented 
the rationale for using A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, to study the decision paradigm. Additionally, 
the chapter also presented Values as the drivers of behaviour.  
The literature review has established that there is a gap in the present research in terms of the 
behavioural perspective on corporate governance (intervening processes), which is an evolving 
concept and is under explored. Moreover, literature also establishes that the response to corporate 
failures, in terms of theoretical and regulatory developments, lacks behavioural explanations, despite 
the evidence of the significance of behavioural elements. This calls for further research and is one of 
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the areas to which this research aims to contribute. The thesis addresses this gap as it focuses on the 
behavioural aspects of corporate governance decision making in the context of corporate failures.  
Overall, the thesis addresses the following: 
“What is the role of corporate governance in corporate failures? Does poor 
corporate governance lead to corporate failures? If so how?”   
 To answer the above, and based on the literature review, this research aims to analyse the data 
related to corporate failures from the perspectives of corporate governance functions (inputs), 
decision processes and value orientation. Chapter 3 explains the method employed in this thesis to 




The objective of this chapter is to provide an understanding of the research methods used by the 
researcher for the purpose of this research. Thereby, Section 3.1 provides the rationale for using 
qualitative research methods and justifies the adoption of the case study as the research strategy. 
The section also informs about the process of the selection of the sample cases (primary unit of 
analysis), with further details on the selection of the secondary unit of analysis. Section 3.2 provides 
details on data collection (including the justification for using secondary data) and Section 3.3 details 
the data analysis process. Additional details on data analysis are also provided in Chapter 6 so as to 
support the understanding of the findings. The last section of the chapter addresses the issue of 
reliability and validity. 
3.1 Qualitative Approach 
This research has adopted a qualitative approach to explore the role of corporate governance in 
corporate failures.  It has been addressed in previous chapters that corporate governance research 
has been dominated by quantitative methods with little focus on board behaviour. This study uses a 
qualitative approach to present A behaviourally plausible decision centred perspective on the role of 
corporate governance in corporate failures. According to Levaru and Berghe, qualitative research is 
not only most suitable to look into the complex board behaviour issues, but it is advocated to 
“counter balance” the quantitative techniques usually used in board research (Levrau & Berghe, 
2013).  
A qualitative approach is an effective method for conducting social research and humanistic studies 
(Creswell, 2003; Robson & McCartan, 2016, p. 18). This research aims to explore the behavioural 
aspects of corporate governance decision making. Corporate governance is a social process (Letza et 
al., 2008), so a qualitative research approach was considered suitable.  
Qualitative research facilitates explanatory inferences (Creswell, 2003; Huberman & Miles, 2002). It 
allows issues and ideas to emerge and does not suggest or indicate anything in advance (Creswell, 
2003). Since this research focused on the lack of research regarding the behavioural aspects of 
corporate governance, it was appropriate to use a qualitative approach to explore these behavioural 
aspects. It was anticipated that new realities may emerge during data collection that may require 
changes in the research questions (Creswell, 2003). 
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3.1.1 Case Study Method 
“Building theory from case studies is a research strategy that involves using one or more cases to 
create theoretical constructs, propositions and/or midrange theory from case-based, empirical 
evidence”  (Eisenhardt, 1989b). A case study is a suitable research strategy in studying a complex 
social phenomenon and contemporary issues  (with no control over behavioural events) in depth 
(Yin, 2009, pp. 4, 18). Work by Eisenhardt (1989b), Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007), and (Yin, 2009)  
establishes the importance and strengths of the case study method. According to Eisenhardt (1989b) 
case study research is “particularly well-suited to new research areas or research areas for which 
existing theory seems inadequate”. One of the unique strengths of the case study is that it can 
consider a full variety of evidence including documents, artefacts, interviews, observations etc. (Yin, 
2009, p. 11). The case study has been the appropriate strategy for this research as a variety of 
documented sources including newspaper articles, journal articles, legal proceedings, court 
documents, books, public enquiry reports, and media reports have been used.  
According to Yin (2009, pp. 8-9) a case study is suitable for research studies that focus on research 
questions consisting of “what” (exploratory nature only), “how” and “why”  components. A case 
study also offers valuable “insights into the nature of the phenomenon” (Easton, 2010). This indicates 
the appropriateness of a case study strategy for this research, which aims to explore the behavioural 
aspects of corporate governance decision making. On a further note, a case study is also a  suitable 
approach to study complex board processes (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). 
Selection of Cases (Sample) 
The selection of the case study organisations was a critical element in the research proposal for this 
study. There were two issues to decide on, firstly the approach to select the case study organisations 
(sample) and secondly the number of case organisations.  
Random sampling has been widely used in research, owing to its ability to generalise the results back 
to the population. This random sampling technique was not deemed suitable (Eisenhardt, 1989b) for 
this study because “studying a random sample provides the best opportunity to generalise the results 
to the population but is not the most effective way of developing an understanding of complex issues 
relating to human behavior” (Marshall, 1996). According to Marshall, qualitative studies can be based 
on a convenience sample, a judgement/purposeful sample or a theoretical sample. Though an 
element of convenience is present in most of the qualitative research, the author recommends the 
use of other thoughtful sampling techniques. Therefore, for the purpose of this research, the first 
consideration was to make a selection between a judgement/purposeful sample and a theoretical 
sample. A theoretical sample was not relevant to the research, owing to the lack of research/theory 
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to explain the selected phenomenon. However, a purposeful sample was found to be the appropriate 
choice, as it allowed selection of a sample that could potentially answer the research questions 
(Marshall, 1996). 
The first judgement criteria were the availability of and access to data. The study of board processes 
such as decision-making posits a big challenge, especially due to the availability and accessibility of 
data (Mellahi, 2005). It was necessary to make a purposeful selection to ensure that there was no 
dearth of data. The Enron Corporation was selected as the first case study because of the availability 
and quantity of data. Enron was a US-based multinational company that went bankrupt in 2001. It 
was once considered the most innovative and successful company in America, winning awards and 
accolades before going  bankrupt (Downes & Russ, 2005). Post-failure Enron was subjected to many 
public inquiries and court cases and commentary. Any public inquiry into the failure of an 
organisation is an important source of information, which compensates for the lack of direct access 
to boardroom data (Mellahi, 2005). Enron’s story has been covered in detail by many newspapers, 
magazines, research journals and books. Many of these publications used first-hand details from the 
people closely associated with Enron. Thus the purposeful selection of Enron ensured that sufficient 
data was available to provide compelling and detailed insights into the “chosen phenomenon” 
(Collins, Onwuegbuzie, & Jiao, 2006, p. 230; Patton, 2015). 
Moreover, the failure of Enron has been studied from different angles (other than behavioural) such 
as quantitative/financial factors, board composition etc. This provided an opportunity to fill a 
research gap to study the failure of Enron from a new (behavioural and qualitative) perspective.  
The second issue regarding case selection was the number of cases to be studied. This decision was 
important for the external validity of the research findings. To validate the findings of the study, 
replication logic was used (Rowley, 2002; Yin, 2009). The study adopted a replication approach with 
multiple case studies where “each individual case study consisted of a “whole” study, in which 
convergent evidence was sought regarding the facts and conclusions of the case; each case’s 
conclusions were then considered to be the information needing replication by another case” (Yin, 
2009). Following the advice of Rowley (2002); Yin (2009, p. 61) this research uses the findings from 
two case organisations. 
The second case organisation selected for the purpose of this research was Nathans Finance Ltd. 
Nathans was formed in July 2001 as a wholly owned subsidiary of a vending technology company - 
VTL Limited. The company went bankrupt in 2007 (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: 
Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011). Nathans was carefully selected to facilitate the application of 
replication logic and presented an opportunity for possible contrasting replication (Yin, 2009, p. 54) 
as it was a smaller company compared to Enron. Also, a preliminary research related to Nathans 
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indicated the possibility of literal replication (based on similarity) (Yin, 2009, p. 54). In terms of data, 
Nathans’s failure is documented in terms of newspaper articles, magazine articles, and public 
inquiries.  
Secondary Unit of Analysis  
The primary units of analysis (for each case) is derived from the research questions and the 
secondary unit of analysis (for each case) is an embedded unit (Yin, 2009, pp. 29,30,146). The primary 
unit of analysis, in this research, is the case study organisations (Enron and Nathans). To explore the 
behavioural aspects of the decision making, a secondary unit of analysis was also selected for both 
the cases. Kenneth Lay (Enron) and Kenneth Roger Moses (Nathans) are the secondary units of 
analysis for the purpose of this research. The selection of secondary units of analysis is based on the 
significance of the position held by the person. Since the selected secondary units played a 
prominent role in the relevant organisations, they were widely covered in terms of court/judicial 
inquiries and news, thus ensuring the availability of sufficient data. A text search query in NVivo 
further confirmed the suitability of Lay and Moses as the secondary units of analysis. It is important 
to note that this study uses NVivo for the analysis, details of which are provided in the coming 
sections. 
3.2 Data collection  
For the purpose of this research secondary data from multiple sources has been used. As discussed 
earlier, the availability of data has been one of the important considerations in terms of purposeful 
sampling for this research. Moreover, it was essential to ensure the availability of multiple sources of 
information to facilitate triangulation of data, which adds to the reliability of the findings (Mellahi, 
2005). Archival data from multiple sources were collected for the purpose of this study. Archival data 
are a rich source of information about the organisations (Patton, 2015, p. 293).The researcher was 
also able to gain access to the interviews (post failure) of Lay and Moses (secondary units of 
analysis).  
One of the major concerns with secondary data sources such as newspaper and journal articles is the 
subjective inclusion of information by the writers of that source of data. This may affect the validity 
of the findings. However, the use of multiple sources of information facilitated the cross checking of 
data thus adding to the accuracy of data. Further, since secondary data provide “unobtrusive access 
when examining sensitive situations, and may reduce distortion due to imperfect recall and social 
desirability bias” (Harris, 2001), use of secondary data to explore the behavioural aspects of 
corporate governance decision making was considered appropriate.  
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3.3 Data Analysis 
The objective of this study was to investigate the role of behavioural aspects in corporate governance 
failures, by using a qualitative methodology. The primary research questions this study focused on 
were “What is the role of corporate governance in corporate failures? Does poor corporate 
governance lead to corporate failures? If so how?”  The study aimed to analyse and explore the 
relationship between corporate governance and corporate failures through a behavioural lens. In 
order to gain insight into the behavioural aspects of corporate governance decisions, this study 
considered the decision maker as the secondary unit of analysis, along with the primary unit of 
analysis (the case study organisation).  
The study made a critical analysis of existing corporate governance and corporate failure literature.  
The research followed the best methods and practices in the development of process studies of 
organisation and management (Ven, 2007; Ven & Poole, 2005) based on the development of case 
studies of organisational failure (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Eisenhardt, 1991; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; 
Yin, 1994). 
3.3.1 Use of NVivo 
The study used a qualitative software NVivo for analysing the data. Initially NVivo 9 was used, but 
later on the data was transferred to NVivo 10, which eventually was transferred to NVivo 11, as each 
new version of NVivo provided better features, especially in terms of coding the data from pdf files. 
NVivo has been recommended for qualitative studies (Bazeley, 2007, pp. 2-3) as it helps in managing 
the data and keeps records of messy overload of data that is used for a qualitative project. Secondly 
it helps in managing the ideas. It helps in organising the conceptual and theoretical knowledge, while 
providing ready access to the context of the data. Thirdly its query feature helps in retrieving all the 
relevant information that is needed to answer a specific question. Furthermore it also allows 
graphical modelling and reporting of the data. 
This study found NVivo very useful in organisation and quick retrieval of data from a long list of 
sources which included journal and newspaper articles, court proceedings and judgements, annual 
reports, and books. The software was immensely useful in analysing data from all the sources, except 
the books which were not available in electronic form. However, inserts from the books were 
manually uploaded into the software as and when needed. The use of Query feature of NVivo not 
only helped in triangulation of data, but also to a large extent helped in avoiding researcher’s bias. 
The thesis provides further details on use of NVivo as and where relevant, in the coming chapters. 
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3.3.2 The Process of Data Analysis 
After uploading the initial set of data into NVivo, the researcher started preparing narratives of the 
case organisations. Here the basic approach was to follow the advice of Huberman and Miles (2002, 
p. 57) to read and re-read the data and to look for recurring topics/themes. Once identifiable 
recurring topics were selected, they were named (coded) in NVivo.  
This was the primary stage in the analysis and is termed as first phase of coding. Here, the researcher 
used an inductive approach  (Corbin & Strauss, 2015, pp. 220-237), and did not have a list of codes to 
start with. Initial data were collected and coded as per the inductive approach. The consideration 
here was to code the recurring and important aspects related to the case study organisations so as to 
develop an initial understanding about the organisations. This phase of coding required further data 
collection as gaps were identified during the coding of data. Further data collection was followed by 
another phase of of coding, resulting in some new codes and recoding of some of the existing codes. 
The process of further data collection and revision of codes (coding/recoding) went on until the 
analysis became saturated, and the researcher had a set of regularly recurring concept codes  
(Lincoln & Guba, 1990, pp. 343,350).  
A set of narrative themes emerged from the first phase of coding. In the context of this study the 
narrative themes are used to narrate the story of the case study organisation (Chapters 4 and 5) and 
to present the major aspects (decisions/turning points/milestones) in the life of the selected 
organisations. Since the narrative themes specifically relate to the individual case study 
organisations, two distinctive sets of narrative themes emerged for each of the case study 
organisations. In total there are twelve narrative themes for Enron and a total of seven for Nathans. 
The results from first phase of coding are used to write the case narratives presented in Chapter 4 
and 5. Once the researcher completed the first phase for both the organisations, the research moved 
into the second stage of analysis.  
By now the researcher had the list of the major aspects for each case study, and had also selected 
the secondary unit of analysis (out of all the decision makers involved in the major events one 
decision maker was chosen for further analysis) for each case study. The secondary unit of analysis 
was selected by using the query feature in NVivo. For Enron, Nvivo generated maximum references 
for Kenneth Lay, who was also the chairman of the company and was part of it from the very 
beginning. For Nathans the query (using the names of Nathans’ Board members) generated highest 
references for John Hotchin and Roger Moses. However Moses, is considered as the sub unit of 
analysis for this case as he was the chairman of Nathans; and secondly Hotchin, while associated with 
Nathans, spent a considerable time outside New Zealand.  
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The second stage of analysis coded the data on the basis of a ‘start list’ of codes developed on the 
basis of the conceptual framework and the research questions. Based on the ‘start list’ the second 
stage of analysis started with the coding of the data by using the query feature of NVivo. At this 
juncture, the conceptual framework and research questions were the best guide in assigning names 
to the themes (Huberman & Miles, 2002, p. 57) 
The second stage was also an iterative stage where the researcher iterated between data collection 
and data coding. As the analysis progressed, some existing codes were merged and relabelled and 
some new codes also emerged to sensibly express the regularities and recurrences. This stage 
involved rereading of existing data along with further data collection in order to fill in the information 
gaps. During this stage the ‘Text search query’ in NVivo ensured that no vital information was missed. 
The query parameters were set to ensure that coding of data was not simply based on the keywords 
but other (synonyms) words were also duly considered. This increased the chances of finding 
relevant information from the data and reduced researcher’s bias.  
The researcher firstly completed the second stage analysis for Enron, and once the second stage of 
analysis for Enron became saturated, a similar analytical path was adopted for the second case study 
(Nathans). On the basis of the analysis of both the organisations a set of essential themes emerged. 
For the purpose of this study the essential set of themes represents the theoretical framework and 
presents the analysis in the context of the research questions.  
3.4 Reliability and Validity 
The research consisted of a small sample size of two organisations. The small sample size could be a 
challenge to the generalisation of results of this study. However, statistical generalisation was not 
the goal of this research but analytical generalisation (Johnson, 1997; Polit & Beck, 2010; Yin, 2009, 
p. 43). The objective here was to generalize the case study findings to some broader theory (Yin, 
2009, p. 43). Moreover, the information rich cases were purposefully selected to provide useful 
insights into the selected aspects of corporate governance decision making (Patton, 2015, p. 40). 
The research followed the advice of Johnson (1997) to ensure the validity of the findings. According 
to Johnson (1997), a number of strategies have been used by qualitative researchers to promote the 
validity of qualitative research. Firstly, this research was an iterative process that allowed a variety of 
explanations to emerge (during the data collection and analysis phases). By doing so the researcher 
allowed for rival explanations to emerge, to reach the final findings. This also facilitated cross-
checking of information and the conclusions that were drawn from the data. On a further note, use 
of multiple sources of information ensured data triangulation. The use of multiple sources was 
valuable in confirming the reliability and trustworthiness of the findings (Johnson, 1997). To ensure 
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the validity of the findings direct quotations from the data are provided. The use of direct quotations 
provides concrete, detailed and rich descriptions of the phenomenon (under study) to the readers. 
As a result, the reader can establish a thorough understanding of the concept and draw his own 
interpretations (Patton, 2015, p. 438).  
A potential limitation of the qualitative approach is the researcher’s bias. According to Yin (2009, p. 
188) the qualitative researcher must avoid selectiveness. This means that the researcher should not 
only present the evidence that supports his findings and conclusions but present neutrally. As stated 
earlier, this research has used NVivo for the analysis which ensured that no relevant data were 
ignored during the coding process (as text search queries have been used). Moreover, detailed 
results of text search queries (which include the text considered relevant and irrelevant) have been 
provided as part of the findings (and related Appendices) to make the reader aware of the coding 
process and its validity. Use of NVivo also helped the researcher to avoid “selective observation and 
selective recording of information” (Johnson, 1997) and has made the coding process more reliable 
and transparent (Flick, 2009, p. 370).  
3.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided the details of the research process. The research used qualitative methods to 
analyse the failure of two case organisations (Enron and Nathans) and thereby, the chapter also 
provided discussion on the primary and secondary units of analysis. The reasons for using secondary 
data sources are also provided. The chapter also discussed the data analysis process and the 
emergence of themes and codes. In this way, the issue of lack of qualitative research, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, in the field of corporate governance was addressed. The next chapter provides a narrative 




Case Narrative - Enron Corporation 
According to Pentland (1999) narrative accounts are central to process studies, as they help with 
understanding the context and explaining the relationships between events. Following the 
recommendation of DiMaggio (1995)  this chapter narrates the important details of Enron’s story 
that are critical to establish an understanding of the context. 
4.1 Background  
Enron was an American energy company that grew rapidly into other fields. It was once considered 
the most innovative and successful company in America, winning awards and accolades before going  
bankrupt in 2001 (Downes & Russ, 2005). Today Enron is known more for its downfall than for its 
past successes - a fall that wrought havoc (Arnold & Lange, 2004) on the US economy and caused 
losses of billions of dollars. 
Enron was founded in 1985 from the merger of two US based energy companies - Houston Natural 
Gas (HNG) and InterNorth. Kenneth Lay, who was working for HNG at that time, became the first 
Chairman and CEO of Enron (Fox, 2003, p. 11; Healy & Palepu, 2003). Lay, who was linked to Enron 
from before its birth, as well as being the person most referred to in post Enron failure literature, is 
the sub unit of analysis for this research in the context of Enron. The selection process is already 
explained in Chapter 3.  
Lay, with a doctorate in economics, was from a modest rural family and financed his education 
through loans, odd jobs and scholarships. Before moving to HNG, Lay worked in senior positions in 
different organisations including Humble Oil, Florida Gas, the Federal Power Commission, and the 
U.S. Department of the Interior. Lay was also active on the social front where he raised money for 
arts and education (Fox, 2003, pp. 7-9). According to Swartz and Watkins, Lay was good at 
relationship building (Swartz & Watkins, 2003, p. 28) and was well known for his relationships with 
high profile individuals, including the then President of the US, George W. Bush  (Boje, Rosile, Durant, 
& Luhman, 2004; Swartz, 2001). 
4.2 Birth of Enron  
As mentioned earlier, Enron was formed from the merger of HNG and InterNorth which was 
proposed by InterNorth, a company three times larger than HNG (Arbogast, 2013, p. 11; Bryce, 2003, 
p. 31; McLean & Elkind, 2004, p. 11).The CEO of InterNorth, Samuel Segnar, persuaded the 
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InterNorth Board to buy HNG, as InterNorth was going through a difficult phase and was facing 
challenges from deregulation and takeover threats (Arbogast, 2013, p. 11; Collins, 2006, p. 8). 
InterNorth purchased HNG at a very high price through raising debt. InterNorth believed that this 
would safeguard the company against takeover, making it unprofitable for others to attempt a 
takeover (Collins, 2006, p. 8). 
Before the narrative is taken further, it is important to consider why InterNorth proposed a merger 
with HNG. InterNorth was aware that HNG had successfully faced a similar takeover threat (Collins, 
2006, pp. 4-5) when the company borrowed a large amount of money and paid $42 million to fend 
off that takeover attempt. HNG’s successful defence against the takeover left it with an unwanted 
debt and, as its Board was not too happy with this increase in company debt, it recommended a 
change of CEO for the company. At that time Lay was working for another company named Transco 
and HNG’s Board was very keen to have him as the new CEO of the company, especially as Lay 
(Transco) had offered to help HNG when it was facing the takeover threat. HNG’s Board was 
impressed by Lay and considered him dynamic and able to face any future takeover attempts (Bryce, 
2003, p. 26), so they decided to hire him as the new CEO of the company. Within months of Lay’s 
arrival HNG bought two pipeline companies, extending HNG’s pipeline network (Bryce, 2003, p. 31; 
Collins, 2006, p. 5) and establishing Lay’s credibility and reputation for sound business decisions 
(McLean & Elkind, 2004, p. 9). In a nutshell, InterNorth was considering embracing more debt (to buy 
another company) so as to reduce its attractiveness for a takeover. HNG had survived a similar 
situation earlier and Lay had revived HNG’s growth (despite the heavy debt), so HNG and Lay were 
the right choice for InterNorth.  
The negotiations for the merger of HNG and InterNorth were headed by Lay (HNG) and Segnar (CEO 
InterNorth) (McLean & Elkind, 2004, p. 11). InterNorth agreed to pay $70 a share for each share of 
HNG that was trading at $46 at that time. It was also decided that initially Segnar would be the CEO 
of the merged company and would be replaced by Lay by the end of 1987. HNG had eight members 
on the Board of the new company compared to twelve for InterNorth. HNG was also given 
preference in naming the company as the new company was called HNG InterNorth (Fox, 2003, p. 13; 
McLean & Elkind, 2004, pp. 11-12). Lay was selling the ‘Pride of Houston1, but he faced no opposition 
for this. The first apparent reason for the lack of opposition was that the sale was believed to be a 
merger in Houston and the name of the newly formed company (HNG InterNorth) supported that 
belief. Secondly, Lay secured a very attractive payout for HNG’s shareholders. Despite being the 
smaller company, HNG also received 40% representation on the newly formed Board. Lay secured a 
                                                             
1 HNG had been part of Houston (Texas) since 1926. It was a local well-admired company that was the primary 
gas supplier to the huge Texas based industry. The company was well known in Houston not only for its 
economic contribution but also for its charitable efforts (McLean & Elkind, 2004, p. 10). 
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financial gain from this merger as, according to McLean and Elkind (2004, p. 11), he booked a 
personal gain of $3 million by converting his stockholdings.  
Although the merger was completed successfully, it was bound to bring repercussions, especially in 
the context of the preferences given to HNG in the merger agreement. After the deal, the InterNorth 
team (Directors of HNG InterNorth who were previously the Directors of InterNorth), realising the 
extent of the preferences given to HNG, held Segnar responsible for ignoring the interests of 
InterNorth. The group also feared that Lay would eventually shift the company’s headquarters to 
Houston from Omaha. Since InterNorth was a popular company in Omaha2 as was HNG in Houston, 
the shifting of the headquarters to Houston was considered a matter of  communal pride by the 
InterNorth team (McLean & Elkind, 2004, p. 12).  
After the merger, this was the first test for Lay who lost no time in hiring McKinsey consultants to 
investigate the matter and make recommendations on moving the headquarters to Houston. 
However feelings on the matter were so intense that before the consultants could even give their 
opinion in favour of Houston, Segnar was made to resign and Lay became the CEO (the 5th highest 
paid CEO in America (Swartz & Watkins, 2003, p. 29)) of HNG InterNorth on 11 November 1985. An 
old friend of Lay and another consultant Jeffery Skilling were the McKinsey team working on this 
issue (McLean & Elkind, 2004, p. 12). 
Although Lay was the CEO of the company he still could not win the full support of the InterNorth 
team. McLean and Elkind mention that at the behest of the InterNorth team, Bill Strauss (a well-
respected person in Omaha, who was the Chairman of InterNorth before he gave charge to Segnar in 
1981 (McLean & Elkind, 2004, p. 11)) was appointed as the new Chairman of the company. The 
authors claim that this step was meant to control/restrict Lay’s authority at HNG InterNorth (McLean 
& Elkind, 2004, pp. 12-13). Further, on similar lines, the Wall Street Journal reported Strauss as saying 
that he was back to support the interests of InterNorth in “blending these two cultures together” 
(Moffett & Richards, 1985). However, Strauss resigned after just four months, giving full charge to 
Lay. McLean and Elkind emphasised that, even if Strauss had not resigned, Lay would still have 
maintained a strong hold on HNG InterNorth, as during Strauss’s tenure as the chairman, Lay was 
quietly gaining more support from the directors (McLean & Elkind, 2004, pp. 13-14).   
For Lay, it was not only a matter of being the Chairman of the company but also about the 
(unconditional) support from the Board of Directors. Some of the decisions of Lay indicate that he 
was focusing on gaining more support from the Board. Mclean and Elkind  report that after Strauss’s 
departure, Lay started bringing his friends and supporters on to the Board (2004, p. 13). On the one 
                                                             
2 InterNorth was the “caretaker of civic causes- the  number one corporate citizen” in Omaha (McLean & Elkind, 
2004, p. 11). The company had one of the best pipeline networks in America (Bryce, 2003, p. 31). 
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hand, he was building support for himself and, on the other, he was avoiding conflict with the 
InterNorth team. Lay’s first such decision to avoid conflict was to have dual Headquarter - the 
Executive Headquarter in Omaha and the Operating Headquarter in Houston (November 1985) 
(McLean & Elkind, 2004, p. 13; Moffett & Richards, 1985).  
Another decision that could have ignited conflict between Lay and the InterNorth team was the 
appointment of the auditors of the new company. Collins mentions that Deloitte Haskins and Sells 
were the auditors for HNG, and Arthur Andersen for InterNorth. As per Collins, Lay wanted to avoid 
conflict and proposed to hire Deloitte as the auditors and Andersen as the primary accounting 
consultant. However the InterNorth team was not ready for a compromise. Hence Lay, who 
according to Collins wanted peace with the InterNorth team, agreed to assign both roles to Andersen 
(Collins, 2006, p. 10). Lay seemed to be so concerned with building support for himself that he gave 
up a condition in his contract which allowed him severance pay equal to three years’ salary and 
bonuses, if he decided to leave the company within a year (Eichenwald, 2005).  
Did Lay really want the board to come together and work as a team? It appears that he was simply 
buying time to strengthen his position before facing the opposition. By July 1986, Lay had enough 
support on the Board and decided to shift the company headquarter completely to Houston (McLean 
& Elkind, 2004, p. 13), stating that Houston is the upcoming “center for the energy industry” and that 
it was strategically beneficial for the company to move the headquarters there (Fox, 2003, p. 15). 
This decision was resented in Omaha city (McLean & Elkind, 2004) and also by the InterNorth team. It 
was seen as a signal that Lay was in the controlling seat at Enron ("Enron to Consolidate Its Two 
Headquarters, Elects Seidl President," 1986). During this time (1986), HNG InterNorth also changed 
its name to Enron (McLean & Elkind, 2004, p. 13). 
4.3 Junk Bond Financing 
Lay was not having a smooth journey at Enron, as in 1986 he faced another challenge when the 
company confronted a major takeover attempt. Takeover threats were quite common at that time 
and Collins reports that, in the 1980s, Corporate America was facing a situation where a “corporate 
raider” would firstly attain a significant number of shares of a company’s low priced shares and later 
publicly seek to buy shares to gain control of the company. Even a company like Walt Disney had 
faced threats from these corporate raiders  (Collins, 2006, pp. 2, 7). As mentioned previously, HNG 
and InterNorth had also faced this situation and now Enron was facing a combined threat from Irwin 
Jacobs who owned a total of 11.4% of Enron’s stock  and Leucadia National which owned another 
5.1%  of the shares of  Enron (Fox, 2003, pp. 14-18). According to Collins, to avoid the takeover most 
of the companies ended up buying back their own shares from these raiders at a very high premium, 
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so Lay was also going to do the same. At that time Enron was already under a huge debt (premium 
pay out to HNG by Inter North contributed to a large portion of this debt (Swartz & Watkins, 2003, p. 
30)) and the energy business was also going through a bad patch (Fox, 2003, pp. 14-18). Moreover 
the company did not have enough liquid assets (McLean & Elkind, 2004, p. 13).  Still Enron decided to 
buy back its shares at $47 per share against the market price of $44.38 per share, resulting in a total 
pay-out of $348 million (Fox, 2003, pp. 14-18). Under the leadership of Lay, who did not tolerate 
rivals (Fusaro & Miller, 2002, p. 4), Enron aggressively faced the threat and used its Employee 
Retirement Funds ($230 million) and ‘Junk Bonds’ ($105 million) to buy back its shares (Fox, 2003, pp. 
14-18).  Junk Bonds were a risky choice as they required Enron to repay the amount within 10 years 
and at a very high interest rate (Fusaro & Miller, 2002, pp. 4-7).  
The ‘Junk Bond’ aid came from Michael Milken, who converted a low rated investment bank into a 
prime issuer of risky junk bonds. The bank went down in 1990 amid a scandal with Milken going to 
jail (Fusaro & Miller, 2002, p. 5). The fall of Milken should have reminded Lay of the ‘Do nots’, but 
unfortunately this was not the case, as Fusaro and Miller (2002, p. 8) report that Lay maintained 
regular contact with Milken, after Milken was caught in the above scam. Lay was seen with Milken at 
some important events and meetings after Milken’s release from jail.  
Enron successfully used junk bonds to stop the takeover but the stock market did not respond 
favourably to this. According to Fox, news about the use of junk bonds by Enron was not well 
received by stock traders and Enron’s stock prices dropped by 9% on the day the arrangement was 
made public (Fox, 2003, pp. 14-18). But the drop in the stock price was not the real concern for Lay, 
as what Enron was really struggling with was its mountain of debt acquired from the merger of 
InterNorth and HNG. According to Fox, junk bonds were just another addition to this pile of debt. 
Enron vigorously attempted to control its debt-to-capital ratio with various measures, such as 
freezing the salaries of some of the top executives, selling some real estate investments and the 
formation of a cost reduction committee. Despite these attempts, Moody’s Investment Service 
downgraded Enron’s investment rating to junk status in January 1987 (Arbogast, 2013, p. 5; Fox, 
2003, pp. 14-18). Lay, who announced after Strauss’s resignation - “This makes it very clear to 
everyone that I'm in charge of running the company” (Moffett, 1986), needed to take accountability 
for this state of affairs. 
4.4 Valhalla Trading Scam 
Enron and Lay were trying to control its debt when there came another blow for the company, when 
one of its leading  subsidiaries - Enron Oil, Valhalla - an oil trading division of Enron (Fusaro & Miller, 
2002, p. 21), became involved in a trading scam in 1987 (Fox, 2003, pp. 18-21). On 23 January 1987, 
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Enron’s internal auditors received a call from a bank in New York, stating that a bank account in the 
name of Enron had been opened, and that the bank had noticed some suspicious transactions in that 
account. Further investigations revealed that two traders (Louis Borget and Tom Mastroeni) at Enron 
Oil had been using fictitious transactions since 1985 to shift profit from one quarter to another, and 
this particular bank transaction was part of the practice. John Harding and Steve Sulentic, Enron’s 
senior employees based in Houston, were formally responsible for overseeing the operations of 
Enron Oil; however, they were only nominally involved in the work at Valhalla, especially when they 
were based outside Valhalla (McLean & Elkind, 2004, pp. 17-19). This meant that the trading unit was 
not subject to regular monitoring. 
Borget and Mastroeni were called to Houston on 2nd February 1987 to investigate the problem. The 
meeting was held in the office of Mick Seidl, a very close aide of Lay, and Enron’s internal auditors, 
Harding, Sulentic and many other senior executives of Enron, including Richard Kinder and other 
close confidantes of Lay, were present at the meeting. Borget and Mastroeni stated that they were 
merely shifting the profits from one period to another as earnings in excess of a certain value in a 
period were not expected to do much good for Enron. Borget explained that profits were shifted 
from one period to another to ensure that Enron’s performance appears to be steadily progressing 
towards its projections. He said that excessive profits in one year followed by not so good profits 
next year would have sent negative signals to the market (Eichenwald, 2005). Borget also said that 
Enron’s senior management had advised them to shift the profits. His division, Enron Oil did have a 
sudden jump in its profits, it earned a profit of $10 million in 1985 and $28 million in 1986. Enron 
wanted to shift profits not only to save on tax, but also to sail through the rough patch. At that time 
the gas industry was facing the impact of changes in regulations, making the time difficult for Enron 
which was already under huge debt and was also facing a serious cash crunch. The company also 
needed to show a certain level of income every quarter to get loans from banks and other 
institutions (McLean & Elkind, 2004, pp. 17-18). 
Sulentic justified their actions saying that they were ‘sincerely’ working for the benefit of Enron by 
shifting profitability from one period to another. Towards the end of the meeting everyone appeared 
satisfied that even though the method used by Borget and Mastroeni was “not acceptable” they 
were sincerely trying to achieve some benefit for Enron, hence no punishment should be imposed 
(McLean & Elkind, 2004, p. 19). The meeting concluded with Lay saying “I just don’t want this to 
happen again……… (next time) the profits have got to be reported properly” (Eichenwald, 2005).  
Enron’s internal auditors continued with further investigation, which later was handed over to Arthur 
Andersen who had certain concerns and wanted to talk to the two traders about that. Seidl informed 
the two traders in advance about the concerns that Andersen had (McLean & Elkind, 2004, pp. 19-20) 
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and, in a message to the traders, after the meeting with Andersen, Seidl thanked them for their 
‘perservance’. He said that they gave very good answers to Andersen and that he had complete faith 
in them. He concluded “please keep making us millions…” (McLean & Elkind, 2004, p. 20).  
Andersen presented their report to the Board in late April 1987, stating that they were unable to 
trace or verify some of the trading partners, and that the particular bank account transaction under 
investigation was intended to shift profits only. They also made the Board aware of the lack of proper 
control at the division and that the traders were not keeping proper records. They left it to the Board 
to decide if the transactions were material enough to require disclosure in financial statements.  The 
Board decided that the transactions were not of much significance and need not be disclosed in 
financial statements. The traders were also not fired but were  put under control and supervision 
(McLean & Elkind, 2004, p. 20). Details in Swartz and Watkins  indicate that it was primarily Lay’s 
decision not to fire the traders, but to enforce more control, whereas  Kinder preferred to fire them 
all and close the unit (Swartz & Watkins, 2003, p. 32).  
Lay had warned Borget and Mastroeni, and given them another chance but the traders did not pay 
attention to him and often exceeded the trading limits (often 10-20 times over the limit (Fusaro & 
Miller, 2002, p. 18)) set by the company (Swartz & Watkins, 2003, p. 32). This was a symbolic 
management gesture used by Enron that was ceremonial in nature. Mike Muckleroy, the head of 
Enron’s liquid-fuels division and an experienced commodity trader, became suspicious of the 
dealings at Valhalla, and took his concerns to Seidl. He told Seidl that he feared that the traders at 
Valhalla were exceeding the limits set by the company, which was dangerous. But Seidl rejected 
Muckleroy’s claim, stating that he was jealous of Borget because of the bonus ($10 million in 1985 
and $9.4 million in 1986 (McLean & Elkind, 2004, p. 17)) Borget and his team has received. Despite 
that, Muckleroy kept taking his concerns to Seidl time and again, and finally Seidl sent him to Lay 
who told him that he was making a big issue out of nothing. Muckleroy asked Lay “What do I have to 
do to get you to understand that this could do devastating damage to our company”.  But Lay was 
not ready to listen and despite the concerns raised by Muckleroy, Enron’s Board increased the 
trading limits of Borget by 50%, that too within a few months of Lay’s meeting with Muckleroy 
(McLean & Elkind, 2004, pp. 20-21). Lay paid ceremonial attention to the issue that was merely a 
symbolic gesture to manage or control the issue.  
Meanwhile, Borget kept on with the unauthorised trading and was maintaining two sets of books and 
reporting inflated results to Enron headquarters. When the situation became too out of control for 
Borget to manage, he himself informed Seidl of the situation. At that time, owing to unauthorised 
trading, Enron Oil was short on 84 million barrels which meant that the trading division had sold 
more oil than it actually had.  All this was about to cost $1 billion plus to debt ridden Enron (which 
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already had a $4 billion debt at that time (McLean & Elkind, 2004, p. 22)). Lay immediately fired 
Borget and Mastroeni and appointed Muckleroy to find a solution (McLean & Elkind, 2004, pp. 22-
24). Muckleroy  handled the situation, but still it cost Enron around $140 million (Fox, 2003, p. 18; 
McLean & Elkind, 2004, p. 22). According to McLean and Elkind, Lay and his team pretended 
ignorance of and shock about the whole incident. The whole affair was termed “the cost of success” 
by Lay (Fusaro & Miller, 2002, p. 22).  
The Valhalla scandal brought Kinder to the forefront replacing Seidl (Eichenwald, 2005). According to 
Eichenwald (2005), Seidl continued to work at Enron but most of his authority shifted to Kinder, who 
was known to Lay from college days and became the ‘Chief of Staff’ in August 1987. He was tough, 
demanding, decisive, and was described as having natural authority (McLean & Elkind, 2004, pp. 24-
26). 
4.5 Gas Bank and the Arrival of Jeffery Skilling 
In the beginning Enron mainly focused on supplying natural gas through its vast network of pipelines. 
At that time the natural gas industry was regulated and was very stable, but the industry was 
deregulated in the mid-1980s (Healy & Palepu, 2003). Deregulation changed the way the industry 
operated, and the industry faced unstable and unpredictable prices and supply (Swartz & Watkins, 
2003, p. 44). Prior to deregulation, gas distribution (pipeline) companies had no choice but to opt for 
“take or pay contracts”. Take or pay contract were signed by pipeline companies with gas producers, 
where they guaranteed to buy a minimum amount of gas from the producers. Failure to do so 
required a penalty to be paid by the pipeline company to the gas producer. Since the pipeline 
companies were almost certain of the supply, it created a “reliable demand”(Fox, 2003, pp. 10-11). 
Initially, after the deregulation, pipeline companies were happy to cancel their “take or pay 
contracts” and choose the “spot market”. As soon as the new form of market became fully 
functional, related problems became apparent. In the free-regime gas prices rose significantly and 
the supply became unreliable. In the absence of take or pay contracts, pipeline companies were 
unable to ensure an uninterrupted supply of gas and Enron was no exception in all this. Lay, who was 
a strong supporter of deregulation, felt that Enron needed to find a new way to do business to grow 
and survive (Swartz & Watkins, 2003, p. 44).  
Lay’s search for a growth opportunity for Enron took him to Jeffery Skilling and McKinsey & Co., a 
consultancy firm. At that time Skilling, who would later play an important role at Enron, was a 
consultant at McKinsey. Skilling suggested an idea to harvest the benefits from deregulation by 
proposing a Gas Bank (McLean & Elkind, 2004, pp. 27-29).The Gas Bank, a new form of market, 
proposed by Skilling focused on networking gas suppliers and consumers. Skilling proposed that 
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Enron work as a bank that would intermediate between suppliers and buyers of natural gas, and 
would contractually guarantee the supply of gas and its price. In return Enron would charge fees for 
the transactions and for the associated risks (Thomas, 2002). 
 McLean and Elkind noted that this new idea was based on the gap between the needs of customers 
and the suppliers of gas.  It mainly focused on the way the market “should” operate rather than 
looking into the “would” scenario (McLean & Elkind, 2004, pp. 27-29). 
Lay liked Skilling’s idea and Enron gave the green light to the formation of the Gas Bank, negotiating 
long term contracts with natural gas suppliers and then slicing and dicing them to match consumers’ 
needs. The Gas Bank offered consumers an option to buy gas at a later stage but at a predetermined 
price. The consumers also had an option to ‘swap’ these fixed price contracts for a floating price, 
with Enron (Fusaro & Miller, 2002, pp. 29-34).  
Since the Gas Bank was dealing in long term contracts with gas producers, Enron felt the need to 
manage the risk associated with price changes. It wanted to do ‘financial trading’ in gas supply (gas 
trading) so as to complement and support its physical supply of gas (gas selling). Enron started a 
trading division in partnership with a well-known derivative expert, Bankers Trust. The aim of this 
division was to facilitate the hedging of gas prices by gas producers and gas consumers. Gas trading 
became a success and by 1990 it constituted 75% of all gas sales (Fox, 2003, pp. 22-35).  
The Gas Bank transformed Enron. It was less like a pipeline company that focused on physical assets, 
it actually was being transformed into a trading company that focused on financial derivatives and 
other financial instruments (Fox, 2003, p. 37). Now Lay needed someone to assist him in the whole 
process. Lay was so impressed with Skilling’s work that in June 1990, almost a year after Skilling’s 
McKinsey assignment, Enron opened its door to welcome Skilling as the CEO of Enron Gas Services3 
(Fox, 2003; Fusaro & Miller, 2002, p. 33; Healy & Palepu, 2003). Soon after his arrival at Enron, 
Skilling hired a close lieutenant of his, Andrew Fastow (Fusaro & Miller, 2002) who, like Skilling, 
would play a significant role in Enron’s future.    
4.6 MM Model 
Enron’s trading business was growing rapidly. A company with a strong belief in physical assets was 
moving into intangible assets as now at Enron mostly “only money, not gas changed hands. Enron’s 
trading division was growing very fast. It had only 144 employees in 1990, rising to 548 in 1992. In 
                                                             
3 Enron Gas Services was later named as Enron Capital and Trade Resources. 
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1990, Enron’s Gas Bank and trading operation earned 3.7% of Enron’s total earnings before interest 
and taxes, and in 1992 these earnings grew to form 12.4% of the total (Fox, 2003, pp. 27, 39).  
In the midst of these developments Enron was facing a complex problem: how to value the long- 
term contracts for natural gas for the purpose of recording in Enron’s books. It was a unique and 
complex situation for Enron, for which there were no clear answers available at that time. Since the 
Gas Bank and trading were a new concept of its own kind, there was no historic price to refer to 
(Fusaro & Miller, 2002, p. 35). But Enron had to find a way out and it decided to use a mark-to-
market model (MM Model), from January 1991 (Fox, 2003, p. 40), and it became the first ever non-
financial company to use mark to market accounting (Mack, 1993). Mark-to-market is a standard 
practice at financial institutions to value their investment in stocks. The shares are recorded at 
current market prices and the resulting difference between the historic price and the market price is 
a gain or loss. Thus the mark to market method can add to the profits/losses of the company without 
the sale of anything (Fusaro & Miller, 2002, pp. 34-35). 
Adoption of the MM Model changed Enron’s culture to aggressive, risk-taking and ‘profit-first’. It  can 
book profits, on a particular day, due to an upward movement in prices and is capable of hitting back 
badly the next day with a downfall in prices (Fusaro & Miller, 2002, pp. 34-36). Under the MM Model 
financial institutions need not sell their financial/stock holdings to book a profit - Enron would also 
follow the same path in future (booking profits on the basis of the valuation of its long term contracts 
to supply gas). Further implications of the MM Model for Enron will be discussed in later sections of 
the chapter. At this point, it is enough to understand that the adoption of the MM Model on the one 
hand made Enron prone to price fluctuations and, on the other hand, it had an immediate positive 
effect (Batson, 2003b) on Enron’s reported earnings. On the basis of information drawn from Gillan 
and Martin (2007), the following table (Table 4.1) provides a comparison of Enron’s profit margins, 
before and after the introduction of the MM Model. The table clearly indicates that Enron’s net 










Table 4.1 (Impact of the MM Model on Enron's profit margins) 
Before the Mark-to-Market Model After the Mark-to-Market Model 
Year ended Net profit 
margin 
Year ended Net profit 
margin 
Dec-85 1.2% Dec-91 4.3% 
Dec-86 -1.4% Dec-92 5.3% 
Dec-87 0.9% Dec-93 4.2% 
Dec-88 2.3% Dec-94 5.0% 
Dec-89 2.3% Dec-95 5.7% 
Dec-90 1.5% Dec-96 4.4% 
 
Enron was reaping the benefits of the MM Model, but it was to face trouble in the future. As Fox 
explains, the use of the MM Model was not as easy for Enron as it was for other financial institutions. 
It was very difficult for Enron to calculate the market value of its long term contracts, which spread 
to 4-5 years or even more. There was no available basis for calculating the discounted present value 
of these contracts. Even the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX)4 had gas futures contracts 
spread to a maximum of only 18 months. Hence in the absence of any benchmark, Enron’s traders 
were responsible/free to value their trades on the basis of their own assumptions and judgements 
(Fox, 2003, p. 41).  
In the coming years, some serious issues would arise for Enron from its adoption of the MM Model. 
However Enron was reluctant to admit to the drawbacks of using the MM Model and it was unwilling 
to pay attention to the criticism of the suitability of this model for Enron. It attended to the 
feedback/information coming from close/trusted sources only. In May 1993, Forbes magazine 
criticised and warned Enron of the shortcomings of the MM Model. It said “Ken Lay’s Enron Corp. has 
been a smashing success [but]…here are some things that could go wrong……. HIDDEN RISKS”. It 
warned Enron that the uncertainty and risk associated with the long-term contracts offered by Enron 
were so high that a $49 million reserve set aside by Enron for the unexpected loses, might not be 
adequate. It also cautioned that booking profits on the basis of the MM Model would require Enron 
                                                             
4 NYMEX introduced gas futures contracts in 1990 (Fox, 2003, p. 28). 
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to search constantly for growth and to enter into more and more long term contracts (to keep the 
profit cycle going) (Mack, 1993).  
The objections raised by Mack (1993) should have alarmed Enron, but instead of assessing the risk, 
Enron went on defending its decision to adopt the MM Model. Not only Lay, who wrote to Forbes 
and Mack to express his anger, but also some of the Wall Street security traders and analysts 
defended Enron. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp. supported Enron saying “We regard 
the ‘Forbes’ recitation of risks as an inaccurate portrayal of the business and as showing a lack of 
understanding of the operations of the EGS [Enron Gas Services] and the industry”.  Lehman Brothers 
termed the Forbes’ story “misleading..... [that] demonstrates a considerable lack of understanding” 
and supported Enron that it “is an even better company than investors believe” (Swartz & Watkins, 
2003, pp. 48-49).  
Enron, a large company, which contributed 20% of the total sale and transport of natural gas in the 
US in 1993, and whose stock at that time was trading at three times higher than its book value 
(Swartz & Watkins, 2003, p. 48), failed to consider the sensitivity of the issues raised by Mack (1993). 
The external support that Enron had for its MM Model appeared to be fictitious since the Wall Street 
analysts supporting Enron did have business interests linked to Enron.  
In 1990, Enron Gas Trust offered 10 million units to the public, valued at $5.35 a unit. These were 
underwritten by three security trading firms including Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette and Lehman 
Brothers ("Financing Business: Enron Corp," 1990; "Recent SEC Filings," 1990). Two security analysts, 
Laurence Nath and Dominic Capolongo (who worked for Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette), played a 
significant role in Enron’s international projects in the later years (Charles & Randall, 2002).  
4.7 Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) 
4.7.1 Origin of SPEs 
After Enron’s failure, its relations with the Wall Street firms were questioned by many, including the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Justice Department, and the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee (Charles & Randall, 2002). Even though  “Wall Street firms wore a number of conflicting 
hats for Enron, serving as an underwriter on Enron stock and bond deals, and often providing positive 
research on the company's stock” (Charles & Randall, 2002), it was the role they played in the SPEs 
that raised major concerns. Many Wall Street executives invested millions of dollars in Enron’s SPEs. 
For example about 100 analysts from Merrill Lynch invested nearly $16 million in one of the SPEs 
(LJM2) (Charles & Randall, 2002). 
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After the Gas Bank and the MM Model, SPEs were the next big change at Enron. The origin of SPEs 
goes back to the Gas Bank as, for the success of the Gas Bank, Enron not only needed customers who 
were ready to sign long term contracts to buy gas, but also gas suppliers/producers who were ready 
to sign long term contracts to supply gas to Enron at a fixed price (Fox, 2003, p. 35). According to Fox, 
most of the gas producers were reluctant to lock in a long-term fixed price with Enron, as they 
believed that the gas prices were going to rise in future.  
In this case Enron had no choice but to rely only on those gas producers who had urgent cash needs. 
However, owing to its debt burden, Enron itself was not in a comfortable position as far as cash was 
concerned and found an innovative solution for this problem in the form of Special Purpose Entities 
(SPEs) (Fusaro & Miller, 2002, p. 36). In simple terms, an SPE is a kind of trust formed by a company 
to carry some of its assets. The SPEs helped organisations in many ways as a legitimate option to 
wipe a risky account from the company’s books, provided certain conditions are met or to arrange 
cheap finances for the company (Fox, 2003, p. 63). 
According to Fox (2003, p. 63) Enron started using SPEs in 1991 by adopting  a Volumetric Production 
Payments (VPP) strategy. The VPP strategy aimed to provide loans through an SPE to the gas 
producers which were to be paid back later in the form of an oil and gas supply (Cornford, 2004; Fox, 
2003, p. 63). The problem here was the time lag between the cash payment and the actual delivery 
of the oil and gas. According to Fox, VPP was not working for Enron as it could not recover its money 
until it received the supply of oil and gas to sell. To arrange money for VPP, Enron started to rely on 
SPEs (Fox, 2003, p. 63). 
Initially, as mentioned above, the SPEs were only used to nurture the energy trading projects of 
Enron; however, later on they were used for numerous justifiable and unjustifiable reasons. It was at 
this time Enron started the ceremonial adoption of the regulations related to the SPEs. The main 
SPEs used by Enron include JEDI, Chewco, Raptors, LJM, and Rhythms. A ‘Word Frequency’ query in 
NVivo was used to find out the main SPEs used by Enron. The word frequency query was set for a 
minimum of 3 letters a word to search for 1000 most frequent words under the node ‘SPE’. The 
results showed a range of words within a range of 3-18 letters a word. The frequency counts for 
these words ranged from 3-652. JEDI, Chewco, Raptors, LJM, and Rhythms were the only names of 
Enron’s SPEs shown in this query’s results, and, hence are considered relevant SPEs to look into, as 
part of this research.  
The following section details JEDI and the rest of the SPEs are discussed in later sections. 
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4.7.2 JEDI (Joint Energy Development Investments) 
In 1993, Enron entered into a joint venture with California Public Employees’ Retirement System 
(CPERS) for the formation of a new SPE named JEDI (Fusaro & Miller, 2002, p. 61). Enron contributed 
$250 million in the form of Enron stock and CPERS contributed $250 million in cash at the time of 
formation of JEDI (Powers, Troubh, & Winokur, 2002, p. 43). According to Fusaro and Miller, this SPE 
not only helped Enron with its liquidity crunch, without adding any liabilities to its balance sheet, but 
also added to its credibility as well, as CPERS was the largest public pension fund in the US at that 
time (2002, p. 67). JEDI financed many big deals for Enron including $62 million to Forest Oil and $60 
million to Flores & Rucks (Fox, 2003, p. 65). Up to this point the use of SPEs at Enron was legitimate; 
however, later on Enron started using SPEs in ways not approved by law and these will be discussed 
later in this case study.  
4.8 Young Gun Strategy 
Enron was evolving and spreading into unregulated and competitive markets. As discovered by Fox 
(2003, pp. 78-82) Enron was venturing into new areas and needed able lieutenants to take risks and 
pursue new options. Fox states that Enron developed a recruitment strategy, referred to as the 
“Young- Gun-Strategy” (YGS) in this study, to recruit fresh graduates, who had a sense of urgency, 
passion and enthusiasm for work (in view of the long working hours) (Fusaro & Miller, 2002, pp. 48-
51).  
This was the time when Enron’s culture and basics were going through a major change. Lay, who 
earlier believed in acquiring physical assets to strengthen a company, was coming round to the view 
that “the energy business is becoming more and more of a knowledge industry ….. Enron is going to 
become more of an information industry and less of a hard asset-driven industry.” According to him 
leaders from “…financial and marketing backgrounds, compared to the engineering backgrounds….” 
were the future of the energy industry (Lay, 1996, pp. 357, 363). 
From the very early days of their arrival at Enron, the new recruits faced fast paced and cut-throat 
internal competition. Enron always over-recruited, which meant that there were large numbers of 
new arrivals who fought for limited opportunities. It was a matter of survival of the fittest at Enron 
and to survive one had to outperform his/her colleagues. Fox also notes that the over-recruitment 
tactic at Enron created a big talent reserve for the company and it was very easy for it to get rid of 
the lowest performers and replace them with the higher performers (2003, pp. 78-82).  
In the early 1990s, along with YGS, Enron adopted a harsh new performance review system which 
was introduced by Skilling and Fastow and aimed at getting rid of the lowest 20% performers each 
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year (Boje et al., 2004). The new system would have a big impact on Enron and its culture, and is 
discussed in the following section.  
4.8.1 Performance Review System (PRS) 
The PRS, on one hand was a job loss threat for some employees (Boje et al., 2004), but, on the other 
hand it generously rewarded the high performing individuals ("The Environment was ripe for abuse," 
2002). The performance review committee consisted of Enron’s managers, who met twice a year to 
review the performance of its employees (Fox, 2003). The PRS linked the individual rewards to 
individual rankings with  the top 5% being the ‘superior’ group, who got 66% higher bonuses than the 
next 30%, the ‘excellent’ group ("The Environment was ripe for abuse," 2002). This review was of 
great importance for individual employees, as the bonuses formed a major part of their individual 
earnings from Enron (Fox, 2003, pp. 83-87). 
Feedback from managers was a vital part of the PRS (Fox, 2003, pp. 83-87) and managers enjoyed 
greater control over their subordinates. The PRS compared performance of one employee with 
others (Fox, 2003, pp. 83-87) leading to an internal competition at Enron. Moreover the employees 
knew that they had to beat their colleagues, not only to avoid being placed in the lowest 20% but 
also to earn high bonuses.  
The following narrative of one of the Enron employees recorded  by Fox (2003, p. 86) shows the 
intensity of the competition faced by Enron employees: 
“…….you had to run very fast to keep up.” 
Enron’s senior management was also aware of these silent changes in the culture of Enron and the 
following statements by Skilling (Fox, 2003, pp. 86, 171) confirm their awareness and affirmation: 
“Our culture is a tough culture. It is a very aggressive, very urgent 
organisation.” 
“ You need to add intellectual value-added to make a buck 
anymore………………you have to weed out the dead weight.” 
“The difference between someone that’s good and someone that’s mediocre 
is not a factor of 50 percent -it’s a factor of 200 or 300 times.” 
“If your managers aren’t waking up at 3 a.m. sweating, you are doing 
something wrong.” 
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Enron was gradually transforming itself into a company devoted to booking profits only (Fusaro & 
Miller, 2002, p. 47). Even though the system was introduced by Skilling and Fastow, Lay also seemed 
to support the new system: “Individuals are empowered to do what they think is best ...... We do, 
however, keep a keen eye on how prudent they are  ...… We insist on results” (Fusaro & Miller, 2002, 
p. 47). Enron was empowering its employees to deliver results, and the PRS was making them do 
anything to survive.  
Lay was also proud of Enron’s compensation system, which was obviously linked to the PRS. He was 
fully satisfied with the system and acknowledged “An important part of our [Enron’s] corporate 
culture is individualised compensation” which, according to him, was based on the performance of 
the individuals. He recommended that the oil companies should “deviate from their hierarchical, one-
size-fits-all compensation system” and adopt a compensation system similar to that of Enron. 
According to Lay, employees are happy to work away from their homes and for long hours, when 
they know that equally great compensation is waiting for them (Lay, 1996, pp. 357-358).    
4.9 Intellectual Capital and Asset Light Diversification 
The adoption of strategies such as the YGS and the PRS was linked to Enron’s inclination towards 
“intellectual capital”. Skilling was a great supporter of “intellectual capital” and believed that money 
can be minted by using it and, for Enron, the ideas were the creation of a new form of market 
(Fusaro & Miller, 2002, pp. 56-57). Skilling was going to transform his ideas into reality with an 
“asset-light strategy” and widespread diversification. His idea of asset-light was a good fit with Lay’s 
belief (Fusaro & Miller, 2002, pp. 44,53) in the creation of new markets.  
Skilling had to wait for the departure of Kinder in 1997 to fully implement his plans at Enron. Kinder, 
a close associate of Lay and the Chief Operating Officer of Enron, was in favour of acquiring physical 
assets capable of generating tangible profits (Fusaro & Miller, 2002, p. 57; Stein, 2007). Kinder’s idea 
of physical capital was the total opposite of Skilling’s idea of intellectual capital. 
Kinder used to critically analyse a project proposal before agreeing to it. He believed that, to be 
picked up, any major investment had to be economically sound (Fusaro & Miller, 2002, p. 57). 
According to Fox, Kinder preferred to invest in tangible assets instead of intangible assets. His priority 
was pipelines and power plants and his belief in investment in hard assets was so strong that even 
after leaving in 1997, he formed a company and bought a pipeline company from Enron (Fox, 2003, 
pp. 98-99). Kinder’s departure reduced the resistance that Skilling could have faced in putting his 
asset light plans in place. 
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Another change was happening in Enron, in terms of Lay’s involvement in Enron’s affairs. Lay worked 
extremely hard for the success of Enron in its initial years, but now he was more into developing his 
public image (McLean & Elkind, 2004, pp. 85-99). In a way Lay was the face of Enron in the outside 
world and Kinder was the driving force inside Enron (McLean & Elkind, 2004, p. 86). After Kinder’s 
departure Skilling took his place and became the CEO of the company (Fusaro & Miller, 2002, p. 39). 
According to Fusaro and Miller, with Skilling replacing Kinder, Fastow, who was a close associate of 
Skilling, also became influential in Enron and was appointed as the Chief Financial Officer of Enron in 
1998. Skilling had a firm belief in asset light, as he stated: “It’s very hard to earn a compensatory rate 
of return on a traditional asset investment… In today’s world, you have to bring intellectual content to 
the product, or you will not earn a fair rate of return” (Deakin & Konzelmann, 2003). 
Hence after Kinder’s departure, Enron started combining “financial contracts” with “physical delivery 
contracts” for different types of markets, including metals, pulp and paper, water, electricity, and 
broadband (Fink, 2002; Gillan & Martin, 2007). Enron was being transformed into an asset light 
organisation, and according to Fink, before its downfall in 2001, 90% of Enron’s revenue came from 
intangible trading business. The increased reliance on trading activities required Enron to closely 
watch its credit rating. Enron confirmed this in its annual statement: “Enron’s continued investment 
grade status is critical to the success of its wholesale businesses as well as its ability to maintain 
adequate liquidity” (Enron, 1998, p. 41). According to Fastow, Enron’s trading business depended on 
“the counterparties who enter into these [trading] contracts with Enron …… [and are ready to take]…. 
Enron counterparty risk” (Fink, 2002). It meant that Enron had to rely on a high credit rating or its 
ability to honour its trading contracts would be doubted, which would ultimately affect its trading 
business (Gillan & Martin, 2007).  
In addition Enron required liquidity for its asset-light business, as the company needed sufficient 
liquidity to fulfil its commitments as a counterparty in its trading contracts (Culp & Hanke, 2003). 
Enron itself acknowledged in one of its Annual Report that “… unrivalled access to markets and 
liquidity” is the primary requirement for Enron to meet its commitments (Enron, 2000, p. 6).  
Since the adoption of the MM Model, Enron was reporting income on the basis of value appreciation 
of its long-term trading contracts. As stated previously, Enron was heavily reliant on its trading 
business which meant that, despite the rise in its net income (Gillan & Martin, 2007), not much cash 
was coming in (Batson, 2003b, p. 87). According to Batson, Enron could not afford to have more debt 
as it would have affected its credit rating. Secondly Enron was already carrying huge debt. Since its 
formation in 1985 until its end in 2001, Enron’s debt ratio never came below 70% (Gillan & Martin, 
2007).  
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Hence Enron needed a solution that did not have a negative effect on its credit ratings, but improved 
its liquidity, and did not lead to a rise in its already soaring debt ratio. Skilling and Fastow believed 
that SPEs were the perfect solution. Hence they initiated the process of forming more SPEs, which 
would not only bring income or finances for Enron but would also keep related charges off Enron’s 
balance sheet (Batson, 2003b, pp. 8-9; Fink, 2002; Fusaro & Miller, 2002, pp. 36-37). 
Unlike JEDI, in future, Enron did not form another SPE in alliance with a public company. Fastow 
wanted a flexible solution in which, he said, “You can get together with one or two investors and craft 
a particular structure to meet your and their objectives, which is very difficult if you have a public 
entity [where] you might have to go with shareholders’ votes and amendments of charters and the 
like” (Fink, 2002). In the future Enron would form more SPEs (Chewco, Raptors, LJM and Rhythms) in 
partnership with private investors.  
4.10 Chewco 
In November 1997, the Executive Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron gave approval for the 
formation of another SPE called Chewco (Minutes of  Meeting of the Executive Committee of the 
Board of Directors Enron Corporation held on 05  November, 1997). The formation of Chewco was 
linked to JEDI - the other SPE used by Enron in 1993. Enron was pleased with the results it was 
receiving from JEDI as it recorded a profit of $68 million from JEDI in the year 1997. It intended to do 
another joint venture (JEDI2) with CPERS on the pattern of JEDI, but Enron was aware of the problem 
that CPERS would not invest in JEDI2 at the same time as it had investments in JEDI (Fox, 2003, p. 
122; Powers et al., 2002, p. 43). Hence Enron needed a third party to replace CPERS’ share in JEDI, so 
that CPERS was free to invest in JEDI2.  
JEDI was jointly controlled by Enron and CPERS and it was not consolidated into Enron’s accounts as 
Enron wanted to maintain JEDI as an unconsolidated entity (Powers et al., 2002, p. 43), to avoid 
JEDI’s debt to add to its balance sheet (Fox, 2003, pp. 122-123), and also needed a third party to buy 
CPERS’s share in JEDI. As a result, Fastow, the Senior Vice President of Finance, proposed the 
formation of Chewco (Fox, 2003, p. 123) as he believed that Enron’s off balance sheet activities 
through SPEs provided it with “a structural cost advantage” (Fink, 2002). Enron was in a hurry to sort 
out the formation of the new SPE, Chewco, so that it could carry out some transactions with it before 
the year end (Fox, 2003, p. 122). The situation was that Enron needed a third party to buy CPERS’s 
share in JEDI and in a short period of time. 
In the beginning Fastow proposed himself as the manager of Chewco on behalf of the third party, but 
his inclusion therein would have required disclosure in a proxy statement, because of the kind of 
position he held at Enron, along with approval from the Chairman and CEO of Enron (Batson, 2003a, 
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p. 98; Powers et al., 2002, p. 43). Enron’s legal counsel, Vinson & Elkins, advised Fastow against his 
inclusion in Chewco, so Fastow replaced himself with Michael Kopper, his close aide from Enron. 
Kopper’s position at Enron was not one that required a disclosure in Enron’s proxy statements, upon 
his involvement in Chewco (Powers et al., 2002, p. 43). 
As stated earlier, Enron was in a hurry to finalise the setting up of Chewco, and Enron’s legal counsel 
prepared all the documents within two days of the finalisation of Kopper’s name and redemption 
terms with CPERS. Finally in November 1997, Chewco was formed, and also an agreement was 
reached with CPERS for a redemption price of $383 million. Chewco arranged the money mainly by 
borrowing from banks, guaranteed by Enron (Powers et al., 2002, pp. 44-45). The complex capital 
arrangement, reported in the Powers Report, of Chewco is shown in the following diagram (Figure 
4.1): 
 
Figure 4.1 (Capital Structure of Chewco) 
Chewco was presented for approval in a meeting of the Executive Committee of Enron’s Board, on 5 
November 1997, which was attended by all the Committee members5 via a telephonic conference. 
The minutes of the meeting reflect that Chewco was given the green light without any opposition 
from any of the committee members (Minutes of  Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Board 
of Directors Enron Corporation held on 05  November, 1997). The minutes of this meeting were also 
presented to a full Board meeting on December 9, 1997 and no inquiries were made by the Board 
                                                             
5 The committee members included: John H. Duncan (Chairman), Robert A. Belfer, Joe H. Foy, Kenneth Lay, 
Charles A. LeMaistre, Jeffery K. Skilling, and Herbert S. Winokur Jr. 
Chewco, Capital $383.5 million
Approximately 
$115,000 by Entity A 
(mainly owned by 
Kooper) as the general 
partner of Chewco




 Revolving credit 




contribution Approximately $11.38 
million by Entity B 
(mainly owned by 
Kooper) as the limited 
partner
Approximately $11.28 
million of bank loan 
guaranteed by a 
reserve account that 
was indirectly funded 
by JEDI
 61 
then either (Minutes of  Meeting of the Board of Directors of Enron Corporation held on 09 
December, 1997). 
As referred earlier, Enron did not need to disclose Kopper’s involvement in Chewco to the outside 
world, but its own code of conduct did require Kopper’s participation to be approved by the 
Chairman and CEO of Enron. However, Lay admitted, during post Enron investigations6, that he did 
not know Kopper and had never approved his participation in Chewco (Powers et al., 2002, pp. 46-
47). Lay’s claims accord with Skilling’s statement to the Powers committee (Powers et al., 2002, p. 
47) that he approved Kopper’s participation on the recommendation of Fastow. Moreover this issue 
appears not to have been discussed during the Executive Committee meeting either (Minutes of  
Meeting of the Board of Directors of Enron Corporation held on 09 December, 1997). The formation 
and approval of Chewco demonstrates how Enron had ceremonial adoption of regulations as a 
gesture of compliance. 
Enron intended to soon replace the bridging finance structure with some other structure, which was 
another indication of the urgency on the part of Enron to form Chewco. However, the formation of 
Chewco fully served the purpose for Enron and helped it to inflate its earnings (Powers et al., 2002, 
pp. 45, 56-59). Later, in March 2001, Enron bought Chewco back, following a proposal by Fastow. The 
buyback awarded great returns to Kopper and William Dodson (since Kopper transferred some of his 
share in Chewco to Dodson (Fox, 2003, pp. 124-125)). In total they received $10.5 million from their 
$125,000 investment in Chewco (Fox, 2003, p. 232). The statement by Jeffrey McMohan (the Senior 
Vice President, Finance and Treasurer of Enron) to the Powers committee and some other evidence 
collected by the committee indicates that Fastow played a crucial role in securing a higher pay-out 
for Kopper and Dodson (Powers et al., 2002, p. 61). At the time Skilling’s hold on Enron was 
increasing as he became the CEO of Enron in February 2001 (Thomas, 2002). 
4.11 LJM Partnerships 
LJM partnerships included the formation of two significant SPEs by Enron, namely LJM1 and LJM2. 
The following section provides details of their formation. 
4.11.1 LJM 1 
LJM partnerships were the other significant SPEs formed by Enron. The roots of these go back to 
Enron’s investment in Rhythms Net Connections, a private company which provided high speed 
internet, in March 1998 (Fox, 2003, pp. 148-149). According to information from Fox, in March 1998 
                                                             
6 All the investigations after the fall of Enron, either by Enron itself or by any other body, into the collapse of 
Enron or issues related to collapse of Enron, are termed post Enron investigations for convenience.  
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Enron invested in 5.4 million shares of Rhythms at a price of $1.85 per share. Rhythms offered its 
share to the public in April 1999, at a price of $21 per share. After the public offering, Rhythms’ share 
price started rising, and by May 1999, Enron’s $10 million investment in Rhythms was worth $300 
million (Fox, 2003, pp. 148-149). However, Enron was contractually bound not to sell its investment 
in Rhythms before the end of 1999 (Fusaro & Miller, 2002, p. 133). 
Owing to this obligation Enron could not sell the shares for next few months, as the lock down was to 
end in October,1999 (Fox, 2003, p. 159), but its MM Model of accounting allowed it to book the huge 
gain resulting from the soaring market value of its investment in Rhythms (Fusaro & Miller, 2002, p. 
133). Skilling was aware that if Rhythm’s share prices went down, Enron would be required to adjust 
the value of the investment, as per the MM Model. Skilling wanted to hedge Enron from the risks 
associated with the investment in Rhythms (Fox, 2003, p. 149). However, it was hard to find a third 
party to hedge this investment for a value suitable to Enron, firstly because Enron had a very large 
block of investment, and secondly Rhythms’ business of technology was considered very risky by 
Wall Street (Fusaro & Miller, 2002, p. 134). 
Concurrently, Enron bought back its own shares from an investment bank under a forward contract. 
The transaction brought gains for Enron, as the market price of Enron stock was much higher than 
that which it paid under the forward contract. But accounting rules do not allow a company to 
register gains on buy back of its own shares as income. On this Fastow proposed the formation of an 
SPE named LJM1, with this appreciated stock, which would then hedge Enron’s investment in 
Rhythms (Fox, 2003, pp. 149-151). Fastow proposed himself as the general partner, stating that his 
involvement in any new SPE was necessary to attract investors. Fastow’s idea appeared to solve 
Enron’s problem and Lay and Skilling agreed to present it to the Board (Powers et al., 2002, p. 68). 
The proposal was presented to the Board in a special meeting of the Board of Directors. Lay called on 
Skilling to present the proposal for the formation of LJM (Minutes of Special Meeting of the Board of 
Directors of Enron Corporation held on 28 June, 1999). It was recorded in the minutes of the meeting 
that Skilling told the Board “due to the changes in the accounting treatment of off-balance sheet 
transactions the company has been looking for new types of financing vehicles”. He then asked 
Fastow to present the details of the proposal to the Board (Minutes of Special Meeting of the Board 
of Directors of Enron Corporation held on 28 June, 1999, p. 6).      
Fastow started his presentation with a discussion of the problems faced by Enron, especially for 
hedging Rhythms. He further proposed to form an SPE named LJM1. He said Enron would transfer 
the forward contract it held on its own stock with an investment bank (as discussed earlier) and in 
return LJM1 would pay Enron $50 million and also hedge its investment in Rhythms (Minutes of 
Special Meeting of the Board of Directors of Enron Corporation held on 28 June, 1999). The minutes 
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of the meeting do mention that there was some questioning by the Board on the proposal, which 
was answered to its satisfaction by Fastow, Lay and Skilling. The document does not provide details 
on the content of the questioning. Fastow also informed the Board that a “fairness opinion” (advice) 
from PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) would be obtained to ensure the worth of the transaction for 
Enron and to establish the ‘fairness’ of consideration received by Enron. After the discussion the 
board approved the formation of LJM1 and also the involvement of Fastow in LJM. The board also 
gave Lay and Skilling full authority to decide whether the consideration Enron would receive in this 
transaction was satisfactory or not (Minutes of Special Meeting of the Board of Directors of Enron 
Corporation held on 28 June, 1999). 
LJM1 was formed in June 1999 and Fastow raised $15 million from two limited partners to form this 
SPE. Enron transferred its 3.4 million shares valued at $276 million to LJM1, with some restrictions. It 
prohibited the sale/transfer of most of these shares by LJM1 for the next four years and also stopped 
LJM1 from hedging the value for one year (Fox, 2003, p. 152). Though LJM1 was formed to hedge the 
risk in Rhythms, the above details clearly indicate that there was no real hedging and that this was 
symbolic risk management. 
It is not apparent what purpose it served for Enron to stop LJM1 from hedging its assets (Enron’s 
shares), but Fox thinks that these restrictions were part of a larger plan, that helped Fastow to obtain 
a favourable opinion from PWC. According to Fox, these conditions allowed LJM1 to value the Enron 
stock at 65% of its full value. As a result Enron shares with a market value of $276 million were 
valued at $168 million, thereby requiring less payment by LJM1 to Enron. In return for Enron’s 
shares, LJM1 provided Enron with $64 million in the form of a note and a put option valued at $104 
million, on Enron’s investment in Rhythms. The put option allowed Enron to sell its investment in 
Rhythms at $56 per share in 2004 (Fox, 2003, pp. 152-153). 
However, the put option was not directly provided by LJM1. Fox notes that LJM1 sold some of the 
unrestricted Enron stock for $3.75 million and then transferred the money to another SPE called 
Swap-Sub along with 1.6 million Enron shares. It was Swap-Sub that provided the put option to Enron 
on its investment in Rhythms (Fox, 2003, pp. 152-153). In a way Enron was the only party involved in 
this hedging transaction and, in reality, there was no transfer of the risk and the company was 
protecting its investment on its own.  
Fox believes that Swap-Sub was formed to protect Fastow’s investment in LJM1 from any direct 
obligation in the event of a fall in Rhythms’ value. Another important revelation by Fox is that 
Vincent Kaminski, who was the head of Enron’s internal research group which operated as part of the 
Risk Assessment & Control Group (RAC), considered the LJM1 proposal “stupid if not illegal”. He 
objected to the proposal by saying that it would be like Enron hedging its own assets. At that time his 
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concerns were ignored but Skilling did take due note of his criticism. After the finalisation of the 
LJM1-Rhythms- Swap-Sub deal, Skilling informed Kaminski that he was transferred out of the RAC, 
owing to the multiple complaints he has received against Kaminski. In this way Kaminski was taken 
out of the loop involving LJM1 or any other similar transactions in the future (Fox, 2003, pp. 153-
154). 
At the start of 2000, Skilling decided to quit Enron’s investment in Rhythms, primarily because the 
‘lockdown’ on Enron, to not sell the Rhythms’ stock, had expired in October 1999 (Powers et al., 
2002, p. 87). Skilling could have made this decision, as soon as the ‘lockdown’ expired in October 
1999 and it is not clear why Enron waited for another couple of months, especially when the 
uncertainties and risks (Fusaro & Miller, 2002, p. 134) associated with Rhythms’ business were well 
known. It could be that Enron firstly wanted to record an after tax income of $95 million from 
Rhythms’ stock (based on the MM Model) (Fox, 2003, p. 159) and then sell off the investment in 
Rhythms.  
Once it was decided that Enron would liquidate its investment in Rhythms, it was necessary to 
terminate the hedging contract it had with Swap-Sub. Richard Causey (Enron’S Chief Accounting 
Officer) had the main responsibility for looking after the termination of the agreement and he 
contacted Fastow to decide the further process (Powers et al., 2002, pp. 87-88). Fastow, who was 
representing Swap-Sub, proposed to Causey that Enron pay Swap-Sub $30 million to terminate the 
deal. The proposal of Fastow was accepted, but this time no ‘fairness opinion’ was sought by Enron, 
and there is no evidence of the Board being informed of this proposal (Fox, 2003, pp. 159-160; 
Powers et al., 2002, pp. 87-90).  
According to Fox, even though the above proposal was not discussed with the Board, it was no secret 
for many at Enron. Fox reveals that, with time the number of Enron-employees doing business with 
Enron through an SPE was increasing (Fox, 2003, pp. 159-160). For example Swap-Sub was bought by 
Southampton L.P which was owned by Fastow along with some other employees of Enron, who 
contributed no more than $6000 each. However these employees received nearly a million dollars 
each in return, over a period of a couple of months (Powers et al., 2002, pp. 94-95).  
4.11.2 LJM 2 
Enron was increasingly using SPEs and soon after LJM1, it formed another SPE, named LJM2 in 
October1999 (Powers et al., 2002, p. 70). Before discussing LJM2, it is important to refer to the 
diversification happening at Enron, as in the year 1999, Enron aggressively pursued its asset light 
strategy. In May 1999, the company announced its plans to trade in bandwidth as a commodity, with 
a determination to revolutionise the internet industry (Fox, 2003, pp. 162-163). According to Fox, 
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Enron acquired the idea from one of its executives, Thomas Gros who used to arrange video-
conferences for Enron. He noticed that the company paid monthly rates for high speed bandwidth 
which it used for only a few hours on some days of the month. At that time companies used to deal 
in multiyear contracts to provide the internet, to cover for the high cost involved in building that 
network. The entry of Enron into telecommunications facilitated standard contracts of smaller 
amounts and the use of derivatives for those. Fox states that Enron began bandwidth trading in 
December 1999, and had an average start. Though the business was slow Skilling was quite ambitious 
and hopeful about the future of this project. According to Fox, bandwidth trading generated interest 
among a few other companies at that time who, like Enron, were very optimistic about it (Fox, 2003, 
pp. 164-165). 
Enron created Enron on-line in November 1999, which brought an important change to its way of 
doing business.  It was not only that Enron was a counter party to every trade, but also the list of 
items in which it started trading increased greatly. The company ended up dealing in 13 currencies 
and more than 1800 products. However, Enron did not enter into the areas monitored by the 
Securities Exchange Commission or by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Fox, 2003, pp. 
168-171, 173-175; Fusaro & Miller, 2002, pp. 74-78). 
During the same phase, Fastow proposed the formation of LJM2 to the Finance committee of Enron’s 
Board. LJM2 would be a bigger company than LJM1 and would aim to attract $200 million or more 
from institutional private investors. It was also proposed that Enron would not contribute any 
forward contract/value towards LJM2. Fastow explained to the committee that Enron needed more 
of these types of SPEs to support its fund flow. He said that LJM2 could provide Enron with an 
optional source of private equity and it may buy assets from Enron to help it manage its investment 
risk and fund flows. He also informed the committee that he would be the general partner in LJM2, 
but would not participate in the general management of the SPE, since he held an important position 
at Enron. He further informed the Board that the Chief Accounting Officer (Richard Causey) and the 
Chief Risk Officer (Rick Buy) would review and approve all the transactions between Enron and the 
SPE along with an annual review of the transactions by the Audit and Compliance Committee of 
Enron. The committee did inquire about the roles of other partners, the review of the proposal by 
Andersen, the benefits of the priority given to LJM2 over any other investor and the role of Fastow, 
and later recommended the proposal for the Board’s approval (Minutes of  Meeting of the Finance 
Committee of the Board of Directors Enron Corporation held on 11 October, 1999). The Chairman of 
the Finance Committee presented the proposal to the Board citing the proposed review and control. 
The Board then approved the formation of LJM2 by Fastow (Powers et al., 2002, p. 72). 
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Fastow promoted LJM2, with the help of Merrill Lynch, as an “innovative financing strategy” of Enron 
and was successful in attracting $386 million from large institutional investors such as the American 
Home Assurance Company, First Union Investors, the State of Arkansas Teachers’ Retirement System 
and Citigroup (Fox, 2003, pp. 177-178). With a strong financial base, LJM2 entered into various 
transactions with Enron, through the SPEs known as Raptors. These will be called Raptor transactions 
in further discussion. According to the Powers Report, Raptor transactions facilitated wiping off the 
merchant investment losses from Enron’s books (Powers et al., 2002, p. 97). 
Raptors  
The first Raptor transaction was Raptor One (R1) which was formed in April 2000 (Fox, 2003, pp. 200-
205). On the basis of information derived from Fox, the following diagram (Figure 4.2) presents the 
capital structure of R1.   
 
Figure 4.2  Capital Structure of Raptor One 
The formation of R1 was followed by another three Raptors in the year 2000, over a span of few 
months (Fox, 2003, pp. 200-207; Powers et al., 2002). The Raptors helped Enron to boost its financial 
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million for Enron in the year 2000 (Powers et al., 2002, p. 119). However, towards the end of 2000, 
the Raptors themselves were in trouble. According to the Powers report R1 and R3 faced serious 
problems, especially due to the loss in derivative transactions with Enron. According to the report by 
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the US Senate, on the one hand, Enron’s assets, 
which were hedged by Raptors, were declining in value and, on the other hand, Enron’s own stock, 
which was the backbone of Raptors was in decline throughout the years 2000 and 2001(The Role of 
the Board of Directors in the Enron's Collapse, 2002, p. 44). 
Enron was keeping a close eye on the developments in all the Raptors, owing to their significance in 
Enron’s financial statements. Enron had various complicated transactions, as and when required, to 
save the Raptors, because their troubles would have negatively affected Enron’s financial statements 
(Powers et al., 2002, pp. 110,119-124) as Raptors were primarily designed to make up Enron’s 
financial statements (due to the ceremonial adoption of risk management practices). The following 
(Table 4.2) are the reflections from the Powers Report that show how effective Raptors were in 
polishing the reported earnings of Enron  (Powers et al., 2002, pp. 132-135). 
Table 4.2 (Contribution of Raptors in total reported earnings of Enron) 
Quarter Total reported 
earnings/losses 
($millions) 
Contribution of Raptors in 
total reported earnings/losses 
($millions) 
3rd, 2000 364 69 
4th, 2000 286 462 
1st, 2001 536 255 
2nd, 2001 530 40 
3rd, 2001 (210) 251 
4.12 Sherron Watkins - The Whistleblower  
Enron’s increased dependence on SPEs was raising suspicion among many at Enron. However it was 
Sherron Watkins, an Enron Vice President and an accountant, who raised concerns about the high 
risk reporting practices of Enron. She sent a Memo to Lay in August 2001 stating “Enron has been 
very aggressive in its accounting, most notably the Raptor transactions…… I am incredibly nervous 
that we will implode in a wave of accounting scandals.” (Powers et al., 2002, p. 172). She expressed 
the fear that Enron would end up facing losses to the extent of $500 million owing to the Raptor 
transactions. She also stated that Fastow was making money through these complex transactions at 
the expense of Enron (Behr & Witt, 2002a).  
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It is important to note that Skilling resigned from Enron in August 2001, just a few days prior to 
Watkins’s memo, citing personal reasons (McNulty, 2001). After Skilling’s resignation as the CEO of 
Enron, Lay became the new CEO of the company and he assigned Enron’s legal counsel, Vinson & 
Elkins to investigate the matter raised by Watkins. It was a surprising move by Lay, since Watkins 
requested Lay not to involve Vinson & Elkins in this investigation as they were involved in many of 
the transactions suspected by Watkins (Behr & Witt, 2002a).  
Vinson & Elkins submitted their report in October 2001 stating that “none of the individuals 
interviewed could identify any transaction between Enron and LJM that was not reasonable from 
Enron's standpoint or that was contrary to Enron's best interests”. They further stated that 
procedures meant to monitor LJM2 “were generally adhered to” and that all the transactions “were 
uniformly approved by legal, technical and commercial professionals as well as the Chief Accounting 
and Risk Officers” (Powers et al., 2002, pp. 175-176). 
4.13 The Downfall   
Even though this initial enquiry suppressed the issues raised by Watkins, Enron eventually ended up 
in trouble. After the September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, Wall Street was 
affected severely, and so was Enron. Along with the fall in its share price, Enron was also worried 
about its over-reliance on LJM and Raptors. On 18 September, 2001, Enron’s stock was trading at 
$28.08, and, if the share prices went to $20 or below, Enron and Raptors would be in serious trouble 
as Enron’s shares were the major support that the Raptors had in terms of resources. It was a 
difficult time for Lay and Enron. Lay urged Enron employees to buy Enron shares “My personal belief 
is that Enron stock is an incredible bargain at current prices, and we will look back in a couple of years 
from now and see the great opportunity that we currently have”. However not many were aware that 
Lay had used 556,055 Enron shares in August and September 2001, to settle the $20 million advance 
he had from Enron (Behr & Witt, 2002a).    
By October 2001 the situation was no longer under Lay’s control. On 16 October, Enron took an 
after-tax-charge of $544 million on its earnings, which reduced its after tax earnings by $544 million. 
This charge was due to the reporting gaps in Enron’s dealings with LJM2. Within another month, 
Enron made another critical announcement - to restate its financial statements for 1997-2001, 
particularly due to the reporting errors in regard to LJM and Chewco (Powers et al., 2002, p. 2). 
The restatement had a substantial impact on Enron. It significantly reduced Enron’s reported net 
income and its shareholders’ equity with a significant increase in its debt. On the basis of Powers et 
al. (2002) the following (Table 4.3) presents the impact of the restatement on Enron. 
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Table 4.3 (Impact of restatement of its reported earnings on Enron) 
Year Net Income before 
the restatement (in 
millions) 








1997 $105 $28 $258 $711 
1998 $703 $133 $391 $561 
1998 $893 $248 $710 $685 
2000 $99 $979 $754 $628 
 
After the restatement Enron’s share prices dropped further. At the same time, Lay was trying to save 
the company through a proposed merger with Dynegy (Robin & Rebecca, 2001); however Dynegy 
backtracked in the wake of the restatement and Enron filed for bankruptcy in December 2001 (Sidel, 
Herrick, & Schmitt, 2001). 
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Chapter 5 
Case Narrative - Nathans Finance Ltd. 
Following the advice of Pentland (1999) and DiMaggio (1995)  this chapter provides a narrative to 
describe key aspects of Nathans’ story that are important for the understanding of the context. 
5.1 Background  
Nathans Finance Ltd (Nathans) was formed in July 2001 as a wholly owned subsidiary of a vending 
technology company - VTL Limited7 (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for 
Verdict of Heath J., 2011, paras [7-10]). As a finance company, Nathans collected money from the 
public, mainly in the form of secured debentures (Gaynor, 2009). Nathans’ experienced and well 
educated Board included Roger Moses, Mervyn Doolan, John Hotchin and Donald Young (The Queen 
v J. Hotchin: Sentencing remarks of Lang J., 2011, pp., para [9]). Nathans was placed into receivership 
in August 2007 (Mace, 2011b) and its Directors faced charges in the court for breaches of the 
provisions of the Securities Act 1978 (The Queen v J. Hotchin: Sentencing remarks of Lang J., 2011; 
The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011). For the 
purpose of this research, Moses is the sub unit of analysis in the context of Nathans. The selection 
process has been explained in Chapter 3.  
Moses (BCom, CFP, FNZIM, FINSTD) was the Chairman of Nathans. He was well known in the financial 
planning industry and was termed as the “grandfather’ of the New Zealand financial planning 
industry” (Macalister, 2001), and had a wide range of experience in financial planning. He was the 
founder of New Zealand’s first independent financial planning company, which was formed in 1972, 
and also strategically contributed to the formation and development of the Institute of Financial 
Advisers. Throughout his career he was involved in starting up many successful businesses as well as 
authoring or co-authoring several books on personal investment (Castle Group Inc (CAGU:OTC US): 
Executive Profile; The Queen v J. Hotchin: Sentencing remarks of Lang J., 2011, Agreed statement of 
facts- para [10]; The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 
2011, paras [111, 120]). This included Westgate Shopping Centre, the first open air mega shopping 
                                                             
7 VTL was formed in 1997 and already had two subsidiaries, New Zealand Vending Management Limited and 
Vending Management PTY Limited, before the formation of Nathans (VTL, 2001, p. 10). It was listed on the 
New Zealand Stock Exchange in 2004. After the listing, Nathans’ Director Roger Moses owned a 4.1% stake in 
VTL. Another two Directors of Nathans, Mervyn Doolan and John Hotchin each had 33.2%, and 25.4% of the 
shares were held by the general public. Another Director of VTL owned the remaining 4.1%. VTL operated in 
many countries and had vending machine businesses spread across New Zealand, Europe, North America and 
Australia (The Queen v J. Hotchin: Sentencing remarks of Lang J., 2011, para [12]; The Queen v K. R. Moses, 
M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, paras [7-8]). 
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centre in New Zealand, Calan Healthcare Property Trust, Strawberry Fields Childcare, and a number 
of successful fixed interest products (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for 
Verdict of Heath J., 2011, para [111]). He also served as the Director of VTL Group, Grafton 
Investments, Triceps Properties, and Castle Group (Castle Group Inc (CAGU:OTC US): Executive 
Profile) 
Moses was also active on the social front, serving on various distinctive bodies including Plunket New 
Zealand, Institute of Directors, Chamber Music New Zealand, the Auckland Cricket Development 
Foundation and the New Zealand Symphony Orchestra Foundation. He also had a long association 
with the Auckland Jewish community (Vaughan, 2012). Moses was well known among high profile 
people in New Zealand, as Barbara Moses (wife of Moses) put it: "We had some high-powered 
support from some pretty amazing people, people who continued to stand by us, who came to visit 
Roger [Moses]. They included several retired judges" (Vaughan, 2012). Before the downfall of 
Nathans, Moses faced a court trial in 2001 as the Director of Reeves Moses Hudig (a finance 
company). The company was accused of being in breach of the law when lending money. It raised 
money from the public to finance a residential development in one particular suburb of Auckland. 
However the company used part of the money for financing property in another suburb without the 
knowledge of the contributors (Bond, 2011b). However, Moses was acquitted by the Court and was 
awarded costs (Bond, 2012; McManus, 2001). 
5.2 Birth of Nathans  
Nathans was a wholly owned subsidiary of VTL and was formed to provide financial support to VTL in 
terms of liquidity and working capital. It is interesting to consider why VTL preferred to form a 
finance company instead of arranging finance from banks or other financial institutions. VTL, which 
was incorporated in December 1997, was not listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange at that time. 
It was operating primarily on the basis of its intellectual property and did not have enough tangible 
assets to provide as security to banks or financial institutions (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. 
M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011paras [7, 9]). VTL had a total tangible fixed assets of 
$154,631 by the year ended 31st March 2000, and $545,080 by the year ended 31st March 2001. 
These included motor vehicles, plant and machinery, office equipment and furniture. These assets 
accounted for 13.86% (2000) and 5.37% (2001) of the total net assets of the company (VTL, 2001, pp. 
13, 17).  But VTL needed finances to utilise its “proprietary technology - Smart Vend” (VTL, 2001, p. 4) 
and “to be  a global licensor” (VTL, 2002, p. 19) of the technology.   
VTL is of significance for this research as Nathans was VTL’s subsidiary and the majority of the funds 
financed by Nathans (as a finance company) were advanced to VTL. Nathans was formed with a 
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capital contribution of $3 million from VTL, who also provided a loan of $8,539,760 to Nathans at an 
annual interest rate of 5%. In its very first year Nathans raised $3,856,500 in the form of debentures, 
secured through a floating charge on the assets, at an annual interest rate of 8.2%. Also in its first 
year Nathans advanced loans worth $13,331,415 to VTL and related parties. This was 99.7% of its 
total lending for the year (Nathans, 2002, pp. 7, 9, 10). VTL’s business mainly included its franchising 
network and its other subsidiaries (finance companies). Nathans provided loans to VTL’s subsidiaries 
as well as to its franchisees. For the purpose of this research the term ‘VTL and related parties’ 
includes VTL, its subsidiaries and other entities associated with VTL’s business. Specific names of the 
entities are mentioned where and when required. Nathans also provided loans to the Directors of 
Nathans/VTL but these are mentioned and considered separately for the purpose of this research. 
Nathans shared its Board with VTL as the Directors of Nathans were also the Directors of VTL at one 
time or another (Gaynor, 2009). Doolan and Hotchin had been Directors of VTL and Nathans since 
their incorporation, while Moses and Young joined VTL later on. On the basis of the data collected 
from legal proccedings (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of 
Heath J., 2011, para [10]), the following (Table 5.1) presents the involvement of all the four directors 
with Nathans and VTL. 
Table 5.1  (Timeline Indicating the involvement of Nathans' Directors with VTL) 
Name of the Director Date of joining 
as the Director of VTL 
Date of joining 
as the Director of Nathans 
John Hotchin December 1997 July 2001 
Mervyn Doolan December 1997 July 2001 
Roger Moses May 2004 August 2003 
Donald Young December 2006 September 2005 
 
Along with the above four, VTL had one other Director - Gary Stevens 8. He was the only one who was 
not the Director of both the companies. However he was a regular at Nathans’ Board meetings and 
participated in the strategic decisions of Nathans. Stevens was close to Moses as they had some 
common business interests (outside VTL/Nathans) and they shared a suite of offices. It is interesting 
to note that Moses and Young joined VTL roughly around the time when Doolan and Hotchin were 
                                                             
8 Gary Stevens was the only Director of VTL who was not on Nathans’ Board. However he was a regular at 
Nathans’ Board meetings and participated in the strategic decisions of Nathans. He was described as the “boss” 
and “shadow Director” by one of the Directors of Nathans. Stevens had other common business interests with 
Moses. He also shared a suite of offices with Moses. Moses had regular interaction with Stevens who was 
actively involved in running VTL (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of 
Heath J., 2011, paraS [11, 122]). 
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spending most of their time overseas (during 2004 and 2005) (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, 
D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, paras [10, 11, 122]).  
VTL and Nathans not only had common Directors but common senior management staff as well. For 
instance the Chief Financial Officer of VTL, Ms Grant, also managed important aspects of Nathans’s 
business. These included risk management, regulatory and legal compliance, and reporting and 
disclosure practices. It appears that she was not formally appointed by Nathans and mainly reported 
to the Board of VTL. VTL’s Investment Services Manager - Ms Short, also worked for Nathans. She 
mainly looked after investor retention and liquidity management of Nathans (The Queen v K. R. 
Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011 paras [127, 130-132]). Even 
though Short reported to the Investment Committee and the General Manager of Nathans (The 
Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011 para [132]) there 
was no evidence of her assuming a formal position at Nathans, rather in the post-failure legal 
proceedings and in print media reporting she was referred as an employee of VTL (Mace, 2011c; The 
Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011; "Witness 
outlines attempts to retain 75pc of Nathans investors," 2011).  
It was observed during the post-failure court hearings, that at all relevant times the only senior 
manager employed by Nathans was its General Manager. The General Manager reported to Nathans’ 
Board and was responsible for monthly reporting and overseeing operations. The General Manager 
also chaired the management, credit and investment committees of Nathans. Despite holding such a 
crucial position, the General Manager did not have full access to “the computer systems [of Nathans] 
containing information from the VTL side of transactions”. It is strange to note that the other 
common senior management staff, who had not been formally appointed by Nathans, did have 
access to this information. Of further note is that all of the VTL and related party transactions were 
handled by the staff who worked for both Nathans and VTL. Hence there was a conflict of interest 
involved (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, 
paras [127, 128, 138]).  
As stated previously, Nathans was the wholly owned subsidiary of VTL, but the level of control VTL 
had on its operations was certainly a cause of concern, especially considering VTL and its related 
party lending. The following sections discuss the other significant issues at Nathans that originated 
from its transactions with the parent company.  
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5.3 Risk Management and Credit Aprroval 
5.3.1 The Risk Management Policy 
In the ‘Credit Risk’ segment of its Annual Report for the year 2002, Nathans stated “Five of the six 
largest finance receivables arose from the sale by Vending Technologies Limited of regional agencies 
in NZ and Australia. These five finance receivables account for 60.4% of total finance receivables” 
(Nathans, 2002, p. 13). It was not a very clear statement and did not reflect clearly the VTL and 
related party lending (as some of the VTL related lending was termed as “Intercompany advancing” 
and some as “Finance receivables”). However, Nathans did have concerns about the related party 
lending as a highly concentrated lending portfolio could have affected its market credibility very 
badly.   
As a result, in May 2004, almost three years after its incorporation, Nathans developed and adopted 
a risk management policy. Along with defining the role of the directors and the senior management 
team in managing the business risk, the policy also addressed issues such as the lending limits and 
concentration of lending.  The adoption of the risk management policy reflected the concerns and 
actions of the Board to manage Nathans’ risk, such as the concentration of lending and the adequacy 
of security for money financed by Nathans. It is important to note that, despite the significance of 
policy in defining the roles of Board members in risk management, Nathans’ Board did not amend 
the policy after Young’s arrival (as a Director) in 2005 (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. 
Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, paras [128, 144, 145]).  
Concentrated Related Party Lending 
The risk management policy required that “No one Borrower or Borrower Group shall comprise more 
than 10% of [Nathans] total receivable book at any point in time”. At the time of issuance of the 
policy, Nathans had borrowers who were well over the 10% limit and the Board committed to reduce 
the concentration and bring it well under the limit of 10% by 30 June 2006 (The Queen v K. R. Moses, 
M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, paras [144, 154, 162]).  
Another important decision that Nathans took in 2004 (after the adoption of the risk management 
policy) was to achieve (by June 2006) “a target composition of the receivables book ………… 33% 
commercial receivables and 66% VTL related receivables” (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. 
Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, para [146]). The lending diversification was certainly a 
cause of concern for Nathans. However Nathans only claimed to follow a diversified lending policy 
(Field, 2011), whereas in reality it neither followed its risk management policy nor did it reduce its 
lending concentration. Throughout its life it advanced a major part of its lending portfolio to VTL and 
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related parties (Report to Investors, 2007). This shows that the risk management policy was merely 
ceremonial in nature and was never truly adopted in practice. This was a practice that Nathans 
continued from its very first year; however this study focuses on the lending concentration after the 
adoption of the risk management policy, because there is no other benchmark to compare to and 
there was limited data available in this regard. On the basis of the information drawn from the post-
failure legal proceedings (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of 
Heath J., 2011, para [154-160]) the following (Table 5.2) suggests that Nathans failed to 
control/minimise its VTL related lending.  
Table 5.2  (Increase in VTL and related party lending after the adoption of the risk management 
policy) 
Period ending Financing to VTL 
related 
franchises 
Financing to VTL 
and its  
subsidiaries 
Total financing 
to VTL and 
related parties 
30 June 2005 $35.46m $60.78m $96.24m 
31 December 2005 $35.71m $73.63m $109.34m 
30 June 2006 $36.47m $79.63m $116.1m 
31 December 2006 $36.97m $95.28m $132.25m 
30 June 2007 $37.24m $103.63m $140.87m 
31 December 2007 $37.49m $108.50m $145.99m 
 
It is important to note that Nathans’ annual financial statements do not classify VTL related 
franchises as “Intercompany advance” (a term used to refer to VTL related lending). Since the notes 
to the financial statements do not provide adequate details to figure out ‘VTL and related party 
lending’ (as defined for this study), details from the court’s decision are given preference over the 
annual statements of the company in this case study. 
Table 5.2 confirms that, despite the risk management policy, the VTL and related party lending 
increased significantly. However most of this increase was due to the lending to VTL and its 
subsidiaries only. The VTL and related party lending were not only increasing in terms of total dollars, 
but also in proportion as compared to other commercial loans by Nathans. There had been a steady 
decline in the proportion of commercial loans to other entities by Nathans, from 22.5% of the total 
loans as at 30 June 2006 to 16.2% by 31 December 2006. By June 2007 they were reduced to merely 
15.1% of the total lending (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of 
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Heath J., 2011, paras [154, 162]). Due to lack of availability of data it was not possible to calculate the 
percentage for the year 2005.                                                                                                           
5.3.2 The Credit Approval Process 
As with any other finance company Nathans also had a rigorous credit approval process that required 
the sourcing of credit reports about the clients and valuation of any pledged security and cash flow 
assessments before the sanctioning of loans. However the process was only applied to third parties 
(other commercial loans) and not to the VTL related lending (Mace, 2011e). This segmented adoption 
indicates that the company was using the credit approval process more as a symbolic gesture of 
compliance rather than for managing the risk. 
As per the risk management policy “Approval of new or increased credit exposures that were less 
than $1,000,000 required the approval of the Nathans’ General Manager and any one of Nathans’ 
Directors, or his designated nominee. [And the] approval of new or increased credit exposures 
greater than or equal to $1,000,000 required the approval of Nathans’ General Manager and any two 
of Nathans’ Directors, or their designated nominees.” The General Manager was also given the 
authority to sanction loans up to the value of $250,000 on his own (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. 
Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, para [144]). The importance of the role of 
the General Manager in the credit approval process is very apparent. However, as stated previously, 
Nathans’ General Manager did not have access to the information related to VTL related financing, 
and VTL and related party loans/loan requests were handled by the common staff. This raised 
concerns that, as the General Manager of a finance company did not have full access to the 
information, it did not allow fair evaluation of loan/credit requests by VTL. 
It is important to note that at times Nathans extended loans to VTL on top of approved limits. In 
some cases, even after the expiry of the loan facility, Nathans kept on advancing further loans. For 
example, Nathans increased VTL’s credit limit from $13 million to $50 million in February 2005. 
Surprisingly at that time VTL already had a total loan of $44.2 million. Later on, after VTL’s credit 
facility expired in August 2006, Nathans continued advancing loans to VTL, and renewed the facility 
only in February 2007 (The Queen v J. Hotchin: Sentencing remarks of Lang J., 2011, Agreed 
statement of facts- para [29]).  
Adequacy of Security - VTL and Related Party Loans 
As with any other finance company, Nathans’s policies required adequate security against the 
lending. However, Nathans approved loans to VTL without proper security where either the 
realisable value of the pledged asset was less than the loan provided or no valuation of security was 
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obtained. As far as lending to the Directors of VTL/Nathans was concerned, Nathans accepted VTL’s 
shares as security against the loans (The Queen v J. Hotchin: Sentencing remarks of Lang J., 2011, 
para [25]; The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, 
para [147]).  
In mid-2006, Nathans decided to draw up a ‘General Security Agreement’ with VTL. The agreement 
aimed to secure all the lending to VTL and its subsidiaries (excluding VTL’s franchises). Nathans 
obtained an independent valuation of VTL’s assets in this regard. The valuation was based on the 
discounted future cash flows for the next five years; however the forecast for the five years was 
provided by VTL, and did not reflect the true condition of VTL’s business which was below the 
forecasts (The Queen v J. Hotchin: Sentencing remarks of Lang J., 2011, paras [32, 33]; The Queen v K. 
R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, para [148]). The valuation 
process was merely ceremonial in nature. It was not only the valuation of the assets that was 
impaired, but Nathans’ Board was also negligent in regard to the agreement. Nathans’ ‘Investment 
Prospectus - 2006’ claimed that loans to VTL and its subsidiaries were secured against all the assets 
of VTL in general which indicates that Nathans’ Board claimed to have the General Security 
Agreement in place, whereas the agreement was not registered and executed at the time of issuance 
of the prospectus but only became effective later (after an interval of a couple of months). This 
meant that during that interval Nathans financed money to VTL without adequate security and made 
false claims in the prospectus. (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict 
of Heath J., 2011, para [148, 149]). 
Nathans also provided finance to the trusts linked to Hotchin (the McConnochie Trust), Doolan (the 
Boston Trust) and Stevens (the Milford Way Trust). The loans to these trusts were mainly secured 
against the shares of VTL held by these trusts (Doolan, Hotchin and Stevens had stakes in VTL 
through these trusts). However, considering the market value of the shares at the time of the loan 
approvals, the security provided by the trusts was less than adequate (The Queen v J. Hotchin: 
Sentencing remarks of Lang J., 2011, paras [32-35]).  
Since Nathans raised the major part of its funds through secured debentures, it was required to 
present a fair and clear picture in its investment prospectus. The 2006 prospectus admitted that 
Nathans provided “significant financial accommodation to its parent company VTL and to VTL’s 
subsidiaries”. But the prospectus kept the investors in the dark by stating that all the loans to VTL 
and VTL’s subsidiaries were advanced “on a commercial, arm’s length basis, normally for terms no 
longer than 12 months” (The Queen v J. Hotchin: Sentencing remarks of Lang J., 2011, Agreed 
statement of facts- para [27]). It is clear from the discussion in previous sections that VTL related 
loans were not subject to the same credit approval process as the other commercial loans, hence 
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were not advanced on a commercial arm’s length basis. Secondly the claim Nathans made about the 
12 month period was also not true, as most VTL related loans were not subject to repayments; 
rather, Nathans allowed capitalisation of interest and rollover of loans. The rollover and the 
capitalisation are discussed in detail in the next session. 
5.4 Rollover of Loans and Capitalisation of Interest 
In conjunction with the previous section, the risk management and credit approval processes 
followed by Nathans were faulty as Nathans did not approve all of its loans on a commercial basis. 
However it is not only about the approval of these (VTL and related party) loans, but also about the 
way they were managed later on. As with any other finance company, Nathans should have required 
regular repayments towards the principal and interest accrued, but Nathans allowed rollover of loans 
and capitalisation of interest to VTL and related parties and to the trusts associated with its own or 
VTL’s Directors. Before discussing the rollover and capitalisation, it is important to understand the 
conflict of interests in this context. 
5.4.1 Conflict of Interests 
Nathans’ operations were affected by conflicts of interests. On one side a large portion of Nathans’ 
lending portfolio contained VTL related lending, and on the other side three out of the four Directors 
of Nathans (Moses, Hotchin and Doolan) owned nearly a 70% stake in VTL. According to Mace, VTL’s 
loan requests were mainly put forward by Doolan and Moses, who acted as counter party to these 
loans. Most of the time the requests were made verbally, and the loans were approved through 
emails (Mace, 2011c). It has already been mentioned that Nathans did not follow the required credit 
approval process for VTL related loans, and the General Manager of Nathans had hardly any 
involvement in the approval of these loans. It is hard to understand how Nathans still claimed to 
have approved VTL related loans “on a commercial, arm’s length basis”. The lending to VTL related 
franchises was also classified as ‘commercial lending’ despite the franchises being “inextricably” 
linked to VTL. These franchises were also allowed to capitalise the interest by Nathans (The Queen v 
K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, paras [152, 153, 217]). 
Clearly there was conflict of interests prevalent at Nathans that affected its lending concentration 
and recovery of the loaned money. Any claims that no conflict of interest existed were merely 
symbolic in nature and had no real relevance to Nathans’ operations. 
5.4.2 Cycle of Rollover and Capitalisation 
According to Nathans’ Investment Prospectus, loans to VTL and its subsidiaries were made for less 
than a year, whereas in reality these loans were rolled over at the expiry of each term (The Queen v J. 
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Hotchin: Sentencing remarks of Lang J., 2011, para [29]). Not only the Investment prospectus, but 
Nathans’ financial statements also projected a similar scenario, where loans to VTL and its 
subsidiaries were classified as “current assets”  (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: 
Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, para [223]). Nathans’ VTL and related party lending hardly 
generated any cash flow for Nathans so, as a result Nathans relied on fresh investment in its secured 
debentures and the reinvestment by existing debenture holders on the maturity of their investment 
(The Queen v J. Hotchin: Sentencing remarks of Lang J., 2011, Agreed statement of facts- para [60]).  
As far as loans to the trusts associated with Hotchin and Doolan are concerned, some repayments 
were made by the two trusts at the beginning (2005). But later Nathans allowed capitalisation of 
interest, requiring no periodic payment at all. Actually in March 2006, Hotchin informed Doolan and 
Stevens of his intention to sell 250,000 shares of VTL (owned by McConnochie Trust) to meet the 
repayment obligations to Nathans. On this Stevens asked Hotchin not to sell the shares, rather he 
proposed to Doolan and Moses to allow the trust to capitalise the interest (The Queen v J. Hotchin: 
Sentencing remarks of Lang J., 2011, Agreed statement of facts para [35]). It is important to note that 
the loan agreement required interest-only monthly repayments and the principal was to be repaid at 
the maturity of the term (3 years) (Nathans, 2005, p. 11; The Queen v J. Hotchin: Sentencing remarks 
of Lang J., 2011, Agreed statement of facts- para [37]).  
Nathans accepted the proposal and allowed capitalisation of interest for six months (28 February - 28 
August 2006) without requiring any additional security. After the capitalisation of interest the loan 
balance, which was $1,115,357 in the beginning, reached to $1,189,218 in September 2006. 
However, Hotchin again requested another extension for the capitalisation, which was granted for a 
further year (September 2006 – August 2007). Following Hotchin, in January 2007, Doolan also 
requested capitalisation of interest for the Boston Trust, until the maturity of the loan in June 2008 
which was also approved without any objection (The Queen v J. Hotchin: Sentencing remarks of Lang 
J., 2011, Agreed statement of facts- paras [35- 38]). It is evident (The Queen v J. Hotchin: Sentencing 
remarks of Lang J., 2011; The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of 
Heath J., 2011) that Nathans was getting into a never ending cycle of rollovers and capitalisation 
which was going to badly affect its cash flows and liquidity. 
Impact of Rollover and Capitalisation 
Rollover of loans and/or capitalisation of interest was not a sound business practice for a finance 
company, and was bound to bring fatal results for Nathans. As the related party loans constituted a 
major part of Nathans’ lending portfolio, it magnified the effect of these rollovers on Nathans’ 
liquidity.  Owing to these faulty practices, Nathans’s cash flow was being squeezed (McManus, 2010) 
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and it was relying on fresh investment for its liquidity (Nathans, 2006; The Queen v J. Hotchin: 
Sentencing remarks of Lang J., 2011, para [66]). 
As a result of the capitalisation of interest, Nathans had a negative operating cash flow. It was not 
receiving much interest but had to pay interest on its borrowings (mainly debentures). Nathans’s 
Annual Report shows that for the year ended 30 June 2005 Nathans paid $7.8 million in interest to its 
investors and received only $2.4 million in interest. In the following year ending on 30 June 2006, 
interest received was $4.9 million in comparison to interest payments of $9.1 million (Nathans, 2006, 
p. 6).  
Even though Nathans’ net cash flow from financing activities decreased to $26.76 million (during the 
year ended 30 June 2006) from $49.47 million (during the year ended 30 June 2005), it did not mean 
that Nathans’ reliance on the investment/reinvestment also decreased. For the year ended 30 June 
2005, Nathans had issued debentures worth $59.27 million (82.99% of total cash inflow) as 
compared to $52.39 million (75.75% of total cash inflow) for the year ended 30 June 2005 (Nathans, 
2006, p. 6).  
In this context Nathans was really struggling to manage its cash flow and financing, particularly due 
to the rollovers and capitalisation. The only ray of hope it had was fresh investment and/or 
reinvestment and here Nathans needed to issue an investment prospectus to invite fresh 
investment. But the issue was that if Nathans presented the actual picture of its cash flows and 
financing along with its lending portfolio, investors would not be encouraged to buy its debentures. 
Nathans eventually chose to dress-up its investment statement and prospectus in a way that would 
mislead the investors by concealing the true state of financial affairs. Before focusing on the dressing 
up and fabrication of the statements and prospectus, the following section discusses the unjustifiable 
belief Nathans had in VTL’s business model that resulted in misleading the investors.   
5.5 Unjustifiable Support of VTL  
As has been discussed in the previous sections, Nathans not only had a VTL related lending 
concentration, it also had a tendency to ignore its own policies and procedures to facilitate lending to 
VTL and related parties. It appears that Nathans considered VTL’s interests as a priority, even in 
comparison to its own business interests. As a result its lending concentration grew beyond 
reasonable limits. 
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5.5.1 Unjustified Lending Concentration 
VTL reported a loss of $9.8 million for the year ended on June 2005, followed by a profit of $2.3 
million for the year ended on June 2006. However, for the next six months ending December 2006, it 
again had a loss worth $5.9 million (Gaynor, 2009). VTL was such a priority for Nathans that, despite 
the problems faced by VTL9, Nathans took no steps to control or reduce the VTL related lending 
concentration. Rather its commercial lending decreased significantly. It is important to consider that 
in 2004 Nathans did set a target to increase its commercial lending so as to bring it up to 33% of the 
total lending. On the contrary, Nathans commercial lending decreased further and in June 2007 
Nathans’s commercial lending was 15.1% of its total lending (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. 
M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, para [162]).   
5.5.2 Other VTL Related Investment by Nathans’ Directors 
It has been discussed previously that Nathans’ Directors had investments in VTL, and that Hotchin 
and Doolan owned a major and substantial stake in VTL through trusts related to them. These trusts 
made further investments to indirectly support VTL’s business. For instance in 2005, All Seasons (in 
which VTL had an 18.9% stake (Robertson, 2009)) took a loan of US$6 million from a private US bank 
‘Brown Brothers’. This loan was later bought by another entity, HD Fund, as an investment in VTL, on 
the condition that Nathans’s co-founder should be a party to the risk assumed by it. As a result, 
trusts related to the Nathans’ Directors made an investment in the HD Fund. The deal was basically 
financed by Nathans as it provided loans to both the trusts for this investment (Mace, 2011g; The 
Queen v J. Hotchin: Sentencing remarks of Lang J., 2011, para [34]). According to Doolan ''Halpern 
Denny had put money into All Seasons and wanted us [Nathans] to share in that, it was a 
commitment from us to do that''  (Mace, 2011g).Though this investment did nothing to improve the 
lending concentration of Nathans it appears to be very significant for VTL, as it was meant to 
establish VTL’s business in the US. Hotchin, who was the chairman of Nathans at that time, resigned 
to become the CEO of All Seasons (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for 
Verdict of Heath J., 2011, para [274, 275]).  
5.5.3 Support for VTL  
As mentioned above, many believed that Nathans’ Directors had an unjustifiable belief in VTL’s 
business model. Despite the problems at VTL they believed that VTL would stand back up one day, 
and Nathans kept on providing financial support to VTL (Chaplin, 2011; Gregor, 2011d; "Nathans 
                                                             
9 VTL reported a loss of $9.8 million for the year ended on June 2005, followed by a profit of $2.3 million for 
the year ended on June 2006. However, for the next six months ending December 2006, it again had a loss worth 
$5.9 million (Gaynor, 2009). 
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Finance documents divorced from reality, court told," 2011). For example in mid-2006, VTL struggled 
to repay Nathans and Chancery (its other finance company) and Nathans’ Board was well aware of 
this (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011). 
Towards the end of 2006 Chancery was in a serious liquidity crunch with its third party debts 
maturing very soon. VTL approached Nathans for more finances so as to repay Chancery’s investors 
on time. Nathans provided at least $1.75 million to VTL for that (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, 
D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, para [156]). At this time Nathans itself was facing 
a shortage of cash flow as it was not receiving repayments from VTL and, as a result, Nathans had no 
option but to rely on fresh investment to keep its business running (Gregor, 2011d). Many times 
Nathans provided instant financing to VTL without inquiring into the intended use of the money. 
Sometimes, VTL used that money to pay for its operating expenses (Anderson, 2011a).  
5.6 Fabricated Statements 
To sum up the previous discussion, Nathans was borrowing money (as debentures) and lending it to 
VTL and related parties, followed by the rollover of the loans and capitalisation of interest. Hence 
Nathans was in financial trouble and since fresh investment in the form of debentures was the only 
way to keep operating, Nathans was worried about its image among the investors. To maintain a 
positive image, Nathans provided inaccurate information in its investment prospectus and related 
statements. For instance a prospectus of Nathans registered in 2006 provided false information 
related to crucial aspects of its activities. It presented a manipulated picture of its financial situation 
by presenting vague and or untrue information related to the bad debts, lending diversification, 
liquidity, and the related party lending. Nathans continued to deteriorate financially after the 
issuance of that prospectus, but the Directors of the company stated that there had been no 
materially significant change in the position of the company and extended the prospectus in March 
2007 without any changes (Mace, 2011h). 
There is evidence that Nathans used ambiguous and soft wording in the risk section of its prospectus 
to woo the investors which was done at the particular direction of Hotchin. He contended that if the 
market got to know the full extent of VTL related transactions, it would destroy Nathans’ future 
prospects. Though Nathans’ solicitors opposed the move, Moses gave his approval stating that the 
company should admit the issue of intercompany lending so that it could appear to meet the legal 
requirements, but should not harm Nathans’ interest (Anderson, 2011a) . The investment statement 
in the prospectus included a letter by Moses, as the Chairman, in which he talked about the nil bad 
debt record of Nathans, its persistent profits, strong credit assessment process, and vigorous 
corporate governance. The letter also stated that Nathans’ growing lending was in wider and more 
diverse commercial entities (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of 
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Heath J., 2011). The Securities Act 1978 requires the issuer of financial instruments/securities to 
provide specific information to potential investors. In New Zealand this investment statement is an 
important document, which assists and informs interested public in the investment decision (The 
Queen v J. Hotchin: Sentencing remarks of Lang J., 2011). 
The positive statements by Nathans kept the public in the dark about the risky investment path it 
was following. It created a false impression about the diversification of its lending and made the 
investors believe that the company had spread its loan portfolio among divergent fields. This was 
totally opposite to the actual situation, as VTL and related parties were the main constituents of 
Nathans’ lending. The statements issued by the company reaffirmed to the audience that Nathans 
held an impeccable record of no bad debts and that it was a cautious lender (Gregor, 2011e). 
Most of the questions about Nathans’ prospectus were raised after the company went into 
liquidation, but Nathans’ Board was warned of the irregularities in the prospectus long before that. 
The Securities Commission had concerns about Nathans’ 2005 prospectus and sent a letter raising 
these concerns to Nathans in March 2006. The Commission stated that Nathans’ statements did not 
provide a clear picture of the proportion of its lending to VTL and other parties and asked Nathans to 
provide detailed information about its lending in its documents. In response Nathans replied “We 
consider that Nathans’ exposure to its parent is covered in both the section ‘Activities’ and …….. in the 
section ‘what are my risks?” .  It was stated that Nathans did not specify the quantum of VTL related 
debt as it would have fluctuated over time.  Nathans in the reply stated “We do not consider ………… 
any money paid in consideration of the securities is received on behalf of VTL. Nathans is a separate 
entity, with a separate board of Directors……. It is not the agent of its parent and any inter-group 
lending is done on an arms-length commercial basis”. Even though Nathans failed to operate as a 
prudent finance company, the reply it sent to the Commission reflected that it was well aware of the 
expectations of a prudent finance company (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: 
Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, paras [165, 166]). 
5.7 The Downfall 
By 2007 Nathans was in deep trouble especially in terms of its fund flows. Nathans’ Directors were 
well aware of these issues and , in early 2007 Nathans unsuccessfully tried for a merger with another 
finance company so that the combined loan book would help Nathans improve its lending 
concentration (Mace, 2011f). In July 2007 one other New Zealand based finance company, 
Bridgecorp, went into receivership, causing investors to look at other finance companies. The last 
thing Nathans wanted was to lose was the faith of investors so Moses was quick to control the 
situation with an extremely positive letter to the investors of the company stating: ‘All our loans are 
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secured. We do not have any unsecured loans. The security for our loans is normally in the form of a 
first charge over the assets of the borrower or over real property, as well as personal guarantees, 
where the borrower is a company.” (Gaynor, 2009).  
In the meantime, Nathans was subject to an inquiry by the Companies Office into its Prospectus and 
related statements. The investigation found Nathans was technically insolvent and it was placed into 





This chapter presents the findings of this thesis. It answers the research questions and presents the 
findings in terms of corporate governance functions, decision processes, and value orientation (a 
context identified and summarised in Chapter 2). The findings for both the organisations are 
presented on the basis of replication logic (Yin, 2009). Section 6.1 presents information about the 
first perspective- corporate governance functions, Section 6.2 relates to the decision processes, and 
Section 6.3 presents the findings related to value orientation.  
As stated in Chapter 3, this chapter also briefly narrates the data analysis process, so as to enhance 
the understanding of the findings. Further details on the use of NVivo and its query tool are also 
provided in the chapter. The details on the NVivo query are supplemented by Appendices A and B. 
The chapter also provides direct quotes and narratives from the data to support the findings. 
 The findings are presented in the following sections. 
6.1 Corporate Governance Functions (Input) 
The study primarily aims to explore the role of corporate governance in corporate failures. Hence the 
researcher started with exploring the corporate governance content (functions) of the selected 
cases. For the purpose of this research corporate governance comprises setting strategic direction; 
formulating policy; managing and controlling risk; selecting the CEO and Directors; and monitoring 
performance.  
Based on the above functions of corporate governance, the researcher had a ‘start list’ which 
included the keywords for the functions of corporate governance. The start list is provided in 
Appendix A (Table A. 1). 
Two separate NVivo projects were created for Enron and Nathans. NVivo-Enron had a total of 142 
sources (documents), whereas NVivo-Nathans had a total of 95 sources. NVivo text search query was 
used separately for both the projects to extract the content related to each of the keywords. The text 
search query was set to find matches that included exact matches along with stemmed words and 
synonyms for each of the keywords. For the text search queries the coding context was purposely 
customised to ONE word. Once the query results were saved into the respective projects, word 
frequency query was used on each of the saved text query results to find the most frequent words. 
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Since the text search queries were customised to ONE word only, the word frequency query provided 
a frequency for the matches for each of the keywords.  
For example, in the case of NVivo-Enron, the text search query for the keyword strategy generated a 
total of 637 text references from 76 sources. Since the query had a customised coding context of one 
word only, the outcome was an exact match or a stemmed word, or a synonym for the word 
strategy. Then the word frequency query revealed the frequency count for each of the matched 
words. It is important to note that the same process and criteria was used for the other concepts (to 
follow). 
6.1.1 Setting Strategic Direction 
The key word Strategy represented the concept of Setting strategic direction. In NVivo-Enron the text 
search query for the keyword Strategy generated 637 text references from 76 sources, whereas a 
total of 59 text references from 19 sources were generated in NVivo-Nathans. The results of the 
query are presented in Appendix B (Table B.1. 1, Table B.1. 2). 
The findings revealed that for both Enron and Nathans, the word strategy had the highest count 
followed by the word strategies, whereas the lowest count was recorded for the words such as 
scheme and schemes. The text references for the words strategy and strategies have been found 
most relevant in generating information related to the setting of strategic directions at both the 
organisations. However, in the case of Enron, the text references containing the words scheme and 
schemes have provided further insight into the concept of setting strategic direction. The following 
sections report on the findings.  
Strategic Direction - Enron 
In the case of Enron, it has been found that use of the “asset light” strategy has been the major shift 
in the strategic direction of Enron (Gillan & Martin, 2007; Healy & Palepu, 2003). It has already been 
discussed in Chapter 4 that asset light strategy shifted Enron’s focus from physical assets to 
intellectual assets. Along with asset light, Enron also adopted a diversification strategy. “It began by 
reaching beyond its pipeline business … to become a financial trader and market maker….”(Healy & 
Palepu, 2003). This shift in the strategic focus of Enron was applauded externally (Swartz, 2001). 
However, the findings indicate that the applause was not about the diversification strategy itself, but 
the purpose it was designed to serve. At Enron, this aimed at increasing immediate returns. Enron 
also wanted to get rid of low-performing physical assets and the goal was to sell these assets and 
“record the income as earnings” (The Role of the Board of Directors in the Enron's Collapse, 2002, p. 
7), which would bring a sudden jump in Enron’s earnings. 
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This change in strategic direction of Enron had a significant impact on Enron’s performance. Firstly, 
due to the asset-light strategy, “income was rising but cash appeared low because the company was 
booking long-term profits” (Barboza, 2002). This was in conjunction with the adoption of the MM 
Model, a concept discussed in detail in Chapter 4. On a further note, the findings indicate that 
Enron’s reliance on this strategy grew over time and this became “crucial to the company's future 
financing strategies” (Barboza, 2002). Ultimately, with the combination of asset light diversification 
and the MM Model, Enron was performing well as far as its financial statements and share process 
were concerned, but internally the truth was most of the income/revenue it claimed never existed 
(details provided in Chapter 4).   
Another significant strategy adopted by Enron was the use of SPEs. Findings indicate that “complex 
SPE transactions” were used by Enron “to manipulate [its] financial statements” (Batson, 2003a, p. 
82). Enron used SPEs to keep its debt away from its balance sheet (Schepers & Gardberg, 2004). SPEs 
were used to “avert the negative performance indicators” (Arnold & Lange, 2004) thereby “creating 
the illusion of earnings growth” (Deakin & Konzelmann, 2003) and an increase in Enron’s stock prices 
(Schepers & Gardberg, 2004). This misuse of SPEs “had been endemic within Enron for several years” 
(Deakin & Konzelmann, 2003) and was an important part of its business strategy (Deakin & 
Konzelmann, 2003; Gillan & Martin, 2007). The Enron board clearly supported the use of SPE 
transactions “to make Enron’s financial condition appear better” (The Role of the Board of Directors 
in the Enron's Collapse, 2002, pp. 42-43). Some concerns were raised internally on the misuse of SPEs 
(Batson, 2003a, p. 44; Behr & Witt, 2002a); however, the continual and increased use of such 
transactions indicate that no attention was paid to such concerns.  
Since, Enron’s “[executive] compensation structure depended heavily on the reported financial 
performance of the company” (Batson, 2003a, pp. 91-92), the manipulation of earnings affected its 
employees (Cunningham & Harris, 2006). For the employees it was “ less about booking profitable 
deals or controlling the risk of deals- and more about booking as many of the biggest deals possible” 
(Cruver, 2003, p. 80). In many cases “the Enron officers appeared less concerned about making the 
correct or best decision, and more focused on finding some justification for their desired result”. For 
example, they searched “for ways to avoid public disclosure” and obtained “professional opinions or 
advice merely as a necessary procedural step” (Batson, 2003a, pp. 93-94). 
To summarise, the findings suggest that Enron adopted various strategies to make its performance 
appear better and ended up becoming dependent on these to avert its negative performance 
indicators. In terms of strategies like MM Model and the SPEs, the company had more of a 
ceremonial compliance. 
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Strategic Direction - Nathans 
In the case of Nathans, the findings are informative about the investment strategies of the company. 
These strategies were critical to Nathans’ performance, especially due to the nature of its business. It 
has been found that there were shortcomings in the investment strategy adopted by Nathans and 
the first significant issue was that its “current assets were considerably less than the liabilities ……. 
This is because [Nathans] has been borrowing short (0 to 24 months) and investing long (0 to 60 
months)." (Field, 2011). These gaps were certainly very critical for a finance company as they would 
affect its cash flows/liquidity and long-term viability. Another important issue was the “the 
concentration risks stemming from the ratio of VTL business-related lending to the total of Nathans’ 
receivables” (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, 
para [146]). The majority of Nathans’ lending was to VTL and related parties, which indicates the 
flaws in its investment policy as it significantly raised the concentration of Nathans’s risk. It also 
indicates that Nathans’s strategies were focused on the short term and primarily ignored the long-
term impact. 
It was not that Nathans was unaware of these issues and the impact these were bound to bring. 
Findings support that concerns were raised internally on resolving these issues. 
Moses then added he was worried and asked, in another email, "isn't it time 
we started to refocus our efforts toward the longer term" (Field, 2011). 
Nathans took remedial steps (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict 
of Heath J., 2011, para [326-328]) to sort out these concerns such as an “investment committee was 
created to review cashflow projections of both Nathans and VTL on a regular basis to ensure that an 
appropriate fundraising strategy is in place” (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: 
Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, paraS [136-138]).  Nathans also set targets to improve its 
commercial lending and reduce its VTL related lending (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. 
Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, para [146]). However, no significant attention was paid 
to implementing these suggested strategic changes (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. 
Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, para [331]). There is evidence that Nathans was pinning 
its hopes on VTL, to revive its business performance. 
“‘the directors’ actions were closer to blind faith as opposed to hopeless 
optimism’……….. ‘[Nathans] was pinning its hopes on a sale of VTL’ …….. 
‘There was no reasonable basis for that view’……… ‘There were no realistic 
prospects of a significant cash injection in the foreseeable’” (Chaplin, 2011).  
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Nathans’s divestment strategy to reduce its VTL related lending also failed, as the company went on 
to further fund VTL related acquisitions in the US. This resulted in “an outflow of cash from Nathans 
(to fund acquisitions) rather than an inflow from a divestment strategy, on which the VTL directors 
had previously agreed”. This was certainly not a viable strategic move not only because of the 
already existing issues with Nathans’s lending portfolio but also because at the time of these 
acquisitions “it was clear that neither the IVL nor VTL debts to Nathans could be paid without VTL 
selling some or all of its American business units” (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: 
Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, para [286]).  
It has been found that there were issues with the public disclosure practices of Nathans (The Queen v 
K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, para [146]). As a finance 
company, Nathans issued a Prospectus to raise funds from the public. However, despite being aware 
of inconsistencies in its strategies (and their implementation) Nathans provided misleading 
information to the public (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of 
Heath J., 2011, para [432]). Along with poor external disclosure, Nathans’ also did not have an 
internal free flow of information which would have affected the formation and implementation of its 
strategies. For example Nathan's General Manager (who was also a member of the investment 
committee) “did not have access to computer systems containing information from the VTL side of 
transactions”  (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 
2011, paraS [136-138]). 
6.1.2 Formulating Policy 
The concept of Formulating Policy is represented by the keyword Policy. In NVivo Enron the text 
search query for the keyword Policy generated a total of 880 references from 83 resources, and 
NVivo Nathans generated a total of 83 references from 18 resources. The results of the queries for 
both Enron and Nathans are presented in Appendix B (Table B.2. 1, Table B.2. 2).  
The query indicate that the results of the text search query for both Enron and Nathans included 
words such as policy, policies, insurer, and insurance. However, keeping in mind the objective of this 
query (to find the content related to policy formulation at Enron and Nathans), words such as 
insurance, insured, insurer, insurable etc. were considered irrelevant. 
Formulating Policy - Enron 
The findings provide evidence that Enron had well-established policies (and procedures) to guide its 
actions such as:  
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[At Enron] comprehensive risk management processes, policies and 
procedures have been established to monitor and control these market risks 
(Enron, 1998).  
 [At Enron] market risks are monitored by an independent risk control group 
operating separately from the units that create or actively manage these 
risk exposures to ensure compliance with Enron’s stated risk management 
policies (Enron, 2000). 
Enron policy required the RAC Group to prepare a DASH [deal approval 
sheet] for every business transaction that involved an expenditure of capital 
by Enron. The DASH had to be approved by the relevant business unit, the 
Legal Department, RAC, and Senior Management before funds could be 
distributed (Powers et al., 2002, p. 90). 
The board was aware of the significance of these policies, for example, there were “seven 
amendments [made] to the Risk Management Policy from December 1998 through May 2000” 
(Batson, 2003a). Enron had also formed special committees in this regard, for instance: 
The Executive Committee met on an as needed basis to handle urgent 
business matters between scheduled Board meetings ... The Finance 
Committee was responsible for approving major transactions …….. [it] 
oversaw Enron’s risk management efforts; and provided guidance on the 
company’s financial decisions and policies ………… The Audit and Compliance 
Committee reviewed Enron’s accounting and compliance programs, 
approved Enron’s financial statements and reports, and was the primary 
liaison with Andersen …….. The Compensation Committee established and 
monitored Enron’s compensation policies and plans for directors, officers 
and employees (The Role of the Board of Directors in the Enron's Collapse, 
2002, p. 9). 
However, the findings reveal the shortcomings in the policies adopted by Enron. For example, the 
risk control measures adopted by Enron were sufficient for managing “true trading activities 
involving assets that have publicly quoted prices and substantial market [but] they did not allow the 
Board the opportunity to prevent the incurrence of debt through SPE transactions (structured as 
trading activities)” (Batson, 2003a). It has already been discussed that SPE transactions formed a 
significant portion of Enron’s trading activities. Thereby, Enron was risk prone owing to the gaps in its 
risk control measures.  
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On a further note, “under the Risk Management Policy, Enron or any of its subsidiaries [SPEs] could 
engage in a virtually unlimited amount of Prepay Transactions”. This was a significant limitation of 
the policies adopted by Enron, especially when many of its SPE transactions if structured in a certain 
way did not require board approval. Moreover “if the Prepay Transactions were executed by a 75% 
owned subsidiary [SPE], the subsidiary's obligations could be guaranteed by Enron, all without 
obtaining Board approval” (Batson, 2003a). Granting such authority to the executives could be a 
good practice to have smooth operations but the problem was that “Enron's compensation policies 
engendered a myopic focus on earnings growth and stock price” (Gillan & Martin, 2007). 
In this situation, the Enron board certainly needed to scrutinise SPE transactions, especially when 
Enron’s interest was involved on both sides of the [SPE] transactions. Despite this “the CFO was 
exempted [by the board] from conflicts of interest policy” when he owned a stake in some of the SPEs 
(Cunningham & Harris, 2006). The Conflicts of Interests Policy of Enron prohibited Enron employees 
from being part of any such business deals. It was not only a matter of allowing an Enron employee 
to do business with Enron. The CFO was also representing Enron in those SPE transactions, thus 
allowing such exemptions was not in favour of Enron.   
Further, the Audit Committee did not follow up on the “requirement for scrutiny having waived the 
Code of Ethics for Fastow [the CFO] despite its remit to review ‘compliance with Enron’s policies 
regarding business conduct’” (Tonge, Greer, & Lawton, 2003). Therefore it appears that Enron’s 
“internal controls over SPEs were a sham, existing in form but not in substance” (Cunningham & 
Harris, 2006), and were merely ceremonial in nature. Such policies and practices of Enron were not 
without concerns, but findings indicate that due attention was not paid to such concerns, rather the 
issue was suppressed. When Enron received negative feedback/criticism for pursuing such policies, it 
exercised its power to suppress any such opposition. For example, the “Andersen audit quality 
partner who challenged some of the aggressive accounting policies [related to the SPEs] that Enron 
wanted to pursue was outflanked and eventually transferred” (Jr, 2002). The following quotes further 
confirm these findings: 
Chung Wu an analyst at UBS Paine Webber, sent an email containing this 
warning to 73 of his clients: ‘ Financial situation is deteriorating in Enron…. I 
would advise you to take some money off the table….Waiting to make a 
decision would cost you a fortune.” After a copy pf email landed at Enron, 
Wu’s Bosses sent out the following correction: ‘I hereby retract Mr. Wu’s 
statements….. UBS Paine Webber has a strong buy recommendation on 
[Enron] stock.” Wu was fired the same day “for violating the firm policy 
concerning electronic communications” (Fusaro & Miller, 2002, p. 72). 
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Formulating Policy - Nathans 
According to the findings, Nathans had established policies and procedures to guide its business 
operations. Nathans’ credit policy addressed issues such as exposure to credit risk and it set limits on 
credit exposure. 
"As part of this [credit] policy, limits on exposures with counterparties have 
been set and approved by the board of directors and are monitored on a 
regular basis." (Ruth, 2002).  
Nathans’ risk management policy focused on managing its business risk. For example, according to 
the risk management policy “No one Borrower or Borrower Group shall comprise more than 10% of 
[Nathans‘] total receivables book at any point in time” (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. 
Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, para [145]). The risk management policy of Nathans 
also defined the roles of the directors and senior management team (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. 
Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, para [128]).  
As discussed above Nathans had policies to manage and guide its operations. However despite this, 
its lending portfolio had a risk concentration with most of its lending being VTL and related party. 
Nathans Finance's concentration of lending looks decidedly risky. The 
prospectus notes that five of its six largest finance receivables (loans) were 
from selling Vending Technologies' master licences. These five parties 
bought licences and Nathans Finance lent them the money to pay for these 
(Ruth, 2002).  
A significant component of Nathans’s risk management policy was that “No distinction was drawn 
between VTL-related credit applications and those made by third parties” (The Queen v K. R. Moses, 
M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, para [135]). It means that Nathans 
should have evaluated loan requests from VTL and related parties on the basis of its established 
policies. However, as discussed in Chapter 5, VTL and related party lending was never subject to 
proper scrutiny, rather sometimes the loans were approved without adequate security. 
Findings further suggest that as far as VTL and related party lending was concerned, Nathans appears 
to have carried out policies according to the letter rather than the spirit (ceremonial adoption). For 
example:  
Nathans’ internal reports assumed that the loans to Advanced and 
Intelligent [VTL related parties] would be repaid on the due date, but it must 
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have been reasonably obvious by [that time] …… that this assumption was 
unsustainable (The Queen v J. Hotchin: Sentencing remarks of Lang J., 2011, 
paras [43-44]) 
Certain other issues have also been found in regard to Nathans’ policies. For instance, Nathans’ risk 
management policy defined the role of board members in managing its operations and related risks. 
It means that the policy needed amendments whenever there was a change in board membership. 
However “No steps were taken to modify the policies when Mr. Young joined the Nathans‘ board” 
(The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, para [128]). 
Nathans’ risk management policy also established a credit committee, but “the committee never met 
as a composite group in person” (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for 
Verdict of Heath J., 2011, para [135]). This indicates that Nathans did not pay due attention to its 
policies (and had a ceremonial adoption of those policies). Findings further reveal that even though 
policies were in place at Nathans, the directors appeared to lack a clear understanding of those 
policies. For example: 
Despite the wording of this [risk management] policy, Mr. Moses gave 
evidence that he believed the 10% limit applied to VTL and IVL individually. 
That would have made the actual ―prudent level 20% of Nathans total 
receivables book (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: 
Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, para [146]).  
There were occasions where the Nathans board did not handle its policy matters adequately. For 
example, at the time of issuance of its investment prospectus the board failed to duly consider the 
risk section of the prospectus, so as to provide full and fair disclosure to the prospective investors. 
This was, as Mr. Hotchin recognised in his email, a quintessential board 
issue. It involved a policy decision: to what extent do we emphasise risk? 
Had a meeting (or even a more informal teleconference) been held the 
directors would have turned their collective minds to the content of the risk 
section ………… An opportunity for the directors to ensure the ―Risk section 
[of the Prospectus] was compliant was lost (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. 
Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, para [185]).  
6.1.3 Managing and Controlling Risk 
The concept of Managing and Controlling Risk is represented by the keyword Risk. The text search 
query for keyword Risk, in NVivo-Enron generated a total of 2132 text references from 95 sources, 
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whereas a total of 176 text references from 33 sources were generated in NVivo-Nathans. The results 
of the queries are presented in Appendix B (Table B.3. 1, Table B.3. 2).  
The results show that for both Enron and Nathans, the word risk and risks had the highest frequency. 
Words such as chance, danger, risked etc. had lower counts for both Nathans and Enron. The text 
references containing the words risk and risks were the most relevant in generating information 
related to the management and control of risk at both the organisations. However, in the case of 
Enron, the text references containing the words chance and dangerous have also provided useful 
insights.  
Managing and Controlling Risk - Enron  
Enron, in the beginning, focused on investment in physical assets, however, over time Enron, an 
asset- heavy company, transformed itself into an asset light company. In the process, Enron 
diversified into areas beyond its specialisation (Downes & Russ, 2005). During its life, many of Enron’s 
much-vaunted ventures failed (Batson, 2003a). Enron used SPEs initially for legitimate business 
purposes but over the time it ended up misusing these entities and “often budgetary and other basic 
controls were abandoned”  (Cunningham & Harris, 2006)  
Evidence suggests that Enron misused SPEs (Munzig, 2003), hedge transactions, and Pre-Pay 
transactions to engineer its financial statements. For instance:  
Although Enron treated these transactions as sales to SPEs for accounting 
purposes, Enron assumed liability for repayment of the debt incurred and 
retained substantially all of the economic benefits and risks of ownership of 
the asset (Batson, 2003a).  
In this way, Enron’s financial statements appeared less risky as its non-performing assets were sold, 
but from the perspective of good governance, these transactions had no significance in terms of 
managing and controlling risk for Enron. The findings further indicate that: 
Although the transactions were loans in economic substance, Enron 
reported its obligations as price risk management liabilities rather than debt 
(Batson, 2003a). 
Considering the above quotes, it appears that Enron’s focus was on managing financial statements 
rather than achieving economic results and that the financial risk protection measures adopted by 
Enron provided virtually no economic protection to Enron. This is an indication of ceremonial 
adoption of the policies at Enron. The MM Model was also a major source of business risk for Enron. 
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Findings indicate that: “The risk was enormous. If the market reversed, mark-to-market accounting 
required the recognition of losses, possibly enormous losses. A huge gap opened between realistic 
estimation of earnings and Enron’s estimations based on aggressive assumptions about interest 
rates, continuing viability of other parties to contract, taxes, regulations, technology, demand, etc” 
(Cunningham & Harris, 2006). Despite the significant risk involved Enron went ahead with the use of 
the MM Model. It has been discussed in Chapter 4 that the model inflated the earnings of Enron, to 
mispresent the financial performance of Enron. Even after the adoption of the MM Model, there 
were concerns among the staff, which were basically ignored. 
Of all of Enron's private investments, Mariner was the most overvalued 
……………. Noting that the valuation model for Mariner was ``highly 
tweakable,'' another RAC employee says it was easy to inflate the 
investment by changing assumptions ………. two RAC employees say that 
when they complained about investment valuations, the head of their unit, 
Chief Risk Officer Richard B. Buy, rarely backed them up ("ENRON'S FISH 
STORY," 2002).  
 Enron was a big organisation and had business dealings with third parties such as banks and financial 
institutions, and obviously, these third parties were interested in Enron’s performance. Findings 
indicate that Enron used its economic pressure to deal with any concerns raised by these third 
parties.  
………… by using Enron's economic power, Enron officers were able to 
pressure third parties, such as financial institutions and Enron's 
professionals, to accommodate Enron's financial statement objectives. In 
many instances, this economic pressure appears responsible for overcoming 
concerns about reputational risk or other reservations by these third parties 
(Batson, 2003a). 
Many of Enron’s strategies were aggressive in terms of assuming risk. Enron’s recruitment strategy 
focused on hiring “individuals with a risk-taking management style”  and training them “to compete 
fiercely among themselves” (Boje et al., 2004). Moreover, Enron’s compensation strategy further 
added to risky and aggressive business practices, and the focus was on providing an explanation to 
justify decisions rather than making a calculated decision to manage and control risk.  “Their primary 
concern seems to have been to ensure that they had an explanation if someone challenged their 
position, rather than to determine whether their decision was correct or was justified in light of the 
risks assumed” (Batson, 2003a). The risk management and control practices appear more like ticking 
the boxes rather than actually managing the risk, as “Many times Enron officers appear to have 
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obtained opinions or advice from professionals merely as a necessary step to justify questionable 
decisions rather than as a tool to assist them in reaching a considered business decision based upon 
the risks” (Batson, 2003a). Enron’s employees were persuaded to take the risk so as to achieve the 
earnings growth and it monitored the risk in terms of a “good deal vs bad deal”. A business deal was 
considered good if it had a positive impact on Enron’s financial statements, and the significance in 
terms of strategic goals was hardly of concern here. For example:  
 “Enron’s unspoken message was, ‘Make the numbers, make the numbers, 
make the numbers—if you steal, if you cheat, just don’t get caught. If you 
do, beg for a second chance, and you’ll get one” (Elangkovan & Said). 
The way Enron handled the Valhalla trading incident (as discussed in Chapter 4), further supports the 
above findings that Enron monitored its operations in terms of the financial impact they brought to 
its reported earnings. It is worth noting that a considerable share of its reported earnings were 
actually never earned and were generated by using various accounting techniques.  
On a further note even if Enron had measures in place to monitor its risk these were not applied 
thoroughly. For example Enron required its Audit and Compliance committee to review transactions 
with SPEs; however, these significant reviews were done as a mere formality. For example: 
These reviews were a significant part of the control structure, and should 
have been more than just another brief item on the agenda . . . lasting ten 
to fifteen minutes (Benston & Hartgraves, 2002). 
None the less the board approved or acquiesced in several decisions with 
problematic features…., and were aware of Enron’s recourse to 
questionable accounting. The record is replete with developments (such as 
an increase in revenues from $40 billion in 1999 to $101 billion in 2000) 
which would appear to have deserved more questioning by the board than 
they actually occasioned (Cornford, 2004). 
Managing and Controlling Risk - Nathans 
As discussed previously Nathans developed policies to manage and control its risk and claimed to 
follow those rigorously. Despite that, Nathans’s portfolio was ill-diversified, and towards the end, 
consisted primarily of dud loans, which indicates that the established policies to manage and control 
the risk of the company were not adopted. For instance: 
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By the end almost 80 per cent of Nathan funds were invested in dud loans to 
VTL - an unbelievable concentration of risk, a dereliction of diversification 
(Chaplin, 2011). 
It was not that Nathans failed to manage and control its risk in terms of diversification, but findings 
also indicate that Nathan’s lending to VTL and related parties was seriously flawed. It had a 
ceremonial adoption of policies related to managing and controlling risk.  Nathans did not follow set 
rules and procedures to evaluate the risks associated with VTL related lending. For example: 
Leong [Nathans General Manager] said the requests [for loan by VTL to 
Nathans] were usually verbal and the approval process involved nothing 
more than an email to one of the directors. There would be no individual risk 
assessment of the loans or a revaluation of the assets they had already been 
secured against, said Leong (Mace, 2011c). 
…….. [Nathans’] lending to VTL was being rolled over without normal risk 
management practices being applied … (Smellie, 2011). 
Available evidence indicates that Nathans’ operations were significantly controlled by VTL, especially 
in terms of the evaluation of credit requests by VTL and related parties, which would have seriously 
affected its risk management and control practices.  
…. [Nathans General Manager] said Nathans relied on the book value [of 
VTL’S assets held as security by Nathans] provided by VTL ….(Mace, 2011c). 
The findings also suggest that Nathans did not allow free flow or at least adequate flow of VTL 
related information, to its staff. For example: 
…. [Nathans General Manager] said he had no access to the parent 
company's financial information. In order to settle the loans VTL's CFO 
would work closely with Nathans accountant and effectively had control of 
the finance company's bank accounts, he claimed. Leong [Nathans General 
Manager] said he wasn't sure how the transactions were recorded on the 
companies' ledger (Mace, 2011c). 
These findings indicate a significant problem with Nathans’s risk management and control practices. 
It has been discussed in Chapter 5 that only the staff who worked for both VTL and Nathans had 
access to full information about the VTL related lending. 
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On a further note findings indicate that Nathans was constantly rolling over the lending to its parent 
company (VTL), which effectively brought no repayments to Nathans. Nathans’ directors were aware 
of the severe financial problems that VTL and related parties were facing, however despite knowing 
VTL’s inability to repay its dues, Nathans continued to financially support VTL and its related parties. 
The following quote indicates mismanagement of business risk at Nathans. 
“From at least June 2006, the directors of Nathans knew that there was no 
reasonable prospect that the inter-company debt could be repaid without 
VTL selling all or some of its business units,” ……………... “The loans could not 
be repaid out of revenue. The continual capitalisation of interest on loans to 
VTL demonstrated that not even that component could be met regularly out 
of income generated from VTL‘s businesses. “This information was relevant 
to the investment risk because it was directly linked to the possibility that 
VTL may itself, become insolvent.”  Yet the directors were rolling over the 
VTL loans and capitalising interest without referring them through the 
“robust” credit-checking process claimed in the Nathans prospectus  
(Smellie, 2011). 
Nathans was badly diversified, with poor risk management practices but still it managed to raise 
money from the public through its debenture issues. The primary reason for this was that Nathans 
did not disclose its risks clearly to the investors. It did not present the complete picture of its lending 
and related risks, in its investment prospectus. There were concerns raised by the Securities 
Commission on the issues related to disclosure. 
…. [In the Securities Commission‘s letter to Nathans] Issues involving 
business activities and risk were raised: “We understand from the 
investment statement that Nathans was originally established to finance 
the activities of the VTL Group, and that it has since expanded into other 
commercial lending but is still significantly exposed to VTL. We query 
whether there is sufficient information given about this relationship to 
enable investors to properly assess the associated risks. In particular, it is 
not clear what proportion of Nathans’ funds are loaned to VTL and other 
related parties. There also appears to be very little information about non-
VTL lending and the industry or geographical sector- specific, or other, risks 
that may be associated with it” (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. 
Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, paras [165-166]). 
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It was necessary for Nathans to take some action to sort out the concerns the Commission had about 
Nathans. However, Nathans’ directors tended not to resolve the issues, either by improving their risk 
management and control practices or by providing full disclosure to the public. For instance:  
After liaising with Mr Doolan and other members of the prospectus 
preparation team, Mr Steytler proposed that the inter-company advances 
from Nathans to VTL be disclosed as percentages of the total loan book in 
the “Risks” section of the documents………. When Mr Steytler circulated 
those proposals he met with some resistance. The responses from directors 
reflected a very real tension between full disclosure to the public and the 
commercial imperative of “selling” the offer to the public (The Queen v K. R. 
Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, paras 
[170-174]). 
The following quotes indicate that the concerns raised by the Securities Commission were not duly 
attended to.  
At one stage, Hotchin emailed his displeasure at a draft prospectus: "I 
strongly urge that the RISK section is changed as if this is going to market 
NO cash will come in" ("Damien Grant: Duties abrogated in murky world of 
second-tier finance," 2011). 
 “The Risk section is a major concern, I agree with Roger this will create a 
big problem for capital raising going forward. We need to tone this down if 
possible.” (The Queen v J. Hotchin: Sentencing remarks of Lang J., 2011, 
para [22]). 
The findings indicate that even the internal concerns raised to adequately address the issues raised 
by the Securities Commission, were ignored. At Nathans they did not manage and control risk by 
adopting such practices, but by controlling information and avoiding full disclosure. In this way the 
company was able to project (ceremonial) adoption of polices. For example: 
….. “Looks ok to me. Do we have to address the credit concentration issue, 
do we have to make reference [to it] at all”. General Counsel, David Steytler, 
…… replied: “It’s part of disclosure of risks (The Queen v J. Hotchin: 
Sentencing remarks of Lang J., 2011, paras [19,20]). 
Mr Hotchin responded in strong terms: “I strongly urge that the RISK section 
is changed as if this is going to market NO cash will come in………. David 
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[Steytler] you keep quoting our external solicitor as the driving force behind 
this, who is the solicitor and when did a lawyer take control of the decisions 
the BOARD make? I AM NOT HAPPY WITH THE RISK SECTION, IT NEEDS 
MODIFICATION URGENTLY. David, do not copy management on your reply. 
Please only address the DIRECTORS” (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, 
D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, pp., para [181]). 
6.1.4 Selecting CEO and Directors 
The concept Selecting CEO and Directors is represented by two key words: CEO and Director; and two 
separate queries were used (First Keyword- CEO, Second Keyword- Director). The first query 
generated 692 text references from 80 resources for Enron, and a total of 91 text references from 26 
sources were produced for Nathans. The second query provided 6638 text references from 112 
resources for Enron, and a total of 1410 references were generated for Nathans from 90 sources. The 
results of the query are presented in Appendix B (Table B.4. 1, Table B.4. 2, Table B.5. 1, and Table 
B.5. 2). 
For the keyword CEO, NVivo Enron generated text references containing words such as CEO, CEOs, 
Chairman, and CFO; whereas NVivo Nathans produced text references containing the words CEO, 
Chairman, President etc. In the case of Enron, text references containing the words CEO and/or 
Chairman were found to be relevant; and for Nathans text references containing word chairman 
were found to be relevant. For the second keyword, text references containing the words 
management, directors, directorates and/or director provided relevant information about the 
selection of key people at Enron; whereas text references containing the words directors and/or 
director provided insight into the selection of key people at Nathans. 
Selecting CEO and Directors - Enron  
The findings indicate that both Lay and Skilling played an important role in envisioning the future of 
the company. According to the annual report of the company “ENRON CHAIRMAN AND CEO Kenneth 
L. Lay …. and President and CEO Jeffrey K. Skilling share a vision for positioning Enron as the leading 
energy provider in markets that are undergoing deregulation and privatization” (Enron, 1998). Lay 
was part of Enron since its formation and he brought Skilling along later. Lay was “……. so impressed 
with Skilling’s talents that he created a new business division in 1990 to bring Skilling’s leadership to 
the Company permanently” (Arnold & Lange, 2004). It is important to note that Skilling as an outside 
consultant brought the idea of Gas Bank to Enron, and it was this idea that impressed Lay. These 
findings indicate that Enron’s then CEO Lay saw an opportunity in the deregulation and privatisation 
of the energy sector and was determined to bring people on board who shared his vision.  
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The findings provide evidence that Enron’s board comprised mainly outside directors and that all the 
board members were well qualified and experienced. For instance: 
Of the 14 board members in 2001 only two were company executives 
(Chairman of the Board and former CEO Kenneth L. Lay and President and 
CEO Jeffrey K. Skilling). The remaining 12 outside directors included five 
CEOs, four academics (including economist Wendy Gramm — former head 
of the Commodities and Futures Trading Commission, Robert Jaedicke—a 
former Stanford accounting professor, a professional investor, and a former 
U.K. politician. Only three of these directors were viewed as affiliated—
Belfer (the former president of Belco Oil and Gas which was acquired and 
became an Enron subsidiary),Wakeham (who also acted as a consultant to 
Enron on the U.K. utility industry), and Winokur (who had business dealings 
with Enron) (Gillan & Martin, 2007). 
Enron’s board members also served on various committees such as executive, finance and audit 
committees. Enron had almost no changes in the memberships of these committees and it was found 
that “… not only was there almost no movement among committee membership, the executive, audit, 
compensation, and finance committees were chaired by the same directors since 1995. Only the 
nominating committee changed chairmanship during this time, due to Director Walker's departure 
from the board” (Downes & Russ, 2005). This indicates a long term consistent team. Moreover, both 
Lay and Skilling held important positions at Enron for the majority of the life of Enron. “Lay was 
Chairman and CEO, and Skilling was President and COO ……. For a six-month period, from February 
through August 2001, Skilling held the position of CEO and Lay continued as Chairman. In August 
2001, when Skilling abruptly resigned all his positions with Enron, Lay resumed the role of CEO” 
(Batson, 2003a). 
Enron’s CEO and Board members received a highly competitive remuneration. “Lay's total pay 
package was almost $31 million—more than four times the compensation of the average peer firm 
CEO” (Gillan & Martin, 2007). Furthermore “Enron directors were among the mostly highly paid for 
their services, according to Pearl Meyer & partners, a New York compensation consulting firm” 
(Ableson, 2002). 
Technically speaking Enron had an independent board and, apart from Lay and Skilling, the rest of 
the board members were outside directors. However, Enron’s board had conflicts of interests where 
its board members had interlocking directorships, and had also been providing other paid services to 
Enron and its management. Enron also made significant donations to the institutions that were 
related to its directors. For example: 
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Unfortunately, many of them [Enron’s directors] had relationships with 
Enron and its management team that clouded their consciences. Directors, 
for example, were collecting fees from Enron for services rendered, and 
some were even on retainer for legal and consulting services. Any opposition 
to management may have meant forfeiting these lucrative contracts 
(Downes & Russ, 2005).  
…… several directors who would otherwise be considered independent 
suffered from potential conflicts of interest by way of business 
arrangements, or the receipt of charitable contributions or consulting fees 
(Gillan & Martin, 2007). 
…………… [The directors] were paid large sums by Enron for their consulting 
services. This creates a situation where board members are beholden to 
management, and thus may side with executives in order to retain their 
contracts with the company. The same may be true of interlocking 
directorates, and Enron had several. In fact, all Azurix Water company 
directors also sat on Enron's board, which may have provoked the 
temptation to "scratch each other’s' backs." This is not surprising, as all 
board members had been nominated by management (Downes & Russ, 
2005).  
Frank Savage was a director for both Enron and the investment firm Alliance 
Capital Management, which since the late 1990’s was the largest 
institutional investor in Enron …… (Munzig, 2003).  
Enron made donations to groups with which directors were affiliated (Gillan 
& Martin, 2007). 
Selecting CEO and Directors - Nathans  
As stated earlier, Nathans was a subsidiary of VTL and provided finances mainly to VTL and related 
parties. The findings relate back to VTL, due to its significance (as discussed in Chapter 5) in 
understanding corporate governance at Nathans. VTL was the dream project of Hotchin who brought 
Doolan along, who shared his vision.  
Hotchin said he and Doolan saw a huge global opportunity to roll the 
technology out. "I thought Doolan was a bright, intelligent man. I wanted to 
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do business with him. It dawned on us that there was a good opportunity." 
(Gregor, 2011b).  
Nathans’ parent company “VTL had a number of high profile directors. The company was chaired 
successively by John Collinge (former president of the National Party), Richard Janes (former 
Chairman of Wools of New Zealand Limited), Warren Larsen (former CEO of the New Zealand Dairy 
Board) and Gary Stevens” (The Queen v J. Hotchin: Sentencing remarks of Lang J., 2011, para [5]). 
Similarly, Nathans’ board consisted of four well experienced and educated members. For instance: 
John Hotchin, who before his VTL career was best known as the youthful 
managing director of Graphic Mirage Print back in the early 1990s …….; 
Donald Young, an accountant who was previously a founding investor in 
water cooler company Aqua-Cool ……..; Mervyn Doolan, who appears to 
have had few directorships or much of a profile outside his VTL role; and 
Kenneth (Roger) Moses, who is a former director of broker Reeves Moses, 
which ran failed contributory mortgage schemes(Robertson, 2009). 
Moses and Hotchin held important position at Nathans. “ Mr Moses became the chairman of the 
Nathans board around September 2005, after Mr Hotchin resigned from that position”. (The Queen v 
K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, para [10]). Nathans had a 
long term stable board with the only change being when Young joined the board in 2005. Similarly, 
there was no change in the membership of the various committees formed by the board.  
The risk management policy defined the roles of members of the senior 
management team and directors, as well as establishing a number of 
committees ………. Moses and Doolan deposed that this policy document 
remained in place for the balance of Nathans‘ trading life. No steps were 
taken to modify the policies when Mr Young joined the Nathans‘ board in 
September 2005 (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: 
Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, para [128]). 
The management committee of Nathans comprised its general manager, 
the chief financial officer of VTL and one director of Nathans. Mr Doolan 
was the director who primarily fulfilled that role…………….. [When Doolan 
reduced his commitment] No director substituted on the management 
committee for Mr Doolan ……….. (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. 
Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, para [134]). 
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The findings provide that “All of Nathans’ directors were, at one time or another, members of the VTL 
board” (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, para 
[10]). And that “[VTL] was controlled and managed by the same board of directors that governed 
Nathans” (The Queen v J. Hotchin: Sentencing remarks of Lang J., 2011, para [26]). This indicates a 
conflict of interest as Nathans was lending money to VTL especially when the directors were involved 
in the application process from both sides.  
[VTL’S loan] requests usually came to Nathans from Doolan himself as a 
director of VTL (Mace, 2011c).  
The findings further suggest that Nathans’ board controlled the access to VTL related information. 
Even its directors only got access to that information once they joined VTL’s board. For example: 
Mr Moses had access to all board papers for Nathans from his appointment 
as a director of that company on 11 August 2003 and of VTL, after his 
appointment to the board of that company on 4 May 2004 (The Queen v K. 
R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, 
para [408]). 
There were occasions, such as receipt of the MC Capital valuation [to assess 
the value of VTL’s assets held as security by Nathans] in May 2006, when 
although he [Young] was told by Mr Doolan of the general outcome of the 
report, he did not receive a copy. Mr Young had the opportunity to consider 
VTL documentation after joining that board on 13 December 2006 (The 
Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath 
J., 2011, para [408]). 
The other conflict of interest was that some of the Nathans’ board members also borrowed 
significant sums of money from Nathans through the trusts associated with them at terms and 
conditions favourable to them, e.g. rollover of loans (as discussed in Chapter 5).  
Directors of failed Nathans Finance and its parent VTL successfully applied 
to the finance company for loans to trusts administered by their spouses in 
the two years before it collapsed (Mace, 2011d).  
The loans were given to the Boston Trust, with trustee Joanne Doolan, and 
the McConnachie Trust, with trustee Sally Hotchin. Both acquired interest-
only loans of US$780,000 (NZ$1.1 million) for 36 months secured against 
directors' shares in VTL. The Milford Way Trust of Gary Stevens, former VTL 
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chairman, also had a $75,000 loan which was rolled over to $125,250 for 
another 12 months from June 2007, records tabled in the court showed 
(William, 2011).  
Some of the directors also provided paid professional services to Nathans such as consultancy. For 
example “Nathans has paid Moses Stevens & Associates Limited $15,000 in the twelve months to 30 
June 2006 for consulting services provided by Kenneth Roger Moses” (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. 
Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, para [203]). 
6.1.5 Monitoring Performance 
The concept of Monitoring performance is represented by the keyword Performance. In NVivo-Enron 
the text search query for key word Performance generated 6445 text references from 76 sources, 
whereas a total of 690 text references from 19 sources were generated in NVivo-Nathans. The results 
of the queries are presented in Appendix B (Table B.6. 1, Table B.6. 2).  
The results show that for both Enron and Nathans, the words act and executive had the highest 
count. However, neither of these words provided text references relevant to the concept of 
Monitoring performance. The text references for the word “performance” have been found to be 
most relevant in generating information related to the concept for both the organisations. 
Monitoring Performance - Enron  
In the case of Enron, the findings indicate that the company had a formal set up to monitor its 
performance such as the performance review committee (Arnold & Lange, 2004). It had a 
compensation plan based on employee performance to ensure that the employees were contributing 
effectively. For example Enron’s Annual Report stated “Enron subsidiaries maintain various incentive 
based compensation plans for which participants may receive a combination of cash or stock options, 
based upon the achievement of certain performance goals” (Enron, 2000). The company had a 
Performance Review Committee (PRC) that monitored the performance of its employees (Arnold & 
Lange, 2004). The company also had established an RAC (Risk Assessment & Control Group) which 
monitored the performance of various departments of the company ("ENRON'S FISH STORY," 2002).  
Further, the findings indicate that there were shortcomings in this system. The performance review 
system of Enron was “known as the harshest employee-ranking system in the country” (Arnold & 
Lange, 2004). Moreover, “Enron's performance-review system gave dealmakers [Enron’s trading 
departments] the ability to evaluate the RAC personnel who were reviewing their deals--a practice 
that made it risky to challenge aggressive investment valuations” ("ENRON'S FISH STORY," 2002).  
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This was certainly a conflict of interest as RAC employees were supposed to assess and control the 
activities of these departments.  
The findings suggest that Enron’s only apparent performance measure was profit. Even though 
“Enron based its employee values on the principles of respect, integrity, communication and 
excellence …….  employees soon learned, the only meaningful performance measure was the 
relentless pursuit of profit” (Arnold & Lange, 2004). Similarly Enron’s Annual Report states “Enron is 
laser-focused on earnings per share, and we expect to continue strong earnings performance” 
(Enron, 2000). 
“Enron’s stated compensation philosophy was a pay for performance approach; those who were 
determined to perform well were paid well” (Schmitt, 2003). This, along with the harsh performance 
review system, appeared to have nurtured a tendency among Enron employees to go for risky deals, 
as the higher the risk the higher the chance of profit. For instance:  
The tools put in place to promote management accomplishment within 
Enron, ironically grew to become the self-serving objective of management. 
Whilst information asymmetry grew, management appeared to escalate 
their risk taking efforts aware that this would enhance the perception of 
their performance with little chance of being exposed (Arnold & Lange, 
2004). 
This further promoted some of the questionable practices at Enron, such as Enron using SPEs to hide 
its non-performing assets and also to create a positive impression in its financial statements.  
Opportunistic strategies were also evident in the use of the SPEs. These 
were used to avert the negative performance indicators ………. (Arnold & 
Lange, 2004). 
It is important to note that even though Enron was successful in creating a favourable impression 
through its financial statements, internally the RAC was not satisfied with the performance of the 
company.  
While the company boasted about the performance of its investments 
externally, a different picture was painted internally. According to Kose, 
executives at an RAC meeting told other members of the unit in the summer 
of 2001 that 70% of Enron's investments had failed to meet their internal 
performance targets ("ENRON'S FISH STORY," 2002). 
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Despite having concerns, no significant steps were taken by the RAC to control these practices- this 
indicates the flaw in the performance review system of Enron. As RAC employees were evaluated by 
other departments, this might have stopped them from taking strong actions.  
Monitoring Performance - Nathans  
The findings indicate that Nathans claimed to have a robust system in place to monitor its 
performance. For example: 
[Nathans’s investment prospectus stated that] the Company has policies in 
place to ensure that all obligations are met within a timely and cost efficient 
manner, and prudential policies are regularly monitored. In addition, the 
Company monitors its liquidity ratios monthly against prior month and 
financial year performance (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. 
Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, para [196]). 
[Moses said that] "Nathans Finance is in a unique position in that VTL 
Group's franchise operators have their business performance monitored 
electronically on a daily basis. This means that any business difficulties they 
are experiencing are picked up early, so immediate remedial action can be 
taken." (Solid Nathans Finance Results, 2006). 
The above findings indicate that Nathans not only claimed to have a good system to monitor its 
performance, but it also claimed to use its (or its directors) relation with VTL to monitor the 
performance of VTL related parties as to whom it has advanced loans. However, further findings 
reveal that Nathans’ claims lacked ground, and that it failed to monitor the VTL and related party 
finance, thereby resulting in a significant deficit for Nathans (Gaynor, 2009).  
There were shortcomings in the way Nathans was operating as a finance company. For example, the 
valuation of VTL’s assets used by Nathans in the loan application process were based on the analysis 
provided by VTL. 
The valuation relied, however, upon a discounted cash flow analysis based 
on a five year forecast prepared by VTL’s internal management. The 
information available to Nathans’ directors ought to have led them to 
conclude by December 2006 that it was not reasonable to rely on this 
valuation, because VTL’s actual business performance did not match the 
forecasts upon which the valuer had relied. This fact should have led 
Nathans to treat VTL’s loans as impaired, and it also called into question the 
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validity of the valuation prepared seven months earlier (The Queen v J. 
Hotchin: Sentencing remarks of Lang J., 2011, para [33]). 
In preparing his valuation, Mr Cole-Baker relied on a 20 year budget for 
Intelligent prepared by VTL’s management. The assumptions in the budget 
did not accurately reflect the past trading performance …. (The Queen v J. 
Hotchin: Sentencing remarks of Lang J., 2011, para [50]). 
These findings suggest that Nathans’ board failed to take corrective action despite knowing the poor 
performance of VTL and related parties. Since Nathans’ directors were also part of VTL, they should 
have knowledge about those issues. However, the findings indicate that Nathans’ directors had 
biased attention and ignored those issues and Nathans continued to lend money to VTL and its 
related parties. For example, during the post failure trial the court noted that: 
You [Hotchin] were prepared to overlook or ignore the fact that VTL and its 
associated companies were performing poorly. This was despite the fact 
that the financial information that was made available to you made that 
fact plain (The Queen v J. Hotchin: Sentencing remarks of Lang J., 2011, para 
[51]). 
It was found that rather than declaring the impaired debt (VTL and related party debt), Nathans 
disguised its negative performance. “Nathans routinely rolled over impaired related party loans and 
capitalised the interest on them to create the guise of a performing asset in its financial statements.” 
("Nathans directors 'bedevilled by conflict'," 2011). The company appear to have an intention of 
ceremonial compliance rather than adopting it in spirit. The findings provided evidence that “non-
performing loans, particularly related-party loans, were frequently rolled over and interest was 
capitalised. These loans were never transferred to the credit recovery team for ongoing management 
and recovery” (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 
2011, para [58]). 
It was further found that Nathans’s had biased attention towards the concerns raised by external 
parties in this regard. For example, some of the franchisees of VTL raised concerns that “the financial 
performance of the VTL entity was a long way from the financial projections that were forecast” 
(Gregor, 2011a). Even the ASB Bank declined to grant a $5 million funding line, for Nathans due to 
the concerns it had about the financial performance of Nathans and VTL (The Queen v K. R. Moses, 
M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, para [341]). 
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6.2 Decision Processes 
The study analysed the corporate governance decision processes on the basis of ‘A Behavioral Theory 
of the Firm’ by Cyert and March (2001). The theory is based on four relational concepts, which are: 
Quasi Resolution of Conflict, Uncertainty Avoidance, Problemistic Search, and Organisational 
Learning. According to Cyert and March (2001) these concepts are the heart of the their theory. 
Based on these relational concepts, the researcher had a ‘start list’ to represent the corporate 
governance decision processes, which is presented in Appendix A (Table A. 2). 
The study used NVivo to extract the findings related to the above four concepts. By now the 
researcher already had two separate NVivo projects for Enron and Nathans (as stated in Corporate 
Governance Functions). The same projects were further used to run text search queries and word 
frequency queries for the four relational concepts. The criteria for the use of NVivo was the same as 
discussed previously (under Corporate Governance Functions).   
6.2.1 Resolution of Conflict (Quasi Resolution of Conflict) 
According to Cyert and March (2001) an organisation is a coalition of members who have both similar 
and different goals. This leads to conflict among members so the organisation goes through the 
process of resolving those conflicts. Therefore, the focus of this query was on the way conflict was 
resolved at both the organisations.  
The concept of ‘Resolution of Conflict’ is represented by the key words Conflict and Resolve. For the 
keyword, Conflict, the text search query in NVivo-Enron generated 2380 text references from 103 
sources, whereas a total of 134 text references from 34 sources were generated in NVivo-Nathans.  
For the keyword, Resolve, NVivo Enron generated a total of 1914 text references from 109 sources, 
whereas NVivo Nathans generated 199 text references from 51 sources. It is important to mention 
that the query results from NVivo presented the starting point to the researcher. The researcher 
searched for further information, mostly surrounding those, to analyse the concept of ‘Resolution of 
Conflict’. A similar approach was needed for the rest of the three concepts of the decision-making 
process. The results of the queries are presented in Appendix B (Table B.7. 1,  Table B.8. 1, and Table 
B.8. 2).  
In the case of Enron quotes containing the keywords Conflict, Conflicting, Different, Engage, Dispute, 
Solution, and Difference provided the key insights into the concept. Whereas in case of Nathans 
keywords Conflict, Struggle, Difference, Dispute, Difference and Differently provided the key insights. 
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Resolution of Conflict - Enron  
In the case of Enron, the findings reflect various conflicts at Enron, such as its issues related to its 
accounting practices (Batson, 2003a), hedging transactions (Behr & Witt, 2002a), concerns regarding 
its use of SPEs (Batson, 2003a) and the  role of Enron employees at various SPEs (Cunningham & 
Harris, 2006). 
It has been found that there were concerns regarding the accounting practices the company had 
adopted. For example: 
 ……. Andersen [Enron’s auditors] partner David Duncan may have warned 
the Audit Committee of the risk that others could have a different view of 
Enron's aggressive accounting and disclosure (Batson, 2003a, p. 43).  
However, in their sworn statements to the court, the member of the Audit Committee denied having 
knowledge of the severity of the situation.  
Indeed, multiple Audit Committee members have stated that they were not 
informed by Andersen of the magnitude of the transactions that involved 
"high risk" accounting judgments (Batson, 2003a, p. 43). 
The findings further indicate that by February 2001 Andersen was so concerned about these issues 
that it considered whether to retain Enron as a client or not10. Prior to that Andersen also made the 
suggestion to “disclose the impact of the Prepay Transactions on the financial statements” but did 
not pursue it further when Enron refused to make the disclosures (Batson, 2003a, pp. 44-45). It raises 
the question that if Andersen was so concerned about Enron’s accounting practices why it never 
raised the issue strongly with Enron. Even the above-mentioned warning by Duncan was given orally 
only (Batson, 2003a, p. 43). The following findings support the lack of stringent action on the part of 
Andersen to raise or resolve this conflict. 
In an internal February 2001 Andersen meeting regarding whether Enron 
should be retained as a client, the Engagement Team presented a slide 
prepared for its anticipated presentation to the Audit Committee that 
disclosed that the application of GAAP to Enron's structured transactions 
often requires "extreme" judgement. When Andersen made the actual 
presentation to the Audit Committee a week later, however, the word 
"extreme" was replaced with the word "significant" on that slide. The 
                                                             
10 Andersen remained Enron’s auditor till the end. 
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evidence suggests that Andersen took a similar approach in other aspects of 
its presentations to Enron's Audit Committee, in which "accounting risk" and 
"disclosure risk" were described as a product of the complexity of Enron's 
business, when in fact that risk arose from the aggressive accounting 
techniques (Batson, 2003a, p. 44).  
Along with accounting practices, Andersen had concerns regarding the use of SPEs by Enron. One of 
the internal emails at Andersen stated “Setting aside the accounting, idea of a venture entity 
managed by CFO is terrible from a business point of view. Conflicts of interest galore. Why would any 
director in his or her right mind ever approve such a scheme?” (Batson, 2003a, p. 45). There is no 
evidence suggesting that these concerns were ever put forward by Andersen. One of the reasons 
could be that Enron was the biggest client for Andersen (Behr & Witt, 2002a) and Andersen did not 
want to risk losing that business. The findings indicate that even if the employees at Andersen raised 
concerns, Enron indicated its displeasure. For example: 
Enron's Chief Accounting Officer, Causey, had requested that Andersen 
remove Andersen partner Carl Bass [who worked in a senior position at 
Enron (Schmidt, 2002)] from further participation in the Enron [when Bass 
objected to some of the accounting treatment at Enron (Schmidt, 2002)]” 
(Batson, 2003a, p. 102). 
Commenting on Enron's ability to exert pressure on Andersen, one Enron in-
house attorney commented: ……………. a very junior person at AA in London 
said no, that will not work ……………………… We will see if the junior person 
who has made this trouble is employed with AA after January 1st; however, 
very few people here are betting on that (Batson, 2003a, p. 102). 
……. An Andersen employee, would later testify that she was told not to 
press her challenge to an Enron action. "It is what it is," she said a superior 
told her. "The higher-ups [at Enron] had already decided that it was going to 
be done." (Behr & Witt, 2002a). 
It has been found that even internally conflicts were not duly resolved at Enron. For example, the 
RAC group at Enron disapproved of many of the practices at Enron such as hedging and SPE 
transactions (Behr & Witt, 2002a). The following quotes indicate the presence of such conflicts. 
Kaminski had never liked Enron's strategy of using its own stock to hedge its 
tech investments in deals with …. [SPEs]. He thought the risk involved and 
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Fastow's conflict of interest created a situation where "heads the 
partnership wins, tails Enron looses." s (Behr & Witt, 2002a).  
However, the RAC was unsuccessful in getting its concerns addressed. For example, the following 
quote indicates that despite RAC’s concerns Enron did not adjust (so as to reflect the true picture) 
the book value of some of its investments.  
Executives inside a key internal control unit, the Risk Assessment & Control 
Group, felt its [Mariner- one of Enron’s investments] soaring book value was 
overstated, according to several ex-employees. They waged an unsuccessful 
war to have Mariner's value marked down ("ENRON'S FISH STORY," 2002). 
Enron regularly discarded the analysis provided by the RAC, resulting in a kind of withdrawal by the 
RAC. For example: “While the company boasted about the performance of its investments externally, 
a different picture was painted internally. According to Kose, executives at an RAC meeting told other 
members of the unit in the summer of 2001 that 70% of Enron's investments had failed to meet their 
internal performance targets. The summer meeting ``was supposed to be secret,'' says Kose. ``They 
purposely did not distribute any documents.” ("ENRON'S FISH STORY," 2002). The following quote 
further confirms these findings. 
Many [RAC employees] say that they frequently complained about how their 
sophisticated financial analyses were discarded. So, out of frustration, they 
decided to take a different approach to valuing the company's outside 
stakes starting in early 2000. Rather than simply rubber-stamping the 
investment valuations proposed by the company's business units, as they 
had been pressured to do in the past, they decided to start offering 
valuation ``ranges'' for the company's investments. The range for Mariner, 
for instance, was $80 million to $350 million, according to one RAC source. 
("ENRON'S FISH STORY," 2002). 
This indicates that the conflict was not resolved, and RAC adopted the above approach to safeguard 
itself from related consequences. For example: 
Little changed, though, as the company almost always took the highest 
possible valuation. But the RAC group believed it was making a point. ``If 
they were marking [the valuation] to whatever number they wanted for 
book purposes, we didn't want to be responsible for that number,'' says 
another former RAC manager ("ENRON'S FISH STORY," 2002).  
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Findings further indicate that some significant conflict issues, despite being known, were not given 
appropriate consideration. For example, the use of SPEs and the interest of Enron’s staff in those 
SPEs were significant issues. As discussed in Chapter 4, there was a conflict of interest involved. 
However, the board appeared to have a limited discussion on such transactions. For example:  
The special meeting lasted only an hour, and amongst the approval of the 
conflict of interest [in LJM transaction] were substantial topics such as 
resolutions authorizing a major stock split, changes in the company’s stock 
compensation plan, acquisition of a new corporate jet, and discussion on an 
investment in a Middle Eastern power plant (Munzig, 2003).  
The above findings indicate that the board did not appear to challenge most of the decisions, nor was 
it dissatisfied with limited discussion on important matters.  
Mr. Winokur admitted, however, that neither he nor any other Board 
member had inquired about who bought Mr. Fastow’s interest in LJM, in 
order to verify that no conflict of interest remained (The Role of the Board of 
Directors in the Enron's Collapse, 2002, p. 34). 
Sworn Statement of Jerome J. Meyer, former Director, Enron, to Steven M. 
Collins, A&B, Aug. 29, 2003, at 45-46 ("Q. With respect to the board 
meetings, did you feel that the time that was allotted to the board meetings 
was sufficient for you to have all your questions answered about the 
matters that were brought before the board? A. Yes. I never felt like we 
were without time to address everything that needed to be addressed. I'm 
comfortable with that (Batson, 2003a, p. 133). 
Another significant finding regarding conflict resolution is the memo presented by Sherron Watkins 
to Lay, raising concerns and warning of severe implications, about accounting irregularities at Enron. 
Watkins requested Lay not to engage Vinson and Elkins, Enron’s primary outside law firm, in the 
investigation because Vinson and Elkins participated in structuring those transactions. However, 
Enron asked Vinson and Elkins to investigate the matter (Brickey, 2003). 
Resolution of Conflict - Nathans  
In the case of Nathans, it is found that most of the conflict arose from VTL and related party 
transactions. It has been discussed in Chapter 5, that a large part of Nathans’ lending portfolio 
consisted of VTL and its related parties. The findings indicate that it was not only the percentage and 
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volume of lending to VTL and related parties that was the cause of concern, but also the falling 
financial performance of these parties (Gaynor, 2009; Mace, 2011a).  
To resolve the VTL related situation, Nathans claimed to follow rigorous credit approval procedures 
for VTL and its related parties. For instance: 
That impression is conveyed by statements that loans to VTL companies 
were made on the same basis as those made to arm’s length third parties. 
An inter- company loan would be treated no differently from any other loan, 
with regard to payment of interest, repayment of principal and, if necessary, 
enforcement of securities (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. 
Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011para [207]).  
Nathans’s policies also did not differentiate between VTL related and third party lending. However, 
as far as the above claims of arm’s length relations were concerned’ “the directors were aware of the 
cursory basis on which applications for finance and/or roll-overs were made in cases involving VTL, 
IVL, and AVS. The degree of scrutiny given to third party borrowers far exceeded those relating to VTL, 
IVL, and AVS ….” (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 
2011). On a further note, Nathans also presented some of the VTL related lendings as commercial 
lending to improve its financial ratios. For instance, findings indicate that: 
 While the amounts owed by IVL and AVS were ………………. treated as part of 
the “commercial” lending [despite the fact that] ………… IVL and AVS were 
inextricably linked to that of VTL. (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. 
M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011para [152]). 
The not so good financial position of VTL and its related parties affected their repayments to Nathans 
(The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011). To resolve 
the situation, Nathans rolled over these loans. However, it seems that these rollover decisions never 
expected to recover Nathans’ money. For example: 
It is interesting that the roll-over was being pressed by the lender [Nathans], 
in a situation where it knew that the borrower had not (and could not) pay 
the debt when due (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: 
Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011para [311]).  
It is important to note that there is no evidence that Nathans ever rolled over loans to third parties, 
but only to VTL and related parties. The frequent rollovers affected the cash flows at Nathans as a 
significant part of its lending was bringing no repayments. To resolve the situation Nathans relied on 
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retention of old investors and bringing in more investors. The following quote describes Nathans’ 
approach to resolving this situation: 
In the year to June 2006 Nathans received $4.9m of interest in cash yet paid 
out $9.1m in interest to secured debenture holders. The difference was met 
by funds received from subscriptions by new debenture holders (Field, 
2011).  
Short said she was happy with the some 70 per cent [retention rate of 
investors], however the directors - Doolan, Moses and Young - wanted to 
achieve a 75 per cent retention target ("Witness outlines attempts to retain 
75pc of Nathans investors," 2011).  
Since Nathans was lending long-term and borrowing short term, the above approach did not resolve 
the situation but rather postponed it. This was certainly not a good way to manage a finance 
company. However, Nathans appeared to have control over VTL related information. For example: 
Mr Young had the opportunity to consider VTL documentation after joining 
that [VTL] board ……….. (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: 
Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, para [408]). 
It has been disclosed previously that Nathans General manager had no access to VTL related financial 
information. According to the General Manager, “he wasn't sure how the [VTL related] transactions 
were recorded on the companies' ledger” (Mace, 2011c). It appears that the controlled flow of 
information resulted in almost no internal objections in terms of VTL related lending. However, 
findings indicate that there were concerns raised regarding Nathans’ operations. For example: 
[The Securities Commission raised concerns about Nathans, prospectus 
stating] In particular, it is not clear what proportion of Nathans‘ funds are 
loaned to VTL and other related parties (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. 
Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011). 
The findings indicate that in response to the above concerns, when the Prospectus preparation team 
proposed to clearly disclose VTL related lending percentages in the prospectus, they met with 
resistance from the directors. For example: “The responses from directors reflected a very real 
tension between full disclosure to the public and the commercial imperative of ‘selling’ the offer to 
the public” (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 
2011Paras [172-174]). Even though there was a difference of opinion regarding the changes 
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required, the board allowed no conflict in that regard. The following quote from one of the director’s 
email supports these findings. 
David [Steytler] you keep quoting our external solicitor as the driving force 
behind this [suggestion to provide clear disclosure], who is the solicitor and 
when did a lawyer take control of the decisions the BOARD make? I AM NOT 
HAPPY WITH THE RISK SECTION, IT NEEDS MODIFICATION URGENTLY. 
David, do not copy management on your reply. Please only address the 
DIRECTORS (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for 
Verdict of Heath J., 2011Para [181]). 
6.2.2 Dealing with Uncertainty and Risk (Uncertainty Avoidance) 
Uncertainty and risk are important factors that affect decision making. According to Cyert and March 
(2001), organisations try to avoid situations requiring correct anticipation of future events (in terms 
of uncertainty and risk). For the purpose of this research, the focus was on the way the organisations 
dealt with the uncertainties and risk. 
The concept of ‘Uncertainty Avoidance’ is represented by the keywords Uncertainty, Risk, and Avoid.  
For the keyword, Uncertainty, the text search query in NVivo-Enron generated 281 text references 
from 68 sources, whereas a total of 28 text references from 13 sources were generated in NVivo-
Nathans.  For the keyword, Avoid, NVivo Enron generated a total of 410 text references from 74 
sources, whereas NVivo Nathans generated 17 text references from 9 sources. For the keyword, Risk, 
the queries used the concept ‘Managing and controlling risk’ for both the organisations. To avoid the 
repetition, no direct quotes for the keyword Risk are provided under this section, rather a reference 
is made to the previously cited quotes. The results of the queries are presented in Appendix B (Table 
B.9. 1, Table B.9. 2, Table B.10. 1, and Table B.10. 2). 
In the case of Enron quotes containing the keywords Precarious, Dubious, and Avoid have provided 
important details about the concept. Whereas in the case of Nathans quotes containing the words 
Precarious, Doubt and Avoid have been found to be useful. It is important to note that the quotes 
containing words Risk and Risks have also provided useful information in regard to uncertainty and 
risk (as part of decision making). 
Dealing with Uncertainty and Risk - Enron  
It has already been discussed under the section ‘Managing and Controlling Risk’ that Enron used SPEs 
to mitigate the uncertainties related to its financial books. These SPEs were used to control the 
financial statements/information of the company. In doing so, the focus of Enron was not on finding 
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a solution to deal with uncertainties and risks, rather it hid/disguised the information to escape from 
those uncertainties. SPEs offered a temporary relief to the company, which indicates that Enron’s 
decisions had a short-run orientation. Enron used a series of SPEs to gain ongoing relief, which 
indicates that long-term impacts were not evaluated. The following quotes further confirm these 
findings: 
Some of Enron’s most abusive SPEs were created to avoid reporting mark-
to-market losses (Cunningham & Harris, 2006).  
Enron had investments in companies (which were not SPEs) that it 
consolidated or reported on the equity method. When the investments 
began to show losses, they were transferred to SPEs so Enron would not 
reflect the losses. Enron did not consolidate or report the SPEs on the equity 
method, and thus avoided reporting the loss (Cunningham & Harris, 2006). 
In order to avoid reporting a loss of $500 million at year-end 2000, the 
Raptors were cross-collateralized against each other (in effect combining 
their assets) for forty-five days. This support arrangement used the assets in 
the Raptors that were still above water as collateral for those not faring as 
well (Markham, 2006, p. 80). 
SPEs sold Enron put options on several of its investments. These allowed 
Enron to avoid showing losses when the investments declined in value 
because the losses were offset by the put-option obligations of the SPEs. 
However, Enron provided almost all of the funds for the SPEs that, 
presumably, were available to pay Enron should the investments decline in 
value. Consequently, Enron’s shareholders could not avoid absorbing losses 
on the investments, but Enron could avoid showing those losses (Benston & 
Hartgraves, 2002). 
LJM2 provided the outside equity designed to avoid consolidation of the 
Raptor SPEs (Powers et al., 2002).  
On a further note the adoption of the MM Model was another source of uncertainty and risk for the 
company. As discussed previously under ‘Managing and Controlling Risk’, the company based its MM 
Model on an over optimistic approach/valuation. Here as well, the focus was on the positive impact 
on the reported earnings, and the long-term implications were ignored. For example: “Under mark-to 
market accounting, these gains had been booked as earnings thus, to avoid reporting possible losses” 
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(Gillan & Martin, 2007). Similarly, the handling of the Valhalla scandal indicates that the company 
valued short-run implications above the long-run implications, as “the company was able to avoid 
defaulting on its $4 billion in debt because of some fortuitous profit racked up by a small trading 
subsidiary in Valhalla” (Pearlstein, 2006). 
It has been previously discussed under ‘Managing and Controlling Risk’ that Enron exercised its 
power to influence the decisions of third parties such as banks and financial institutions. The 
following quote further confirms Enron’s approach to controlling its environment to deal with 
uncertainties and risks:  
……… once again, Enron aggressively lobbied to avoid FERC oversight of 
many of its operations (Gillan & Martin, 2007). 
Dealing with Uncertainty and Risk - Nathans  
In the case of Nathans, it has been discussed earlier (under Managing and Controlling Risks) that VTL 
and related party lending was one of the major sources of uncertainty and risk for the company. 
Nathans was aware that it could have bring severe implications for it. However, the approach, 
adopted by Nathans indicates that it focused on immediate implications and the long-term impact 
was not considered. As discussed previously, Nathans rolled over VTL related loans which was a 
short-term solution and Nathans used a series of rollover transactions to hide its bad debts. This was 
a quite similar approach to Enron’s SPEs in terms of decision orientation. Nathans also disguised its 
financial statements to mislead the investors about its weak lending concentration and, like Enron, 
avoided full disclosure to cater for the related uncertainties and risks. The following quote confirms 
this finding: 
And, in spite of its precarious financial position, in the eight weeks before 
collapsing into receivership Nathan Finance sent two reassuring letters to 
investors and prospective investors, and pulled in an extra $6m (McManus, 
2010). 
“no bad debts written off” statement was only technically correct, because 
the Nathans and parent company VTL directors did “everything in their 
power to avoid any of its debts being classified as impaired,..”("Nathans 
directors 'bedevilled by conflict'," 2011). 
The above quotes also indicate that by controlling the information (to external parties) Nathans tried 
to control its environment. Even after being aware of the concerns of the Securities Commission, 
 119 
Nathans did not evaluate the long-term implications. The following quote supports that at that time 
as well the focus was on immediate implications: 
“I strongly urge that the RISK section is changed as if this is going to market 
NO cash will come in …………………….. this is simply not commercial” (The 
Queen v J. Hotchin: Sentencing remarks of Lang J., 2011).  
6.2.3 Searching for Solutions (Problemistic Search) 
The search for solutions is an important part of organisational decision making. According to Cyert 
and March (2001) the search for a solution for a problem is directed and motivated by the problem 
itself, and the search continues up to the time a solution is found. The authors further state that the 
organisations look for solutions close to the problem and near the existing solution, and the search is 
biased due to prior experience and expectations (Cyert & March, 2001). The biased search is also 
supported by the concept of Attention-based view. For the purpose of this research, the focus was 
on the way solutions were found for the problems faced by the organisations. 
In this research the keywords Problem and Solution represent the concept of ‘Problemistic Search’. 
For the keyword, Problem, the text search query in NVivo-Enron generated 1638 text references from 
105 sources, whereas a total of 56 text references from 23 sources were generated in NVivo-
Nathans.  For the keyword, Solution, NVivo Enron generated a total of 2179 text references from 105 
sources, whereas NVivo Nathans generated 113 text references from 40 sources. The results of the 
queries are presented in Appendix B (Table B.11. 1, Table B.11. 2, Table B.12. 1, and Table B.12. 2).  
In case of Enron, the query related to the keyword Problem resulted in quotes containing 8 different 
words, whereas the query related to the keyword Solution generated quotes containing 19 different 
types of words. However, in the case of Enron quotes containing the keywords Problem, Problems, 
Trouble, Troubles, Result, Results, Resulting, Resulted, Solution, and Solutions have provided 
important insights into the concept. 
The results indicate that in the case of Nathans the query related to the keyword Problem provided 
quotes containing 6 different words. The query related to the keyword Solution generated quotes 
containing 13 different types of words. However, the quotes containing the keywords Problem, 
Problems, Result, Results, Resulted, and Answer have provided important insights into the concept. 
Searching for Solutions - Enron 
It has been found that Enron used the SPEs as a solution for many of its problems. These SPEs were 
used to provide “almost instant results” (Behr & Witt, 2002b) for the problems faced by Enron such 
as financial losses and non-performing assets (Olin, 2005). However, the SPEs were a temporary fix 
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(Olin, 2005) and did not really address the problem. The search was biased and paid attention to the 
immediate issues faced by the company. For example: 
[Enron was facing losses] However, coming clean would have devalued the 
company's stock ………. Further, the rating agencies, such as Moody's and 
S&P, wanted to see steady cash flow. Enron's solution was found in …. [SPEs 
where Enron] engineered an array of "structured financing" designed to 
show cash flow that was not "flowing", profits that had not been earned, 
and considerably less debt than was actually there (Downes & Russ, 2005). 
Enron appeared to be satisfied with these temporary solutions, as they had a positive impact on its 
reported earnings. Following is an example of the selective attention towards the reported earnings:  
[With the use of SPE] Enron’s share of JEDI’s debt was kept off Enron’s 
balance sheet while Enron recorded its share of JEDI’s earnings as equity 
income (Healy & Palepu, 2003). 
It is worth noting that many of these solutions did not even follow accounting rules and regulations 
and mislead the investors and other external parties. The following quote supports these findings 
and depicts a ceremonial compliance: 
One accounting irregularity that arose from the JEDI joint venture was that 
Enron incorrectly included in income from JEDI the appreciation in the value 
of Enron stock owned (Healy & Palepu, 2003). 
…….. but the transactions did not follow those rules. ……. [These 
transactions] allowed Enron to conceal from the market very large losses 
resulting from Enron's merchant investments by creating an appearance 
that those investments were hedged--that is, that a third party was 
obligated to pay Enron the amount of those losses---when in fact that third 
party was simply an entity in which only Enron had a substantial economic 
stake (Powers et al., 2002). 
It was a paper hedge designed to achieve favorable financial statement 
results, not a substantive hedge that was intended actually to transfer 
Enron’s risk of loss to an unrelated party. (The Role of the Board of Directors 
in the Enron's Collapse, 2002). 
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Some other solutions adopted by Enron also indicate that many of its other short run solutions 
affected the disclosure in its financial statements and “disguise[d] its problems with financial 
alchemy” ("The Fall of Enron," 2001). For example: 
…. Enron was revising its financial statements every year, which made it 
impossible to compare the results of one year with another. Its 1991 
balance sheet cited "Marketable securities" worth $23 million, down from 
$28 million in 1990; in 1992 that line disappeared, and a new one popped 
up--the puzzling "Assets from price risk management activities." (Mack, 
2002). 
Enron also regularly changed how it reported results from its businesses, 
lumping some together one year and others the next. This made it 
impossible to discern whether a particular unit, such as the power business, 
was earning or losing money or whether its assets were growing or 
shrinking (Mack, 2002). 
Enron was selective/biased in its attention. It focused on short-run implications and failed to 
evaluate its options carefully. For example, one of the SPEs (Chewco) was formed in a limited time 
and was a “rush job”. The reason was that it was almost the end of the financial year for Enron and it 
needed to manage its financial statements (Barnes, Barnett, & Schmitt, 2002). Some other solutions 
adopted by Enron also indicate a similar approach. For example, in the case of the Valhalla trading 
scam (Barnes et al., 2002), Enron failed to take strict action against the traders  because the trading 
operations at Valhalla had had a positive effect on Enron’s earnings. On a further note, Enron did not 
pay attention to the objections related to its short run approach. For example, in 2001 Enron used 
“accounting and financing solutions” to fix problems related to one of its SPEs, while overriding the 
advice of its auditors which stated that “the solutions violated accounting rules” and are a 
“temporary fix” (Behr & Witt, 2002a). 
It is found that Enron used a spiral of such transactions over the time (Powers et al., 2002), and many 
of these transactions brought negative implications for Enron. However, if one SPE was in trouble, 
Enron either created another SPE or designed a financial transaction to either temporarily delay or 
disguise the situation. For example, when Enron’s investments in Raptors began to decline, raising 
doubts about the hedging transactions, Enron restructured it through another financial transaction 
to cover up the situation (Cornford, 2004). “But these restructuring efforts were short-term solutions 
to fundamentally flawed transactions” (Munzig, 2003). Enron kept on using such temporary 
measures until the “problems in the Raptor entities became insoluble. Ultimately, the SPEs were 
terminated in September 2001” (Powers et al., 2002). 
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The findings further indicate that there was a sense of denial at Enron as far as the 
shortcomings/drawbacks related to its short-term solutions were concerned, which is a kind of 
biased/selective attention. For example many times Enron “failed to respond to indications of 
potential problems related to the use of SPE transactions” (Batson, 2003a). Even when external 
parties started questioning the SPEs, Enron’s initial reaction was to deny all that. For example 
…. Mr. Lay had been warned about the company's accounting problems at a 
time when he was assuring employees and investors that Enron's stock 
would rebound  (Jr & Berenson, 2002). 
[Lay] continued to claim publicly that all was well with the company, even 
after he found out that Enron was in trouble (Ferrell & Ferrell, 2011). 
Searching for Solutions - Nathans 
In the case of Nathans, the findings indicate that most of the problems faced by Nathans were 
related to its parent company VTL. The following quotes support these findings: 
VTL was at the root of all the finance company's problems (Mace, 2011a).  
It has been previously discussed in Chapter 5 that VTL and its related party lending constituted a 
major part of Nathans’s lending. Nathans continued to advance money to VTL and its related parties 
despite the serious financial issues ("Banking breach not disclosed," 2007) faced by VTL and its 
related parties. It has been discussed earlier that the volume of VTL related lending and the constant 
rollover of that lending severely affected the cash flows at Nathans. 
The rollover of loans meant that no cash was coming in for Nathans in terms of repayments from VTL 
and related parties. Moreover, VTL related lending constituted a large portion of Nathans’s lending 
portfolio. This way VTL related lending severely affected the cash flow at Nathans. In that situation, it 
was expected that Nathans would decrease its VTL related lending and declare bad debts if VTL or its 
related parties were unable to repay the loans. 
Nathans should have treated both loans as being substantially impaired. No 
provision for bad debts was made in respect of either loan by Nathans in its 
financial statements …….. (The Queen v J. Hotchin: Sentencing remarks of 
Lang J., 2011para [35]).  
However, the solution adopted by Nathans was totally the opposite. Nathans was “dependent on 
fresh investment funds to maintain liquidity” (McManus, 2010). This was a temporary fix for the 
problem, as Nathans was paying more in terms of interest than it was receiving as interest. The 
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following quote further supports these findings and demonstrates the selective/biased attention of 
the company: 
 "The result was that there was no cash flow to enable Nathans to pay its 
debenture investors interest or to repay principal, except from the cash it 
obtained from new investors providing fresh funds to Nathans" (Gregor, 
2011d). 
Nathans continued to ignore these problems and continued advancing money to VTL and related 
parties. For example: 
These acquisitions occurred at a time when it was clear that neither the IVL 
nor VTL debts to Nathans could be paid without VTL selling some or all of its 
American business units. They resulted in an outflow of cash from Nathans 
(to fund acquisitions) rather than an inflow from a divestment strategy (The 
Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath 
J., 2011para [286]). 
In this way, Nathans helped VTL and related parties, but its own problem of cash flow and non-
repayment of its dues was still there. As a finance company, Nathans was supposed to inform its 
investors about the situation. However, Nathans disguised its financial information and presented a 
misleading picture of it through ceremonial compliance. For instance:  
The words used in the 14 May 2007 letter created an impression of a 
successful finance company that had never had any problems with impaired 
debt ….. (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for 
Verdict of Heath J., 2011para [246]).  
……  what was said to Nathans' investors in offer documents and marketing 
letters was "completely divorced from what was actually happening" 
(Gregor, 2011d). 
The findings further indicate that Nathans did not see VTL and related party lending as a real 
problem, rather what was more concerning for the company was the public disclosure of that 
information. The following quote supports these findings: 
Mr Moses replied: “I hope the wording can be modified further to convey a 
true and realistic view of the risks without sticking it too far up investors‟ 
noses”. Mr Hotchin then replied: “The Risk section is a major concern, I 
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agree with Roger this will create a big problem for capital raising going 
forward. We need to tone this down if possible.” (The Queen v J. Hotchin: 
Sentencing remarks of Lang J., 2011para [22]). 
6.2.4 Learning (Organisational Learning) 
According to Cyert and March (2001) organisations learn over time from their experiences, which 
feeds back into their decision-making process and related choices. According to the authors, this 
learning will affect their choices regarding “what to strive for”. Over time the organisations also learn 
to pay attention to certain parts of their environment and ignore others. The decision choices also 
change with the learning, which is the outcome of success or failure of certain decisions (Cyert & 
March, 2001).  
For the purpose of this research, the keyword Learning represents the concept of ‘Organisational 
Learning’. The text search query for the keyword Learning generated total 7841 text references from 
115 sources whereas a total of 444 text references from 74 sources were generated in NVivo-
Nathans. The results of the text search query are presented in Appendix B (Table B.13. 1, Table B.13. 
1).  
In case of Enron the query related to the keyword Learning resulted in quotes containing 94 different 
words. However, in the case of Enron quotes containing the words Learn, Learning, Learned, Know, 
Knowledge, and Knowing have provided important details about the learning of Enron.  
In the case of Nathans, the text search query related to the keyword Learning provided quotes 
containing 44 different words. However, the quotes containing the keywords Know, Knowledge, 
Take, Checks, and Taking have provided important insights into the concept. 
Learning - Enron 
The findings provide evidence that Enron learned from its experience as far as its reliance on and use 
of SPEs is concerned. Enron used a series of SPEs, one after another. For example: 
In 1999, Fastow constructed two partnerships called LJM Cayman and LJM2 
………... They were followed by four more, known as the Raptors. "You do it 
once, it works, and you do it again," (Barnes et al., 2002). 
As discussed previously in Chapter 4, Enron actually misused these SPEs, and most of the 
SPE transactions were flawed. This raises the question, “Why did not Enron learn from 
these shortcomings of its SPE transactions and amended/changed its decision?” The 
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findings indicate that Enron failed to pay attention to the red flags in that regard, which 
could have affected the learning. The following quotes support these findings:  
…. it is clear that Lay and Skilling failed to respond to red flags that, had 
they inquired, would have led them to the knowledge that senior officers 
were misusing SPE transactions and disseminating materially misleading 
financial information (Batson, 2003a).  
 
And a close reading of the available records suggests that the directors 
………. missed critical signs as they repeatedly approved deals that inflated 
the company's profit (Abelson, 2002). 
The findings indicate that it was not only because of the failure to notice red flags, the learning was 
interrupted, but at certain instances, despite being aware of the issue, the board failed to learn and 
respond. For example, when questions were raised about the compensation that Fastow earned 
through his stake in an SPE, “Enron's directors agree to monitor Mr. Fastow's compensation” , 
however the directors failed to follow up on that and "did not learn until much later that Mr. Fastow 
made at least $30 million through the partnerships” (Abelson, 2002). On a similar note when 
concerns were raised about Fastow’s financial interests in the SPEs (as he was an employee of Enron 
and had a conflict of interest), he sold his share to one of his close friends (also an Enron employee) 
(The Role of the Board of Directors in the Enron's Collapse, 2002). However, the board did not inquire 
about the buyer. The following quote indicates the casual approach towards that. 
…..  Outside Director Herbert Winokur testified, when asked if he had been 
interested in learning the identity of the person who purchased Fastow's 
interest in LJM1 and LJM2: "[I]ts management's responsibility to tell me 
what I should know …….. I didn't inquire because I assumed somebody 
would tell me if I needed to know." (Batson, 2003a).  
On a further note that Enron did not want to change or alter its decisions, if they were bringing in a 
positive impact on its reported earnings. This indicates that the criteria for change/learning were the 
reported financial values. The following quotes support these findings: 
………. many other documents demonstrate that the Board knowingly 
allowed Enron to use high risk accounting techniques, questionable 
valuation methodologies, and highly structured transactions to achieve 
favorable financial statement results (The Role of the Board of Directors in 
the Enron's Collapse, 2002) 
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The Enron Board of Directors knowingly allowed Enron to conduct billions of 
dollars in off-the-books activity to make its financial condition appear better 
than it was, and failed to ensure adequate public disclosure of material off-
the-books liabilities that contributed to Enron’s collapse (The Role of the 
Board of Directors in the Enron's Collapse, 2002).  
Enron’s multi-billion dollar, off-the-books activity was disclosed to the Enron 
Board and received Board approval as a explicit strategy to improve Enron’s 
financial statements (The Role of the Board of Directors in the Enron's 
Collapse, 2002).  
The above quotes also indicate that Enron was mainly focused on reported earnings, which further 
points that the company failed to correct/acknowledge its mistakes, and reinforced its wrong 
practices based on short term outcomes. For example, as discussed in Chapter 4, Enron initially did 
not take strict action against traders at Valhalla, because it needed those reported earnings. 
However, later that ended in huge losses for the company. Similarly, Enron was approving SPEs 
despite the flaws, as it needed those inflated earnings. However, it failed to learn that it would bring 
negative consequences eventually. 
The available evidence suggests that Enron employees were not expected to resist the usual 
practices at Enron. Thereby they learned not to oppose the practices. The following quotes provide 
support for these findings. 
There is little evidence, to date, that Enron’s employees were able to offer 
significant resistance, least of all resistance that was effective (Tourish & 
Vatcha, 2005). 
If any employee came forward with some negative feedback, he was either not given due attention 
or rather punished for that. The following quotes indicate such practices at Enron. 
He telephoned Lay's secretary and asked for an appointment to talk about 
what was happening in the tax department and beyond. "Every damn year 
the stretch kept going up," Hermann would later explain. "It just kept 
getting bigger and bigger. That to me was evidence of the fact we don't 
know what we're doing here. It bothered me. I wanted to tell him what was 
happening." A week went by. Lay's secretary called Hermann back and said 
Mr. Lay was busy and would be unable to meet with him (Behr & Witt, 
2002a). 
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Fastow was furious that Watkins had talked to Ken Lay. Upon learning that 
she had, he told Watkins’ direct supervisor that he wanted Watkins “out of 
here tonight” and seized the laptop computer from her desk (Brickey, 2003). 
There were different versions of learning at Enron. The employees at the front learned 
to reinforce their faulty practices, and the others learned not to object to those 
practices.  
According to the findings, there was not a free flow of information at Enron, and sometimes 
distorted or modified information was provided to the employees.  For example: 
……… Kaminski discovered that Enron's finance department had deceived his 
research team about the deals. ……… Kaminski supervised a team of finance 
whizzes who calculated the likely future gains and losses in stock and 
commodities trading (Behr & Witt, 2002a). 
Now Kaminski and two of his key associates discovered that they had been 
given incorrect and misleading data, which had distorted some of the 
team's earlier analyses of the Raptors deals. And they'd recently been asked 
to perform calculations on some LJM deals without being told their work 
related to LJM or the Raptors (Behr & Witt, 2002a). 
As stated above, Enron failed to acknowledge its wrongdoings or its faulty practices. However, Enron 
employees did learn from these practices. They learned to fall in line with the prevalent practices and 
internal norms at Enron. In this way, the feedback system collapsed and learning was affected. The 
following quotes support these findings. 
[The] employees soon learned, the only meaningful performance measure 
was the relentless pursuit of profit at any cost (Arnold & Lange, 2004) 
Whilst information asymmetry grew, management appeared to escalate 
their risk taking efforts aware that this would enhance the perception of 
their performance with little chance of being exposed (Arnold & Lange, 
2004). 
The employee adds that anyone who questioned suspect deals quickly 
learned to accept assurances of outside lawyers and accountants. She says 
there was little scrutiny of whether the earnings were real or how they were 
booked. The more people pushed the envelope with aggressive accounting, 
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she says, the harder they would have to push the next year ("The 
Environment was ripe for abuse," 2002). 
As one knowledgeable Enron employee put it: “Good deal vs. bad deal? 
Didn’t matter. If it had a positive net present value (NPV) it could get done. 
Sometimes positive NPV didn’t even matter in the name of strategic 
significance.” (Thomas, 2002). 
Learning - Nathans 
The findings provide evidence that similarly to Enron, Nathans also failed to correct/acknowledge its 
wrong practices. The available evidence indicates that Nathans’s directors failed to take due care 
while taking important decisions (Mace, 2011a). As discussed previously, Nathans had financial issues 
due to its VTL related lending. However, the continued lending to VTL and its related parties indicate 
the failure to learn on part of Nathans. Instead, the company either did not disclose the related 
information or disguised it (Field, 2011).  For example:  
while the documents acknowledged a "significant proportion" of Nathans 
lending was to VTL, the impression given was that those loans were arm's-
length transactions on normal commercial terms, usually for no more than 
(Ross, 2011). 
Nathans failed to amend its VTL related lending practices, even though it was becoming a concern for 
Nathans. For example, in 2006 one of the VTL’s franchise holders “threatened to send his knowledge 
of both companies' bad debts to the auditor” (Mace, 2011i). Even the Perpetual Trust had concerns 
regarding Nathans VTL related lending (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons 
for Verdict of Heath J., 2011para [382]). In the wake of these concerns Nathans should have 
amended its VTL related practices. However, the company failed to amend its practices. The 
evidence related to the issuance of Investment Prospectus indicates that the company ignored the 
known facts and tried to disguise the information. It is found that Nathans issued untrue statements 
to raise funds (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 
2011).   
Internally Nathans was aware of these concerns. For example in an email Moses expressed his 
concerns : "We must take great care to ensure we cannot be accused of non-compliance” (Gregor, 
2011c). Similarly, the directors were aware of the deteriorating financial condition of VTL and its 
related parties. However, the focus was on keep the business going by injecting in more funds. For 
instance: 
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“I strongly urge that the RISK section is changed as if this is going to market 
NO cash will come in” (The Queen v J. Hotchin: Sentencing remarks of Lang 
J., 2011). 
On a further note, evidence suggests that Nathans also did not allow resistance to its practices, and 
also kept control over the flow of information. This should have affected the learning of the 
company. The following quotes support these findings:  
David, you keep quoting our external solicitor as the driving force behind 
this, who is the solicitor and when did a lawyer take control of decisions the 
BOARD makes? I AM NOT HAPPY WITH THE RISK SECTION, IT NEEDS 
MODIFICATION URGENTLY. David, do not copy management on your reply, 
please only address the DIRECTORS.” (The Queen v J. Hotchin: Sentencing 
remarks of Lang J., 2011). 
6.3 Value Orientation 
The study aimed to look into the Value Orientation of the decision makers. The objective here was to 
understand the decision preferences of the decision makers. For this purpose, the study focused on 
the decision preferences of Lay (Enron) and Moses (Nathans). A Text Search Query was used to 
extract the data related to the two participants. However, in this case, the query was set to find exact 
matches only, and not the synonyms and stemmed words as was the case for previous queries. The 
Text Search Query for the keyword Lay provided 2304 text references from 91 sources and the query 
for Moses returned with 371 text references from 74 sources. In the case of Enron, further data was 
collected from books as well. In the case of books, the researcher followed the Index for the keyword 
Lay to extract further data. It is important to note that in the case of Nathans no published books 
were available. 
To analyse the data the researcher bracketed all her prior understanding about values to allow the 
data to inform freely about the underlying values of the decision participants. After the preliminary 
analysis, a list of value preferences emerged. These values further revealed three different categories 
of orientation that included Individual Orientation, Group Orientation, and Functional Orientation.  
The following sections provide further details of the Value Orientation of the participants. 
6.3.1 Individual Orientation 
Individual orientation reflects the preferences of the participants in the context of their self-interest 
that affected their corporate decisions. The findings informed that the participants considered their 
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self-interest a priority, which affected their corporate decisions. The following sections present the 
details of findings related to the individual orientation of both the participants. 
Individual Orientation - Kenneth Lay (Enron) 
When Lay got the top job at Enron, his wife expressed that “It’s fun to be the king” (McLean & Elkind, 
2004, p. 10). The findings indicate that Lay maintained an extravagant lifestyle at the cost of Enron. 
For example: “Kenneth Lay had Enron pay $7.1 million for a penthouse apartment, which he and his 
wife converted into a Venetian palace with dark woods, deep velvets, period statuary, and a vaulted 
brick ceiling in the kitchen” (Swartz & Watkins, 2003). The findings further reveal that Enron was 
Lay’s “American dream” (Ahrens, 2006b) which provided him with a lavish lifestyle. For example, Lay 
stated “I realized the American dream. I lived a very expensive lifestyle, the type of lifestyle that is 
very difficult to turn on and off like a spigot” (Ahrens, 2006b). This indicates that Lay became used to 
that lifestyle and found it hard to live without it. The findings further reveal that many times Lay used 
Enron’s resources for his personal use. For instance: 
Not only did he [Lay] use the company’s fleet of airplanes for his private use; 
so did his children. Enron employees called the planes the Lay family taxi, so 
frequently did family members use them ……. Another time an Enron jet was 
dispatched to Monaco to deliver Robyn’s [Linda Lay’s daughter] bed 
(McLean & Elkind, 2004, p. 90). 
Many members of Lay’s family worked for Enron. For example: “Ken and Linda Lay had five children 
……... four of the five worked at either Enron or Azurix, a water company Enron started in 1998” 
(McLean & Elkind, 2004, p. 90). The point here is not that his family also worked at Enron, but the 
way his family used Enron’s resources for personal benefits. For example:  
His top executives were also dismayed at the way he [Lay] and his family 
openly fed at the Enron trough. “If you’re the CEO of a public company, it 
isn’t yours,” says a former executive (McLean & Elkind, 2004, p. 90). 
Lay also misused his authority at Enron for the benefits of his family. The findings provide that “He 
always had Enron employees use his sister's travel agency. And not just …… [Enron employees]; the 
local Andersen office and Enron's outside attorneys, Vinson and Elkins, were pressured into using her 
agency as well. Trouble was that it provided neither low cost nor good service” (Watkins & Pearce, 
2003). The following quote indicates that Lay ignored Enron’s interests for his or his family’s interest.  
In late 1994, lawsuits were filed alleging that Bruin’s executive team, 
including Mark Lay [Lay’s son], had embezzled more than $1 million………… 
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while some of this was still going on, Enron decided to do a deal with 
another small company that Mark Lay had gotten involved with. Enron 
agreed to reimburse over $1 million of this company’s expenses; as part of 
the deal Mark got three-year contract with Enron guaranteeing him almost 
$1 million in salary and bonuses, plus 20,000 Enron options (McLean & 
Elkind, 2004, p. 90). 
The available evidence further indicates that Lay also exploited Enron’s policies for his individual 
interest. For example, Enron provided Lay with a Line of Credit as part of his employment contract. 
The available evidence suggests that Lay exploited that facility. For example, “The line of credit was 
originally set at $4 million and was later increased to $7.5 million. The aggregate amount withdrawn 
pursuant to this line of credit from 1997 through 2001 was over $106 million” (Schmitt, 2003). The 
findings indicate that as far as the line of credit was concerned it was more than it appeared as the 
frequent use of the line of credit or the amount withdrawn through that line. It is worth noting that 
“during 1997 through 2001, Mr. Lay repaid principal amounts of $99.3 million. Over $94 million of 
this amount was repaid with 2.1 million shares of Enron stock” (Schmitt, 2003). However, “Lay's 
repayment to Enron of more than $94 million of loans with Enron stock was not duly authorized or 
approved by the Enron Board under applicable corporate law” (Batson, 2003a). In this way, Lay was 
“effectively selling [Enron] stock back to Enron” (Gillan & Martin, 2007), and that too without due 
approval. The above evidence, related to the use of a line of credit by Lay, indicates that he 
misused/exploited Enron’s resources and bypassed established Enron procedures for his personal 
gain. 
The findings further reveal that Lay’s Individual Orientation guided his decisions not only during 
Enron’s peak time but also at the time of its downfall. For example, the following quote indicates that 
Lay prioritised his personal needs while ignoring the interests of his staff and the financial difficulties 
faced by the company. 
Lay chartered a boat …………….  for $200,000 for his wife's birthday. Another 
$12,000 was spent on Lay's birthday celebration. Another $20,000 on 
antiques on a trip to Spain. [However] Months later, Lay laid-off Enron 
employees and canceled the Enron Christmas party to cut company costs 
(Ahrens, 2006b). 
When Enron was looking for a way to escape bankruptcy, Lay took care of his self-interest. For 
instance, “Lay ‘maxed out’ his corporate line of credit a day before Enron's ill-fated merger with rival 
Dynegy cratered” (Johnson, 2006a). And when he was questioned about that withdrawal, he justified 
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his decision, which indicates that he was taking care of his gains/losses before that of Enron or its 
employees. The following quote supports these findings: 
"You still took $1 million from Enron while its bankruptcy was being 
drafted," Hueston stated. "Yes," Lay said. "And you saw to it that you were 
taken care of before the employees were," Hueston said. Lay responded by 
saying there was very little the company could do for its employees in 
bankruptcy (Ahrens, 2006b). 
The findings suggest that Lay tried to rescue Enron from a bankruptcy. For example, despite knowing 
the bleak financial situation of Enron he tried to build confidence among Enron employees. He 
advised the employees to invest in Enron stock. He told the employees "My personal belief is that 
Enron stock is an incredible bargain at current prices, and we will look back in a couple of years from 
now and see the great opportunity that we currently have" (Behr & Witt, 2002a).  However, Lay 
himself never wanted to take that risk, as he was either selling his Enron shares (Johnson, 2006a) or 
was repaying his credit line (Behr & Witt, 2002a) with those shares at that time.  
Even when Enron was negotiating a merger with Dynegy to escape bankruptcy, Lay did keep his self-
interest in mind. He was negotiating  “$60 million in severance pay upon consummation of the 
merger with Dynegy” (Markham, 2006, p. 87). 
Individual Orientation - Kenneth Roger Moses (Nathans) 
It has been discussed earlier in Chapter 5, that Moses had an investment stake in VTL, and that most 
of Nathans’s lending was to VTL and its related parties. In the previous sections (Corporate 
Governance Functions, and Decision Processes) it has been stated that VTL related lending caused 
most of the troubles for Nathans. As far as Moses’s Individual Orientation is concerned, it appears 
that due to his financial interest in VTL, he failed to undertake corrective actions to safeguard the 
interest of Nathans. The following quote indicates that Moses joined Nathans and VTL so as to be 
part of a revolutionary vending machine business idea. 
Moses said he joined Nathans and VTL on hearing about an idea, from 
Hotchin and Doolan, which was good enough to “revolutionise the vending 
machine industry ” (Anderson, 2011b). 
However, the vending business belonged to VTL and not Nathans. This indicates that Moses’s 
primary interest was in VTL and that he joined Nathans as it was the financial lifeline of VTL. The 
available evidence indicates that Moses represented VTL in its financial dealing with Nathans (Mace, 
2011c). The findings suggest that Moses’s personal interests in VTL affected his decisions at Nathans 
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and that he gave VTL priority over Nathans. It is important to note that, according to Moses “Banks 
don’t like start-up venture businesses” (Bond, 2011a) and that it was hard to get external financing 
for VTL (Bond, 2011a; Vaughan, 2012). The following quote by Moses indicates that he knew the 
significance of the lending decisions/criteria of a finance company, but failed to adapt to that due to 
his personal interests in VTL. 
Nick Leeson destroyed Baring Investment bank by accumulating bad 
investments, not by making the bad investments all at the same time 
(Moses, 1996). 
6.3.2 Group Orientation 
Group orientation reflects the preferences of the participants in relation to the other members of the 
group including fellow directors/colleagues, and employees.  The findings inform that group 
orientation affected the decisions. The following section present the details related to the group 
orientation of both the participants. 
Group Orientation - Kenneth Lay (Enron) 
The findings suggest that Lay preferred to have his close confidants around. For instance, “After the 
merger of Inter North- HNG Lay had hired lots of his old cronies” at Enron (McLean & Elkind, 2004, p. 
25). This appeared to be Lay’s way of avoiding any kind of dissension. Lay believed that key to 
success is the people (Kaminski & Martin, 2001), and he believed in providing monetary benefits to 
his colleagues and staff to keep them motivated. Lay was the CEO and Chairman of Enron and was 
active in running the company; many of the policies at Enron reflect this kind of group orientation. 
The following quotes support these findings. 
He [Lay] began lobbying for higher salaries for the board members [after 
the merger of HNG InterNorth] ….. (Swartz & Watkins, 2003, p. 29). 
Enron made donations to groups with which directors were affiliated 
…………… [Enron directors] received consulting fees from Enron …. (Gillan & 
Martin, 2007). 
Enron did not have a general policy or program relating to executive loans. 
However, from time to time Enron extended loans to various executives 
(Schmitt, 2003). 
The findings further reveal that mainly Lay and Skilling’s confidants enjoyed more rewards compared 
to other executives. For example: 
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There was always a huge salary, a bonus, stock options or stock, and 
perhaps even half-dozen parking spaces monitored by security cameras for 
the Romans within Enron who were tight with Lay or Skilling (Fusaro & 
Miller, 2002, p. 40). 
However, Lay preferred to have close relations with all of his employees to gain their loyalty (Mack, 
1987).  For example, “Lay made a point of personally serving drinks to subordinates [at company 
functions] ……. he remembered names, listened earnestly, and seemed to care about what you 
thought” (McLean & Elkind, 2004, p. 3). In this way, he won the trust of his employees and motivated 
them. For instance: 
"You can imagine,' adds Jim Rogers, "how excited young people four or five 
levels down in the organization get when the chairman of the board calls to 
tell them, "You're doing great'' (Mack, 1987). 
Another important aspect of Lay’s group orientation was that he gave executives freedom and 
authority to work. The following quote supports these findings. 
"I'm more of a delegator," Lay testified. "I have a decentralized manager 
approach to business." ……….  Lay testified that his management strategy 
was two-fold: hire the best talent he could find and then give them "room to 
run." (Ahrens, 2006a). 
The freedom and authority came with high expectations in terms of results. For example, Lay stated 
“Individuals are empowered to do what they think is best ….. [however,] we insist on results” (Fusaro 
& Miller, 2002, p. 47). Lay believed that by achieving expected results employees may “be able to 
provide financially and otherwise for their families in a way that they'd never really dreamed of” (Lay, 
2004). This further confirms that Lay believed strongly in the power of monetary rewards. It is found 
Lay did not object even if the employees exceeded their authority or misused it, provided they 
delivered the expected results, as was the case of the Valhalla trading scam (discussed in detail in 
Chapter 4).  
Group Orientation - Kenneth Roger Moses (Nathans) 
In the case of Moses, the findings indicate that Moses was part of a group which included fellow 
directors at Nathans. The group had a common financial interest in VTL (as discussed in Chapter 5). It 
has been discussed in the earlier sections of this chapter that Nathans’ interest was ignored to meet 
the financial needs of VTL. It seems that the common financial interest of the group overshadowed 
the decisions, as there is no evidence that Moses took any concrete steps to revive Nathans’ 
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situation. It has already been discussed in the previous sections that Nathans’ directors gained access 
to VTL related documents only after they became the directors of VTL. This further confirms the 
presence of a group orientation. 
On a further note (as discussed in Chapter 5) Moses never objected to the capitalisation of loans to 
the trusts associated with the other directors, and the lack of security. Nathans was receiving no 
repayments against these loans, as the interest was also capitalised. Moses firstly allowed the 
capitalisation for the trust related to Hotchin and later for the trust related to Doolan. It is important 
to note that Hotchin proposed to sell his VTL shares to repay Nathans. But one of the VTL’s directors 
proposed capitalisation of the loan to Moses (The Queen v J. Hotchin: Sentencing remarks of Lang J., 
2011, para [36]). The failure of Moses to object to this capitalisation indicates group orientation, 
where the organisation’s interest was ignored to take care of the interest of fellow directors. 
The findings further confirm that group orientation affected Moses’ decisions. For example, in regard 
to the investment statement, Moses “responded by saying that he regarded the requirements for the 
Risk section as being tough but added that, presumably, there was no option but to comply for 
regulatory purposes”. But Hotchin said that the “Risk‖ section of the investment statement should be 
toned down”. And later on Moses agreed with Hotchin stating that “We need to tread the fine line 
between being open and upfront, but not overly obvious” (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. 
Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, paras [176, 178]). It is also worthy of note and has been 
discussed in the previous sections, that Nathans’s executives were given restricted access to 
information. This further confirms that Nathans directors worked as a close confidant group. 
6.3.3 Functional Orientation 
Functional Orientation - Kenneth Lay (Enron) 
The findings suggest that a functional orientation affected Lay’s decisions. Lay’s functional 
orientation seemed to focus on the short run and on immediate results while ignoring the long-term 
impacts. This orientation is well reflected in his various decisions such as the Valhalla trading scam, 
and the decisions related to the SPEs. For example, in the case of the Valhalla trading scam, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, Lay’s was focused on short-term functionality/results for the organisation. He 
said, "I've decided we're not going to discharge the people involved in this because the company 
needs those earnings" (Barnes et al., 2002). Here Lay’s functional orientation seems to be supported 
by his group orientation as the board did not oppose his decision to not to terminate the traders. For 
example: 
 “No one pounded the table and said these guys are crooks.” (McLean & 
Elkind, 2004, p. 19). 
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The findings indicate that “Lay persuaded directors to keep things quiet, at least until the company 
could unwind some of its potentially devastating trading positions” (Pearlstein, 2006). This indicates 
an orientation where the facts were denied to cover things up. On a further note, there were some 
executives whose concerns, regarding the Valhalla trading, were either not addressed or ignored. For 
instance 
 “What do I have to do to get you to understand that this could do 
devastating damage to our company?” Muckleroy asked Lay (McLean & 
Elkind, 2004, p. 22). 
"I was waiting for Lay to fire them on the spot," says one participant in a 
(Barnes et al., 2002).  
Since Lay’s functional orientation was short run based, the problem at Valhalla returned and at that 
time Enron’s financial condition did not allow a further cover up. Hence Lay was left with no choice 
but to take corrective measures and  Enron “reported $140 million pre-tax loss that wiped out about 
half of Enron's profit for the year” (Pearlstein, 2006). This indicates a functional orientation where it 
was preferable to cover up or hide the issues threatening the reported financial results of the 
company.  
It is important to note that Lay’s short run focused functional orientation did not change after the 
Valhalla incident, where hiding the facts landed Enron in a big trouble. Rather, decisions were mainly 
taken based on the short-run impact. The decisions were not questioned or reconsidered if they 
were delivering good reported earnings. The following quotes support these findings: 
“When the auditors told the board that Enron was following high-risk 
accounting, no one drilled deeper…” (Downes & Russ, 2005). 
"I realized that there was nobody doing any planning in that company," 
Hermann said. "They were just managing it day to day and trying to get 
earnings for the quarter" (Behr & Witt, 2002a). 
After the Valhalla scam, Lay continued to ignore the concerns raised by some of the executives. For 
example, in 2001 Enron’s Chief of Staff wrote to Lay as follows:  
“We should do the economically rational thing in every transaction and 
business and let the chips fall where they may. Instead of tying ourselves in 
a knot about managing earnings or write downs or avoiding an asset sale 
because it's on the books for more than the market, we should just make 
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the rational economic decision ….. If we make the economically rational 
decisions over and over, the stock price will come along” (Batson, 2003a).  
However, no action was taken by Lay in this regard.  
The findings related to the SPE transactions further confirm that decisions were taken on short run 
functionality. A decision option was preferred if it served the immediate needs of the company. For 
example, Lay’s decision to grant Fastow an exemption from the Code of Ethics served the immediate 
need (for an investor in the SPEs) of the company, but created a conflict of interest “thus allowing 
the CFO….. to profit from private partnerships he had set up” to do business with Enron (Downes & 
Russ, 2005). Lay defended his decision stating that “It isn’t a conflict of interest. …….. Almost all big 
companies have related-party transactions” (Smith & Emshwiller, 2003, p. 43). This conflict of 
interest later brought a significant negative impact to Enron (Batson, 2003a). The above findings are 
further confirmed by the fact that some of the SPE transactions were approved despite the evidence 
that “Lay, Skilling, and the Outside Directors were in possession of facts necessary to conclude that 
the transactions lacked a rational business purpose before approving the transactions” (Batson, 
2003a). As discussed in Chapter 4, the SPEs were a crucial part of Enron’s operations, yet Lay 
appeared to have a casual approach towards them, despite being aware of the related malpractices. 
This indicates that he was quite confident about the functionality of those SPEs. The following quote 
supports these findings: 
Smith pressed for more detail ………… “What was the name of the structured 
finance deal? Didn’t it have a name?” …………….. “I’m not sure it had a 
name,” Lay said. “It was an internal vehicle set up to finance certain assets”. 
“What was it called?” Smith asked ………… “It had to have a name if it was 
doing business with Enron. I mean, everything has a legal name or you can’t 
do business with it, right?” Lay fumbled uncharacteristically for a moment, 
as if not quite sure what to say. Then he muffled the telephone mouthpiece 
and asked someone nearby, “What’s the name of the thing?” When he 
came back on the line he said, again “I’m sorry, Rebecca, but I don’t know if 
it had a name.” (Smith & Emshwiller, 2003). 
The findings further indicate that Lay’s functional orientation did not change despite the concrete 
grounds he had to believe that it would bring disastrous results for Enron. For example, when Lay 
received a memo from Watkins warning about the risky accounting practices, he did not intend to 
take a corrective action rather he tried to cover up the situation. The following quotes support these 
findings: 
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During Ms. Watkins’ meeting with Ken Lay, he inquired whether she had 
talked to the SEC or the press. When she said she had not, he asked her to 
refrain from going public until he had time to investigate (Brickey, 2003). 
Lay did admit, however, that when he ordered the investigation, he told 
James Derrick, Enron's general counsel, "let's not re-invent the wheel." 
(Ahrens, 2006a). 
Lay ignored the suggestions of Watkins and seemed unhappy with her memo, which indicates that 
his primary concern was maintaining the reported earnings and the share prices of the company. His 
response towards Watkins’ memo confirms his orientation. 
Watkins had urged Lay not to hire Vinson & Elkins to investigate her 
concerns because its lawyers had worked on some of the very deals she 
challenged …. But Lay not only hired V&E, he authorized the firm to conduct 
a limited, preliminary inquiry…….. (Behr & Witt, 2002a). 
The following action of Lay indicates that he rather wanted to get Watkins out of Enron, probably to 
stop further similar incidences. 
Within days of meeting with Watkins, he contacted the organization’s 
lawyers to inquire if grounds could be found for firing her (Tourish & Vatcha, 
2005) 
…. a telling e-mail from a Vinson & Elkins lawyer to Enron’s Assistant 
General Counsel. Bearing the subject line “Confidential Employee Matter,” 
[in the context of Watkins] who made the sensitive report……You . . . asked 
that I include in this communication a summary of the possible risks 
associated with discharging employees who report allegations of improper 
accounting practices……. Texas law does not currently protect corporate 
whistle-blowers……. there is the risk that the discharged employee will seek 
to convince some government oversight agency (e.g., IRS, SEC, etc.) that the 
corporation has engaged in materially misleading reporting or is otherwise 
non-compliant …….. (The message was dated just two days after Watkins 
met with Ken Lay.) (Brickey, 2003). 
The above details related to the Valhalla scam and the SPEs indicate another aspect of Lay’s 
orientation, which was breaking or changing the rules as and when needed to reach the targets. The 
following quotes confirms these findings: 
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Lay’s contribution [in a book] was a chapter called “The New Energy 
Majors” in the “Innovation and Creativity” section. His major theme was 
“rule breakers get to the future first” (Swartz & Watkins, 2003, p. 118).  
A regretful Kenneth L. Lay conceded he broke technical rules related to bank 
loans, but the former Enron Corp. chairman testified that the violations 
were an inadvertent result of his commitment to the energy company 
(Johnson, 2006b).  
Functional Orientation - Kenneth Roger Moses (Nathans) 
The findings indicate that functional orientation affected the decisions of Moses. It is important to 
note that “most of the loan approval decisions in which directors participated were made by Mr 
Doolan and Mr Moses” (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of 
Heath J., 2011, para [135]). However Moses lacked clarity on the credit limits set in the Credit Policy 
of the company (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 
2011, paras [145, 146]). It has been discussed in the previous sections of this chapter and in Chapter 
5, that Nathans mainly financed VTL and related operations. The credit policy of Nathans mainly had 
implications for VTL and related party lending, because Nathans did not advance money higher than 
the limits set in the policy to any other third party. This indicates a functional orientation where 
company’s policies were not given significant weight in decision making. The following quotes further 
confirm these findings. 
VTL and related party lending was not made at an arm's length, nor on a 
commercial basis, as it should have been ….. (Mace, 2011a). 
[VTL and related party loan] requests were usually verbal and the approval 
process involved nothing more than an email to one of the directors. There 
would be no individual risk assessment of the loans or a revaluation of the 
assets [as should have been the case with Nathans’s loan approval process] 
(Mace, 2011c).  
……. "In the case of related party lending the approval process was often 
completely bypassed with lending exceeding permitted levels." (Mace, 
2011h) 
However, it is important to note that this type of functional orientation was present in the case of 
VTL and related party lending only and third party loans were sanctioned based on the established 
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credit approval processes (The Queen v K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of 
Heath J., 2011). 
Another aspect of Moses functional orientation was that decisions were not aimed at taking 
corrective action [for VTL and related issues] but to cover up or disguise the information. The 
following quotes support these findings. 
……. in order to decrease the amount of intercompany debt VTL owed to 
Nathans Finance, several loans were made directly to VTL subsidiaries ……. 
(Mace, 2011d).  
“Nathans routinely rolled over impaired related party loans and capitalised 
the interest on them to create the guise of a performing asset in its financial 
statements.”("Nathans directors 'bedevilled by conflict'," 2011). 
..... what was said to Nathans' investors in offer documents and marketing 
letters was "completely divorced from what was actually happening" 
(Gregor, 2011d). 
……. the company had made a small provision for bad debts, but did not 
acknowledge non-payment of many [intercompany] loans …… the 
classification of inter-company and master franchisee loans as current 
assets also painted a misleading picture …. (Mace, 2011j).  
[Despite the problems related to VTL and related party lending, Moses said ] 
that Nathans had a positive story to tell and that the key message was that 
there were no bad debts and no problems of the type that had led to the 
collapse of three smaller finance companies, earlier in the year (The Queen v 
K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, 
para [168]). 
The findings suggest that by disguising the information Nathans was successful in collecting money 
through debentures. For instance, "by August 2007, when Nathans was still taking in debenture 
funds, the company's position, particularly with regard to liquidity, was hopeless” and the public was 
not aware of it (Field, 2011). This further indicates that Moses’ functional orientation focused on 
short-run implications and ignored the long run impact. It is found that Moses was aware of the long-
run implications and failed to address his own concerns about that. For example: 
 141 
Moses then added he was worried and asked, in another email, "isn't it time 
we started to refocus our efforts toward the longer term" (Field, 2011). 
Mr Moses did nothing to ensure that this [reduction in  VTL and related 
party lending] was achieved (Judgement of the Court: Between Mervyn Ian 
Doolan and The Queen and between Kenneth Roger Moses and The Queen, 
2011). 
Another important aspect of his functional orientation was that he paid great importance to the 
compliance, but his focus was not on presenting a true and clear picture but on how to present the 
information to avoid any negative outcome. For example, Moses said in an email: "We must take 
great care to ensure we cannot be accused of non-compliance. No matter how spurious the claim 
might be." (Gregor, 2011c). 
There are instances where Nathans’s own rules were not followed while granting loans to VTL and 
related parties (The Queen v J. Hotchin: Sentencing remarks of Lang J., 2011, para [29 b]; The Queen v 
K. R. Moses, M. Doolan, D. M. Young: Reasons for Verdict of Heath J., 2011, para [148]). 
Another aspect of the functional orientation of Moses was that the decisions were taken in the best 
interest of VTL and Nathans’s interest was ignored (as discussed in the previous sections of this 
chapter and Chapter 5). Even after the bankruptcy incidence Moses firmly stressed that Nathans was 
doing well, for example: 
But we had $16 million in the bank, we did not think we were under any 
cash flow pressure and we had certainly not missed any payments to 
investors or creditors (Vaughan, 2012). 
6.4 Chapter Summary 
The aim of this chapter was to present the findings based on the analysis of the data. The findings in 
the context of the research questions and the relevant perspectives identified in earlier chapters are 
provided. The research used a start list for corporate governance functions and decision processes, 
but no start list was used to explore the perspective of value orientation. Appropriate coding 
frequency and details are provided where needed. In this way the findings are primarily presented in 
a qualitative way. Overall this thesis found links between poor corporate governance practices and 
corporate failures, and elaborated on the decision processes. The thesis also found three types of 
value orientation, including Individual, Group, and Functional, which affected the decisions of the 
decision makers. 
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The next chapter provides discussion and the conclusion of the thesis by relating these findings to 




The purpose of this research is to explore and understand the role of the behavioural aspects of 
corporate governance decision-making in corporate failures, which was the research gap as found in 
Chapter 2. The study attempted to derive a theory, grounded in the decision-centred behavioural 
aspects of corporate governance, to explain the role of corporate governance in corporate failures. 
The research selected the case study as an appropriate approach to achieve this purpose and this is 
discussed in Chapter 3. Chapters 4 and 5 provided an in-depth narrative of the individual case studies 
and Chapter 6 presented a combined analysis of the findings. 
This chapter uses ‘Data-Theory Coupling’ (Golden-Biddle & Locke, 2007, p. 52) to pursue the 
discussion and relate the findings of this research to existing literature.  In doing so the chapter looks 
into the findings related to the role of corporate governance in corporate failures, with an extended 
focus on the similarities and deviations from the current literature. In this way, this study makes an 
important contribution to confirm and extend the existing literature.  The discussion follows Patton 
(2015) in that “qualitative interpretation begins with elucidating meanings”, thereby making sense of 
the available evidence/findings (Golden-Biddle & Locke, 2007; Patton, 2015). In this way, the 
research makes an important contribution, by addressing the issue of “inadequate” (Golden-Biddle & 
Locke, 2007) literature to explain the role of corporate governance in corporate failures. In particular, 
this research contributes by bringing the qualitative focus back into corporate governance research.  
The first section of this chapter discusses the findings of the study with a focus on the primary 
contribution of the research towards a limited and inadequate understanding of the role of the 
behavioural aspects of corporate governance in corporate failures. The objective is to discuss how 
the findings of this study have advanced the present understanding of the role of corporate 
governance in corporate failures. The second section of this chapter presents the theoretical 
contribution of this research along with the limitations. 
7.1 Discussion of the Essential Findings (Association Between the Behavioural 
Aspects of Corporate Governance Decision-making and Corporate Failure) 
As discussed in Chapter 2, this research refers to Setting strategic direction, Formulating policy, 
Managing and controlling risk, Selecting CEO and Directors, and Monitoring performance as the main 
practices of corporate governance. These practices were the starting point of data analysis for this 
research. The study’s findings suggest a relationship between the behavioural aspects of corporate 
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governance and the corporate failure of both the organisations in the sample. Their corporate 
governance practices exhibit negative aspects that include flawed strategic orientation, myopic 
rational focus, cohesive and consistent long-term teams, internal information asymmetry, conflicts of 
interest, financial misrepresentation, subdued opposition, faulty monitoring systems, and an over- 
aggressive business approach. The following sub-sections provide details on how the findings of this 
research advance the academic understanding of various individual aspects related to the role of 
corporate governance in corporate failures. The overall contribution of these findings, and the 
resulting model is provided under Section 7.2. 
7.1.1 Flawed Strategic Orientation 
The findings of this research suggest that it was not strategies and policies in themselves, but the 
flawed strategic orientation through which those policies were implemented, that brought significant 
negative implications for both the organisations. Though some of Enron’s strategies and policies had 
problems from the beginning, such as the inability or unwillingness to control the risks associated 
with the MM Model and the complex SPE transactions, it was primarily the strategic orientation 
behind the implementation of those strategies or policies that contributed to the failure. For 
instance, SPEs could have contributed towards Enron’s growth and stability, had there been a 
genuine third party (instead of Enron-related party) investment. In that way Enron would have truly 
hedged its risks and would have sold its assets to actual third parties to book genuine returns. 
Similarly, in the case of Nathans, its policies provided for arm’s length credit checks for all the lending 
including VTL related lending. However, the intention was merely to formally present policies that 
attracted investors and to satisfy third parties such as regulatory authorities. There was no genuine 
attempt to follow these policies in spirit or action.  
Previous studies have highlighted the role of decision implementation in the success of decisions 
(Alexander, 1989; Bourgeois & Brodwin, 1984; Crawford, 2014; Elbanna, 2006; Hickson, Miller, & 
Wilson, 2003; Noble, 1999; Nutt, 1986). However, different researchers relate successful 
implementation to different factors. According to Quinn (1980) organizations need to create internal 
awareness, understanding and psychological commitment to successfully implement their decisions, 
while Nutt (1986) suggests applying intervention, persuasion, participation, and edict for a successful 
implementation. Bourgeois and Brodwin (1984) state that the shared perception of reality affects the 
implementation of decisions rather than the reality itself and Miller, Wilson, and Hickson (2004) 
consider managerial action and organizational context affect successful implementation. On the 
other hand, Amason (1996) relates successful implementation to the content of the decision, team 
consensus, and positive affective relationships. 
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The findings of this research further contribute to the existing body of literature, in terms of the role 
of the “human element” (Hickson et al., 2003) in the implementation of decisions. These findings 
extend the existing literature and provide evidence that strategic decisions may fail to deliver, 
despite good strategic content and clear “performance expectations” (Pinto & Prescott, 1990), due to 
the flawed strategic orientation/intention behind the implementation of those decisions. In this way 
the research findings relate to the gap (Noble, 1999) created by the “overwhelming focus on the 
actual content of the strategic decisions” as compared to the implementation (Alexander, 1989), and 
support the role of behavioural aspects (Noble, 1999) in successful strategic decisions. 
7.1.2 Myopic Rational Focus 
On taking the opinion of Doyle (1999) into consideration that rational decision-making is “choosing 
among alternatives in a way that properly accords with the preferences and beliefs of an individual 
decision maker or those of a group making a joint decision”, it seems that both the organisations 
were “myopic rational” (Carrillo & Gaduh, 2012) and focused on short-term or immediate outcomes 
while ignoring the long run consequences. For example, Enron provided a waiver to its own CFO to 
do business with it (by forming an SPE) and entered into complex hedging transactions with that SPE. 
This helped Enron to sort out its immediate concern of finding an investor to invest in its SPEs, but it 
also brought negative consequences (due to conflicts of interests) in the long run. Similarly, Nathans 
focused on short-term implications and ignored long-run consequences. For instance, to avoid the 
immediate concern of disclosure of bad debts in its financial statements, it rolled over VTL related 
loans and accepted VTL shares as security despite being aware of VTL’s falling performance. In this 
way, it solved the immediate issue of a negative impact on financial statements but ignored the long-
term impact on its financial sustainability.  
These findings further extend our understanding of what Piezunka and Dahlander (2015) call the 
impact of “crowdsourcing”: getting information from a large number of sources, some of which may 
fall beyond the boundaries of the organisation, but only attending to information from certain 
sources. This research supports that the decision makers have a tendency to rely on their 
close/trusted sources of information when it comes to attending to the information from a pool of 
sources (Piezunka & Dahlander, 2015). This could well be driven by the self-interest of the decision 
makers (Lee, Pitesa, Insead, & Pillutla, 2015). For example, at Enron the directors ignored the 
suggestions/warnings by the Followers or external sources such as print media. They relied on the 
feedback/suggestions of their close knitted group – the Drivers. 
The issue of myopic focus has been well represented in the literature. Hambrick and Mason (1984) 
state that cognitive choices (myopic views) of decision makers have a huge impact on organizational 
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outcomes, as decision information and context are filtered through these views. According to 
Larwood and Whittaker (1977), managerial myopia arises from the self-serving biases of the 
managers. In their seminal work, Levinthal and March (1993) state that the tendency to ignore the 
long run implications as well as  the larger picture, and to overlook failures, can lead to a myopic 
focus. Levinthal and March (1993) further state that organizations often need to have a trade-off 
between short-run and long-run impacts, as both might not be in tune. This indicates that 
organizations need to strike a balance between short run and long run preferences. However, the 
findings reveal that both the organizations gave priority mainly to achieving short run considerations, 
and ignored the negative long-run consequences. Laverty (2004) considers organizational culture, 
process, and routines as the factors causing myopic rationality. The findings of this study further 
extend this understanding and reveal that myopic rationality leads to an organizational culture which 
in turn feeds back into myopic practice (details in Section 7.2). 
7.1.3 Cohesive and Consistent Long-term Team 
Both the organisations had a consistent long-term team (board), with hardly any changes in the 
committee memberships. According to Anderson, Melanson, and Maly (2007) directors with 
knowledge and experience pose more and better questions and engage in high-quality discussions, 
whereas the findings of this study reveal a lack of constructive questioning/criticism/discussion on 
the part of the qualified and experienced boards of both the organisations who mostly affirmed the 
proposed decisions. Westphal (1998) and Vafeas (2003) state that an increase in board 
independence leads to better corporate governance by increasing the monitoring capability of the 
board. However, this research lends support to Bhagat and Black (2002), and Kumar and 
Sivaramakrishnan (2008), and contributes evidence that board independence does not necessarily 
relate to better governance, and can lead to the failure of the organization. The role of cohesive and 
consistent long-term teams in the failure of an organization is presented in Section 7.2.   
7.1.4 Internal Information Asymmetry 
The findings of this study suggest internal information asymmetry in both the organizations, with 
controlled access to information. There was a deliberate intra-organizational restricted flow of 
information, with the internal transmission of manipulated or untrue information (Polman & Russo, 
2012).  In this way, both the organizations transmitted (Caldwell & O'Reilly, 1982) favourable 
information and restricted unfavourable information. This is in accord with Caldwell and O'Reilly 
(1982), Halperin and Clapp (2007, p. 260), and Polman and Russo (2012) that organisations may 
suffer from systematic information asymmetry as individuals may be selective in reporting only those 
factors that support their views or decisions. An example of this would be the systematic supply of 
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manipulated information to RAC, at Enron, to gain their approval for certain transactions. And at 
Nathans, there was systematic control over VTL related information.  
The concept of information asymmetry has been previously studied from quantitative and financial 
aspects (Biswas, Avittathur, & Chatterjee, 2016; Evans, Perrault, & Jones, 2017; Healy & Palepu, 
2001). However this study brings forward the qualitative considerations of this aspect, and provides 
evidence that internal information asymmetry promotes an organisational culture that leads to 
failure. In this way, this research defends the existing literature that an information processing view 
is important in understanding the culture of the organization (Deshpande, Farley, & Webster, 1993). 
According to Tong and Crosno (2016) information asymmetry can be useful in a business-to-business 
environment. However, this research has found evidence of only the negative impacts 
(organisational culture leading to failure) of information asymmetry. This difference could be due to 
one of the limitations of this study, as this research has abstained from looking into the positive 
aspects of corporate governance practices in the sample case organisations. The limitations of the 
study are discussed in detail in the following sections. 
7.1.5 Conflicts of Interest 
Both the organisations suffered from conflicts of interests. For instance, Enron’s CFO had a personal 
interest in various SPEs, and Nathans’ directors had a stake in VTL. According to Moore and 
Loewenstein (2004), and Demski (2003) conflicts of interest affect the decisions in an organisation 
and can lead to professional violations. Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore (2005) state that the conflicts 
of interest can negatively affect the decisions of the organisation, despite the due disclosure of those 
conflicts. In terms of this research, both the organisations were aware of the prevalent conflicts and 
formally addressed these issues. For example, Enron required its audit committee to monitor all the 
transactions with SPEs related to its CFO. Similarly, Nathans required stringent credit processes to 
approve VTL related debt (as was the case with third-party debt). However, that did not help in 
managing the conflicts. The findings of this research further extend the existing understanding, and 
suggest that even if the organisations formally address the conflicts of interest, they can still bring 
negative consequences. This is supported by Powers et al. (2002) in their report where they state 
that “…. a conflict of this significance that could be managed only through so many controls and 
procedures should not have been approved in the first place.” The findings of this research are also 
significant in terms of depicting the role of conflicts of interests in promoting a culture leading to 
failure.  
 148 
7.1.6 Financial Misrepresentation 
Both the organisations engineered their financial statements and avoided significant disclosure in 
order to present a favourable picture to the internal and external parties. For example, Enron used 
SPEs’ transactions to hide its debt and non-performing assets and to inflate its earnings, whereas 
Nathans rolled over non-performing debt to avoid recording of bad debts. Even though both the 
companies were facing serious issues such as liquidity and non-performing debt, the primary focus of 
both the organisations was on averting negative performance indicators rather than truly addressing 
the issues.  
The concept of financial misrepresentation is widely addressed in the present literature. While Harris 
and Bromiley (2007), O'Connor, Priem, Coombs, and Gilley (2006), and Zhang, Bartol, Smith, Pfarrer, 
and Khanin (2008) recognise the negative implications of financial misrepresentation, Tucker and 
Zarowin (2006) consider managerial discretion on financial reporting advantageous in terms of 
providing  information. Financial misrepresentation has been considered an illegal and criminal act 
(Baucus & Near, 1991; Mishina, Dykes, Block, & Pollock, 2010; O'Connor et al., 2006); however, Harris 
and Bromiley (2007) state that all financial misrepresentations do not necessarily lead to criminal 
convictions. This makes financial misrepresentation an appealing option for organisations. According 
to Clinard and Yeager (2011, p. 58),  corporate culture is one of the primary factors that promotes 
financial misrepresentations and crime. The findings of this research further confirm the link 
between financial misrepresentations and corporate culture and further incorporate that a repeated 
and systematic pattern of financial misrepresentation leads to a corporate culture that results in 
corporate failure. In this way, the research findings indicate that financial misrepresentation is both 
the outcome and a factor of corporate culture. This further extends the existing literature which 
mainly links financial misrepresentation to financial implications such as stock prices, reported 
earnings, market response, and shareholder value (O'Connor et al., 2006; Tucker & Zarowin, 2006; 
Zhang et al., 2008); however this research adds value by demonstrating the qualitative implications 
of financial misrepresentation. The current research also indicates a negative relation between 
earnings management and strengthening of external rules and regulations (Sáenz González & García-
Meca, 2014). However, the findings of this research provide that despite the strict and clear 
regulations, both the organisations indulged in earnings management. In these two organizations, 
rules provided insufficient controls on corporate conduct. 
7.1.7 Subdued Opposition 
The findings indicate that both the organisations subdued the opposition of their policies and 
practices either by force or by disseminating manipulated information. For example, there were 
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concerns regarding Enron’s policies both internally and externally. Enron employees showing 
concerns about or opposition to its policies and practices were either transferred or reprimanded to 
change their behaviour. Similarly, it used its market power and economic pressure to overcome the 
concerns raised by external parties. In the case of Nathans, it suppressed the concerns raised by 
VTL’s franchise holders, and provided misleading information to external parties to subdue the 
opposition.  
The literature considers conflict/opposition as an integral part of an organization. According to Pondy 
(1992) conflict is the very essence of an organization, whereas cooperation is an occasional event. On 
resolving the conflict Elías and Alkadry (2011) state that people are biased and take up information 
that aligns with their own thoughts and ideas, and that organizations, with deliberate efforts, can 
achieve integration of thoughts and have a constructive conflict. This demonstrates the positive 
impact of conflict, an opinion supported by Pondy (1992) but challenged by De Dreu (2008), who 
concludes that organisational  conflict hinders the operations of the organization. 
 However, the findings of this research provide that rather than biased consideration of conflicting 
ideas, both the organisations subdued opposition and conflicting ideas by withholding true and fair 
information. In a way, the conflict resolution was achieved for the “wrong reasons” (Mitroff & 
Emshoff, 1979). It indicates that the two organisations did not have an “active conflict” (Pondy, 
1992), the absence of which leads to subdued opposition. Pondy states that due to the absence of 
active conflict, one polar extreme becomes dominant and stops the flow of diverse ideas, which 
could eventually lead to failure. While Pondy considers that inactive conflict results in a lack of 
capacity to adapt which eventually leads to failure, this research suggests that subdued 
opposition/inactive conflict contributes toward the formation of an organizational culture that 
eventually leads to failure.  
7.1.8 Faulty Monitoring System   
The research findings of this study indicate the presence of a faulty monitoring system. For example, 
RAC at Enron was meant to assess and control the work of other departments. However, the 
performance review system of Enron required the other departments to evaluate the work of RAC, 
thereby creating a conflict of interest and thus affecting the monitoring setup. Similarly, at Nathans, 
the directors and staff working both for VTL and Nathans had the responsibility to evaluate and 
control the risks related to VTL related lending, which was also a faulty monitoring system. The 
findings of this research support that a faulty monitoring setup contributes towards a corporate 
culture that leads to failure. 
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7.1.9  Over-aggressive Business Approach 
The corporate governance practices at both the organisations promoted over-aggressive business 
practices that pushed the limits of legality. Enron’s recruitment strategy, performance review system, 
and compensation strategy reflected its promotion of risky and over-aggressive business practices. 
On a further note, the available evidence suggests the same for Nathans. For instance, Nathans’s 
directors pushed limits to achieve a higher retention rate of investors, even though its retention rate 
was higher than the rest of the industry. This research demonstrates that over-aggressive practices 
promote an organizational culture that may contribute to failure. 
As has been discussed earlier that the practices such as subduing opposition and controlled access to 
the information were used to suppress the negative or below par performance/outcome of the 
decisions of the Drivers. According to Kuusela, Keil, and Maula (2017) an organisation’s response to 
the below par performance is based on how big the gap is. According to the authors, smaller gaps 
lead to resource-consuming acquisitions while larger gaps lead to divestment to free resources. 
However, the practices of both the organisations indicate that irrespective of the scale of the 
performance gap related to the decisions of the Drivers, there was an increase in commitment 
(similar to resource-consuming acquisition) of resources towards those decisions. 
7.2 A Behavioural Model of the Role of Corporate Governance in Corporate 
Failure  
This section presents the primary and significant contribution of this research: A behaviourally 




Figure 7.1 (A Behaviourally Plausible Decision Centred Model of the Role of Corporate Governance 
in Corporate Failure) 
The model presents the way the negative aspects of corporate governance practices affect the 
corporate governance outcomes. These negative aspects not only affect the perceived success of the 
corporate governance outcomes, but also result in the formation of an organisation culture that 
leads to corporate failure. The individual role of each of the negative aspects has already been 
discussed and interpreted in the previous section. There are five major characteristics of this culture. 
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Firstly, it is not a single negative aspect but a group of negative aspects that form a culture bound to 
fail. Secondly, the resulting culture forms a loop with the corporate governance practices. In so 
saying, the resulting culture is a dynamic phenomenon that not only changes in response to the 
corporate governance practices but also affects those practices. Thirdly, this resulting culture is 
parallel to the formal/official shared values (Deshpande et al., 1993)  of the organisations. For 
example, Enron’s official shared values were Respect, Integrity, Communication and Excellence 
(Thomas, 2002), but the parallel culture did not reflect these.  
 Fourthly, the parallel culture creates a divide in the organisations. The first group is termed the 
Drivers, who actively participate in the creation and promotion of this parallel culture. The other 
group consists of the Followers, who are inactive in terms of creating this parallel culture (the 
concept of Drivers and Followers is further interpreted in the following discussion). Fifthly, in order to 
create or impact the culture, the negative aspects persist over an extended period of time.   
The perceived success of the corporate governance practices is another significant component of this 
explanation. The organisations carry on with their corporate governance practices (despite the 
negative aspects), until the outcome is perceived as successful by the Drivers. This effectively means 
that the perceived success of corporate governance practices leads to the persistent reinforcement 
of those practices over a period, which (as stated earlier) is an important factor in the development 
of the parallel culture. However, if the outcome is not perceived as successful by the Drivers, the 
organizations abandon the reinforcement of those practices and shift their focus to managing and 
controlling the issues related to that perceived failure. The notion of perceived success is subjective 
and depends on the perception of the Drivers. The concept of perceived success is what Kim and 
Rhee (2017) term as relative performance, is a behavioural consequence. Kim and Rhee relate this 
behavioural aspect to the position of the decision maker in the organisation structure, but, the 
findings of this study (as explained earlier) relate them to the concept of Drivers  and Followers. 
 Once the issues are managed and/or controlled, the practice becomes part of the loop and 
eventually is incorporated into the culture and practices of the organization. However, if the 
organization fails to manage and/or control the issue, the process is repeated until the stage when it 
either achieves a resolution or finds it is not viable to manage and control the issues. The latter is an 
extreme event and leads to the failure/death of the organization.  
7.2.1 The Drivers and the Followers  
As stated earlier, this research makes an important contribution by introducing the concept of 
Drivers and Followers, and the role they play in the failure of an organization. The following (Table 





Table 7.1 (The concept of Drivers and Followers) 
 The Drivers  The Followers 
Access to information Full/Adequate Limited/Inadequate 
Conflicts of interests  Yes No 
Role in formation of organisational culture Active  Inactive  
Voicing of opinion  Possible Not possible 
Opinion  Valued  Not valued  
Information asymmetry Do not affect  Negatively affects 
Remuneration system  Rewards  Do not reward 
 
The Followers experience “double bind” (Argyris, 2000) where they understand that by complying 
with the organisation’s official values they are defying the parallel culture prevalent in the 
organisation.  This effectively means that whatever choice the Followers make it will be 
counterproductive in one way or another. As a result, most of the Followers prefer to adopt a 
“culture of silence” (Mugarura, 2016). 
The Drivers display characteristics similar to “narcissistic leaders” (Maccoby, 2000), and are self-
assured and pay selective and biased attention to the information. However, the Drivers operate as a 
group, which is in contrast to the nature of narcissistic leaders, who according to Maccoby (2000) 
keep others at arm’s length with a strong wall of defence. However, in agreement with  Maccoby 
(2000), when the Drivers face a threat, they act similarly to narcissistic leaders;  they isolate 
themselves from the advice of others (the Followers) and act in defence. This is demonstrated by 
Lay’s reaction to Watkins’s memo, where instead of paying attention to the warning signals, he tried 
to find ways to expel Watkins from Enron. Similarly, when Nathans’s external solicitor objected to 
the misrepresentation of information in its prospectus, Nathans’s directors excluded him from the 
information loop. In this way, the Drivers stand by their own learning only and reinforce their learned 
past routines (Maccoby, 2000). 
There exists a greater level of cohesiveness among the Drivers, despite the overall internal 
atmosphere of non-cohesiveness. On the other side the Followers self-censor (Leana, 1985) 
information due to the dominance and non-cooperation from the Drivers. In a way, the Drivers 
represent a highly cohesive group who use their collective rationalisations (Janis & Mann, 1977, p. 
 154 
129) and power to support their shared beliefs and values. The high level of cohesion is one of the 
factors that lead to the absence of attention towards critical information and facts (Janis & Mann, 
1977, p. 133). On a further note, Chatterjee and Pollock (2017) state that narcisstic leaders are 
interested in control rather than feedback, and in order to control a large organisation they rely on a 
loyal cadre of lieutenants. The distinction between the Drivers and Followers is in agreement with 
Katz (1982), who states that the long tenure of group members is positively linked to a reduction in 
communication and that members of a long-tenured group tend to ignore critical evaluation, 
information, and feedback from other sources (Katz, 1982). This effectively makes the Drivers  
“unreceptive” (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992) to the corrective strategic measures required.  
7.2.2 A Behavioural Theory of the Firm (Extending the Current Understanding) 
This section interprets and discusses the contribution made by this research towards the current 
understanding of A Behavioral Theory of the Firm by (Cyert & March, 2001).  
Resolution of Conflict 
This research supports the work of Cyert and March (2001) that most organisations exist and grow 
with considerable latent conflict of goals and have a quasi-resolution of conflict. According to the 
authors, even though organisations adopt certain procedures to resolve conflict, it does not reduce 
all goals to a common dimension, which means there is always a lack of internal consensus. The 
findings support that at both the organisations there was a lack of consensus. For example, the 
accounting and financial practices of Enron, and the content of the prospectus of Nathans always 
attracted internal concerns, which were never resolved. 
 Organisations deal with these conflicts by using local rationality which represents a tendency of the 
individuals or individual departments to focus on a limited set of problems and a limited set of goals. 
In this way, the organisations use delegation and specialisation to reduce a complex set of goals and 
problems to a number of sub-goals/problems. To achieve a fit between various sub decisions, the 
organisations adapt acceptable-level decision rules and they pay sequential attention to goals. The 
acceptable-level decision rules ensure that various local/sub decisions provide a joint solution to the 
problem. The organisations also attend to various problems and goals in sequence, by attending to 
one problem/goal at one time followed by another (Cyert & March, 2001). 
The findings of this study support the view that organizational conflict has a quasi-resolution, and 
further contribute that the Drivers neither adapt acceptable-level decision rules nor do they pay 
sequential attention. Rather they rely on manipulation, suppression and control to achieve quasi-
resolution of conflicts. A Behavioral Theory of the Firm by Cyert and March (2001) indicates a 
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temporary compromise among different goals as the organisation attends to these different goals in 
sequence. However, according to this research, the goals/expectations of the Followers are 
permanently compromised. In doing so, the research supports that organisations pay different 
attention to different goals and solutions, an Attention-based view (Ocasio, 1997, 2011). Recent 
research on attention-based view relates the attention structure  to the formal structure of the 
organisation (Gaba & Joseph, 2013; Joseph & Wilson, 2017), knowledge structure of the individuals, 
and the changes in the environment (Shepherd, McMullen, & Ocasio, 2017). The findings of this 
research, however, suggest that the attention structure of the organisation is related to the 
organisational culture driven by the Drivers. These findings are meaningful in explaining the 
divergent attention and perception of the decision makers regarding various goals and solutions. 
According to Cyert and March (2001), organisations are able to overcome the inconsistencies related 
to the local rationality of various individuals/departments. However, this research demonstrates that 
the failed organisations did not overcome inconsistencies between the rationality of the Drivers and 
the Followers. In this way, the research supports the opinion of Kim and Rhee (2017) that the rational 
choice assumption is unrealistic. 
Dealing with Uncertainty  
Organisational decision making always entails dealing with uncertainty (Knight, 1921/2012). 
However, organisations avoid uncertainty during their decision-making, as they tend to avoid the 
requirement to correctly anticipate the distant future, hence the decisions are based on short-run 
feedback rather than long-run anticipation.  In this way, the organisations solve pressing/immediate 
problems rather than developing long-run strategies (Cyert & March, 2001). The findings of this study 
support the work of Cyert and March as both the organisations focused on solving the 
pressing/immediate issues. The research findings further contribute to the concept of uncertainty 
avoidance by presenting that when a short run relief ceased to work or lost its effect, another short 
run measure was adopted to replace it and provide an ongoing relief.  
Organisations arrange a negotiated environment to avoid anticipation of uncertainty related to the 
future reactions of other parts of their environment. The negotiated environment is achieved by 
imposing plans, standard operating procedures, industry traditions, and uncertainty in absorbing 
contracts on that environment. In this way, organisations achieve a manageable decision situation 
while avoiding planning that requires prediction of uncertain future events (Cyert & March, 2001). 
Similar views are expressed by Hofstede who states that uncertainty avoiding cultures persistently 
avoid ambiguity and look for structure in their organisation, institutions, and relationships, which 
makes events clearly interpretable and predictable (Hofstede, 2001, p. 148). 
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However, both Enron and Nathans avoided uncertainty by controlling their environment through 
measures such as market power, and manipulation and misrepresentation of the facts. The measures 
listed by Cyert and March (2001) basically focus on avoiding losses by negotiating a certain 
environment; however, the results of this study reveal that in the failed organisations the measures 
are adopted not to avoid losses but to avoid reporting of those losses.  
Searching for Solutions 
The findings of this research are consistent with those of Cyert and March (2001), that the 
organisation’s search for a solution is stimulated by a problem and is directed towards finding a 
solution to that problem. This research supports the view that organisations do not undertake a 
regular planned search for changes in the current solutions, and search for options only when the 
current alternatives fail to match the expectations.  This research further demonstrates that the 
failed organisations defined a problem in terms of its immediate impact and sought a solution to deal 
with that immediate impact. The long-term impact of the same problem remained to be dealt with 
later. However it was not part of sequential attention, rather the issues in waiting were addressed as 
and when they became immediate/pressing issues.  
The organisations continue searching for a solution until a problem is solved. The solution is found 
either by discovering an alternative that achieves the goals or by revising the goals to match the 
available alternative (Cyert & March, 2001). However, according to this research the search 
continued until a solution was found as an immediate fix for an immediate issue. The immediate fixes 
were of a temporary nature, as they focused on short-term impacts only. A temporary fix was later 
replaced by another temporary fix.   
As per Cyert and March (2001)the organisational search for a solution is biased due to the difference 
in training and experience of the decision makers. This research supports that the search for a 
solution is biased and further extends the understanding that the value orientation of the decision 
makers contributes towards that bias. The role of the value orientation is discussed in detail in the 
next section.  Further according to Cyert and March, organisations adopt standard operating 
procedures and follow certain industry norms and practices during their decision-making. However, 
the findings of this study suggest that both the organisations disregarded many such practices, and 
sought a solution to disguise their problems rather than fixing them.  
A recent review of literature on Problemistic search by Posen, Keil, Kim, and Meissner (2018) calls for 
“research to take a more process-oriented approach and to embody a more central role for 
cognition”. This research has addressed this call and has explored the behavioural aspects of 
corporate decision making.  The insights from this research provide cognitive and processual 
 157 
understanding of the organisational decision process (including Problemistic search). For example, as 
discussed earlier, the research informs about how an organisational culture lead by the Drivers result 
in divergent attention and perception regarding various goals and solutions. 
Organisational Learning 
Individual members are the agents of organisational learning. The learning of an organisation 
consists of the adaptation of goals, adaptation in attention rules, and adaptation in search rules. 
Adaptation of goals is influenced by the previous goals, previous experience with those goals, and 
the learning resulting from the experience of a similar organisation. Adaptation in attention rules 
refers to the selective attention paid to the environment, and that the learning of the organisations is 
reflected in the subjective attention rules which change in response to learning. The adaptation in 
search rules is the outcome of the success/failure of those rules (Cyert & March, 2001).  
The literature relates the adaptation and learning of organisations to the reference groups (primarily 
to the economic reference groups/historic aspirations such as previous performance and the 
performance of the competitors) (Hu et al., 2017; Washburn & Bromiley, 2012). Kacperczyk et al. 
(2015) and (Washburn & Bromiley, 2012) call for more research to gain further insights into the 
social/peer reference groups, which according to Tarakci, Ateş, Floyd, Ahn, and Wooldridge (2018)  
are more important drivers of decision behaviour than the economic/historic reference points. Also  
Kuusela et al. (2017) for  qualitative research to study the reference groups and related perspectives. 
This research has added to the existing understanding regarding reference groups by using a 
qualitative methodology to present the concepts of parallel culture and the Drivers and the 
Followers.  
The findings of this study support that individual members of the organisation play an instrumental 
role in organisation learning. However, there are two parallel sets of learning. One set is for the 
Drivers and the other for the Followers. It is the learning of the Drivers that drives the adaptations in 
goals, attention rules and search rules. The learning of the Drivers also forms the culture of the 
organisation, while the learning of the Followers relates to their adaptation to the culture developed 
by the Drivers. Further, organisations do not seek active feedback from the Followers. Learning is the 
detection and correction of errors, and the lack of either or both inhibits learning (Argyris, 1976). 
Complete learning does not happen as the concerns of the Followers are not duly addressed by the 
organisations.  
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7.2.3 Value Orientation 
This research makes an important contribution by introducing the types of value orientations that 
affect the decisions of the organizational leader of a failed organization. They include Individual, 
Social, and Functional orientations. The research findings support that the value orientation plays a 
critical role in the decision of the leaders of the failed organisations, as they screened the decision 
context and available information through these orientations. 
The concept of individual orientation denotes a context where the leader considers self interest as 
the priority and takes the decision to serve this self-interest. The decisions dominated by individual 
orientation exploit organization resources and policies for individual interest. In decisions dominated 
by individual orientation, the decision maker considers organizational interest secondary to self-
interest. The findings suggest that an individual orientation results in negative outcomes for 
corporate governance. An example of that would be that due to self-interest both the organisations 
allowed conflicts of interest to prevail at the cost of the organizational interest. The individual 
orientation of these leaders persisted during both good and bad phases (financial context) of the 
organization’s life. The available evidence supports that, even near the end of the organisations, the 
leaders considered themselves a priority. For example, just before Enron’s bankruptcy, Lay tried to 
secure a financial return for himself, while negotiating a possible merger with Dynegy.  
The concept of social orientation denotes the value orientation of the leaders in the context of their 
group members. The findings of this research support that in terms of their social orientation, the 
leaders of the failed organisations preferred to have their close confidants around. The leader and his 
confidants worked as a closely knit group and supported the decisions of the leader and vice versa. In 
doing so the leader ignored any negative or opposing signs/information. For example, initially Moses 
had concerns regarding the information provided by Nathans in the investment statement. However, 
later on, he became convinced of the logic and went on to support his fellow directors, while ignoring 
the issues related to that statement. Similarly, Lay also supported his close aide Skilling, while 
ignoring the legal or ethical aspects. This kind of social orientation promotes unanimous decisions 
while avoiding dissension. However, the unanimity does not mean the actual absence of opposition, 
rather it is the suppression of opposition, where the Followers are subdued with various means such 
as information asymmetry. 
 The concept of functional orientation reflects on the day to day functional or operational 
preferences of the leader. The findings of this research suggest that the leaders of the failed 
organizations had short-term functional orientation where they focused on achieving immediate 
results while ignoring the long-term impacts. The functional orientation does not change or is not re-
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considered until it fails to deliver the desired results. The findings further suggest that, with time, the 
leaders escalated their commitment towards their previous decisions or existing functional 
orientation. The failure of previous decisions or the challenges/opposition to the functional 
orientation of the leaders was positively related to the escalation of commitment.  
The value orientation of these leaders was also reflected in the parallel culture in the organizations. 
For example the negative aspects of the conflicts of interest related to their individual orientation. 
Whereas, social orientation relates to information asymmetry and restricted access of information to 
the Followers. Similarly, as part of the social orientation, Drivers are generously rewarded and the 
Followers are reprimanded to fall in line. Further the negative aspect of financial misrepresentation 
reflected on the functional orientation of the leaders. 
As stated in the literature review, there is need of further research to study the relation between the 
individual determinants of risk and the organisational determinants of risk (Kacperczyk et al., 2015). 
This research has made an important contribution by demonstrating the role of the Value 
Orientation of the individual decision makers in organisational decision making. The research has 
presented three types of Value Orientation that affected the decisions of the organisations. For 
example, it demonstrated how the Value Orientation of Lay and Moses have affected the decision 
making in their respective organisations. 
7.3 Conclusion   
7.3.1 Theoretical and Methodological Contributions  
The objective of this research was not to replace the existing governance theories and related 
prescriptions with a direct alternative theory, but to refocus attention on underexplored aspects of 
corporate governance. It was highlighted in Chapter 2 that the research on corporate governance has 
seldom focused on the behavioural and human side of governance (Leblanc, 2004, 2013; Pugliese et 
al., 2009; Sonnenfeld, 2004), and that corporate governance is not a pure economic process and 
needs to be studied in the social context as well. Further, in this regard, the contemporary research 
on corporate governance has accommodated some issues such as  board independence (Faleye, 
2017; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998, 2003; Mateescu, 2015; Sarkar, 2009), stock and equity ownership 
of directors (Rose, Mazza, Norman, & Rose, 2013); CEO Duality and board composition (António, 
Lúcia Lima, & Russell, 2017; Byrd, Fraser, Scott Lee, & Tartaroglu, 2012; Dalton, Dan, & Catherine, 
2011), board accountability (Keay & Loughrey, 2015), and demographic characteristics (Huse, 2005). 
However, the behavioural and social components are still not duly addressed (Huse, 2005; Plessis, 
2008). Thereby this research contributes towards enhancing the existing understanding of the 
behavioural aspects of corporate governance decision making. In so doing, the research has adapted 
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a social context and a human context  (Letza et al., 2008; Marnet, 2007) rather than a purely 
economic context. As a result, it establishes the human element as the most critical element of 
corporate governance -  who is “influenced by and is influencing” (Senge, 1990, p. 78) the culture of 
the organisation. 
Gavetti et al. (2007), believe that the legacy of A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (or The Carnegie 
school in general) has not been duly carried forward by contemporary researchers, who have drifted 
away from a decision making and organisational level of analysis. Retrospectively, Gavetti et al. 
(2007)  call for a “behaviorally plausible decision-centered perspective on organisations”. This 
research attends to this call and presents A behaviourally plausible decision-centred model of the role 
of corporate governance in corporate failure. Further, this model also attempts to fill the research 
gap (in the context of the behavioural aspects of corporate governance) found in Chapter 2. Given 
that, this research introduces the concept of parallel culture as the key factor which emerges from 
corporate governance decisions and which also affects the future corporate governance decisions, 
ultimately leading to corporate failure. The research provide insights into the concept of corporate 
culture which according to Clark and Brown (2015); Minichilli et al. (2007) have significant impact on 
organisational decision making. 
There has been an attempt by current researchers to investigate the behavioural aspects of 
corporate governance decision making. For instance Steckler and Clark (2018) have analysed the role 
of individual moral and virtue in corporate governance dynamics. Nakpodia and Adegbite (2018) 
have analysed the influence of three external groups (political, cultural, and religious) on the 
corporate governance practices of the organisations. Wu (2016) have provided a “behaviourally 
plausible decision-centred perspective” into the investment behaviour of venture capital firms. Kim 
and Rhee (2017) have integrated the behavioural perspective on decision making with the structural 
perspective.  In response to the behaviourally plausible, decision-centred perspective, Wilson (2016) 
has provided a structure–feedback theory of decision making that integrates hierarchy and 
aspirations. With reference to the present research on behavioural aspects of decision making, this 
research makes a unique contribution as it provides insights into the impact of Value orientations of 
decision makers on organisational decision making. It also extends our understanding of behavioural 
aspects within the context of corporate culture.  
The research also contributes to the further understanding of A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, by 
extending the existing understanding of the decision related concepts in relation to corporate 
failures. In this respect, the research relates the sub-processes of the above theory to behavioural 
aspects , which are not originally represented in the theory of Cyert and March (2001). The research 
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also contributes by explaining the lack of early whistle-blowers in cases of corporate failures, by 
introducing and demonstrating the concept of Drivers and Followers.  
According to Hiley and Smallman (1999), research on corporate failure is driven by quantitative 
methods such as regression analysis, multivariate discriminate analysis, and ratio analysis. An 
analysis of contemporary research confirms that this trend has continued over the years and 
quantitative research methods still dominate the research on corporate failure (Cielen, Peeters, & 
Vanhoof, 2004; Hsu & Wu, 2014; Lakshan & Wijekoon, 2012; Qaiser Rafique & Abdullah Al, 2015). 
Appiah, Chizema, and Arthur (2015) confirm this dominance and state that corporate failures are 
mainly analysed from quantitative and statistical perspectives and call for further research to address 
this methodological dominance. The research in the field of corporate governance has also used 
quantitative methods (Ees, Laan, & Postma, 2008; Erakoviç & Overall, 2010), whereas use of 
qualitative methods has been recommended by others (Roberts et al., 2005). This research makes 
this important methodological contribution by using and demonstrating the effectiveness of 
qualitative research methods (the suitability of which, for this specific topic, has been discussed in 
Chapter 3) to study issues related to corporate governance and corporate failures. On a further note 
Johnson (1992) has raised concerns that the strategic decisions have been analysed on the grounds 
of what should have been done, rather than observing the actual decision making. This research 
responds to this call by focusing on how the decisions are actually taken in the organisations. Further, 
as stated in the literature review, this research has also addressed the issue of ceremonial adoption 
(Bromley & Powell, 2012; Hambrick & Lovelace, 2018; Markóczy et al., 2013; Shi & Connelly, 2018) by 
drawing inferences from the outcomes (Shi & Connelly, 2018) of corporate governance decisions of 
the organisations.The research also contributes by driving three types of value orientation that affect 
the decisions of the decision maker. In doing so it has adopted a different approach from the 
previous value theories, such as (Rokeach, 1973) and (Schwartz, 2009), which were driven by a pre-
set list of values and goals, and where respondents were asked to rank the given values in certain 
contexts. However, the value set provided by this research has emerged from the data itself, where 
no pre-set list was imposed. In this way the research makes an important contribution by exploring 
behaviour through actual choices/decisions rather than asking for an opinion on a pre-set list. This is 
a significant contribution in terms of focusing on individual orientation, which meets the call by 
Marnet (2007) to focus on individual levels of corporate governance decision making. Current 
research on values and organisational decision making are driven by quantitative or mixed method 
approaches (Pohling, Bzdok, Eigenstetter, Stumpf, & Strobel, 2016; Tang, 2016; Wisler, 2018). This 
research contributes by adopted and demonstrating qualitative research methods to study the 
concept of values. 
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7.3.2 Practical Implications 
As has been discussed in Chapter 2, current actions and reactions (including legal and regulatory) to 
corporate failure have failed to address the problem and this research offers further insights in that 
regard. The research offers a clear perspective on the role of the behavioural aspects of corporate 
governance, which emphasizes the need to address these aspects in the form of internal and external 
policies. It is expected that the research findings will provide a more effective approach to legislation 
and policies, which as of now, focuses on the structural elements of governance (Levrau & Berghe, 
2013), and has failed to check the reoccurring corporate failures (Marnet, 2007). 
Even though minimal, the insights from this research regarding the whistle-blowers are valuable in 
terms of policy formulation for encouraging employees to speak up earlier. 
Taking account of the human element in the complex dynamics of corporate governance is vital to a 
good corporate governance system (Huse, 2005). Thereby the findings of this research such as value 
orientations and the emergence of a parallel culture are expected to provide a vital understanding of 
good governance practices. These could be meaningful insights for designing legislative and 
regulatory improvements (which are at present insufficient to encourage ethical conduct (Plessis, 
2008)), to improve corporate governance practices. 
Further, this research is expected to help current boards and/or individual board members identify 
the behavioural indications that should trigger a watch out mode in terms of corporate governance 
practices.  This is also expected to assist the outside third parties in identifying the warnings signs. 
However, as have been evident from the findings of this research, mere identification of the warning 
signs (faulty corporate governance practices) won’t serve the purpose.  It requires people from 
within and outside the organisation to take responsibility and actively respond to those signs. The 
board of directors might prefer to have truly independent knowledgeable observers (with no 
conflicts of interest at all) in the board, who provide independent reflections on the practices. 
However, again it comes back to the board members whether to attend to that feedback or not. 
Hence, it is suggested that the independent observer should have the independence to approach the 
regulatory authorities, should the board fails to act on the signs. Similarly, the whistle blowers from 
within the organisations need to be further protected. For instance, as provided in Appendix C, the 
complaint form of the Serious Fraud Office of New Zealand requires quite a bit of detail and related 
evidence to report the fraud to the office. Though the complaint can be made without the evidence, 
the office needs the evidence before it decides to the conduct the investigation (2018). It is 
understood that such type of investigation involves significant resources and related evidence needs 
to be evaluated prior to the investigation. However, this research has found that there was 
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information asymmetry in the selected organisations and limited details were available to the 
Followers. This certainly affects the ability of the whistle blowers in terms of providing evidence. 
Therefore, this aspect requires reconsideration in terms of motivating the whistle blowers to come 
forward. 
7.3.3 Limitations 
The research findings are based on data from two case studies only. The nature of corporate 
governance is very complex and this research could have benefited from more cases. However, 
considering the availability of data and the time required in retrieving useful details (the study 
experienced data overload in the case of Enron and limited data in the case of Nathans, both of 
which were an issue), the study has made a significant contribution.  
The second limitation comes from the nature of the data and data sources used for this study. The 
study used archived/secondary data. However, the triangulation of data was achieved through 
multiple data sources which added to the validity of the research findings. But this research to some 
extent still could not ignore the subjective interpretation of the original authors of those articles, 
books, reports etc. Moreover, the study adopted more of a social context, so thereby financial 
statements were beyond the scope of its research. However, specific financial details were analysed 
to understand the context of various decisions. 
The research also abstained from looking into positive factors/aspects related to the governance 
practices of the selected case organisations. It is possible that an analysis of positive aspects could 
have provided meaningful comparative insights. 
The research relied on coding by the researcher only, and no other coder was engaged to look for 
any disagreements. However, the research was substantially able to overcome this limitation with 
the Query feature of NVivo, the details of which have been provided in the previous chapters. 
7.3.4 Future Research  
This research contribution of this study is based on two case studies only. Further extension in this 
regard would add value to the results. Secondly, a further comparative research on successful 
corporate governance practices may add further value and strength to the behavioural aspects of 
corporate governance decision making.  
While this research used data triangulation to achieve validity, future researchers would benefit from 
direct/live data in the form of meetings and interviews with the directors. However, that would be 
possible mainly for the study of successful/currently operating organisations only. Having said that,  
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“negotiating access to the black box” of corporate governance is a difficult task, as participants are 
likely to be reluctant to share critical details (Leblanc, 2004). Moreover, the mere presence of an 
outsider (researcher) in the meetings can be obstructive , as participants may avoid discussing 
sensitive or inside matters in front of an outsider  (Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007). 
This research has addressed the concept of reference groups and their impact on the adaptation and 
learning of the individuals.  The reference groups have two functions Normative (individuals seek to 
gain membership of a desirable group), and Comparative (individuals use the performance of a 
particular group as a benchmark). There is lack of research in terms of the Normative functions of the 
reference groups (Moliterno, Beck, Beckman, & Meyer, 2014). There is a future research opportunity 
to study the behaviour of new entrants from when they initially join the organisation to when they 
become part of a reference group (the Drivers/ the Followers). 
As stated in the literature review, corporate governance deviance can happen in the form of 
underconforming or overconforming governance rules and practices. Aguilera et al. (2018). This 
research has primarily looked into the context of underconforming where the organisations fell short 
of the expected standard. However, overconforming to corporate governance practices is another 
possible area of research that could provide further insights into the process of corporate 
governance. For example in response to the principle of board independence, many organisations 
have removed all inside directors except the CEO (CEO-only boards). This offers the CEOs 
informational brokerage advantages as compared to the outside directors, which could negatively 
impact the corporate governance process in the organisations (Joseph, Ocasio, & McDonnell, 2014).   
 
Finally this research has provided A behaviourally plausible decision centred model of the role of 
corporate governance in corporate failure, which offers a starting point for future research efforts. 
The research has brought behaviour back into corporate governance research, which calls for further 
research in this area. On a further note, future research may also provide useful insights by extending 


















Start List/Keywords  
Table A. 1 (Corporate Governance - Keywords for Respective Functions) 
Corporate Governance Function Start list (Keywords for respective function) 
Setting strategic direction Strategy 
Formulating policy Policy 
Managing and controlling risk Risk 
Selecting CEO and Directors CEO, Director  
Monitoring performance  Performance  
Table A. 2 (Decision Process - Keywords for Respective Content) 
Relational Concepts Start list (Keywords for respective concept) 
Quasi Resolution of Conflict Conflict, Resolve 
Uncertainty Avoidance Uncertainty, Avoid 
Problemistic Search Problem, Solution 





NVivo - Word Frequency Query  
Following are the tables for NVivo - Word Frequency Query. The column ‘Length’ denominates the 
number of letters in the relevant word, whereas the column ‘Count’ refers to the frequency of the 
relevant word.  
B.1 Word Frequency Query - Keyword: Strategy 
Table B.1. 1 (Enron - Word Frequency - Keyword: Strategy) 
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
strategy 8 383 60.13 
strategies 10 157 24.65 
scheme 6 49 7.69 
schemes 7 47 7.38 
scheming 8 1 0.16 
Table B.1. 2 (Nathans - Word Frequency - Keyword: Strategy) 
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
strategy 8 41 69.49 
strategies 10 11 18.64 
scheme 6 4 6.78 
schemes 7 3 5.08 
B.2 Word Frequency Query - Keyword: Policy 
Table B.2. 1 (Enron - Word Frequency - Keyword: Policy) 
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
policy 6 394 44.77 
insurance 9 229 26.02 
policies 8 194 22.05 
insured 7 14 1.59 
insurer 7 13 1.48 
insuring 8 12 1.36 
insurers 8 11 1.25 
insurance 5 5 0.57 
insure 6 5 0.57 
insurable 9 1 0.11 
insurances 10 1 0.11 




Table B.2. 2 (Nathans - Word Frequency - Keyword: Policy) 
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
policy 6 39 46.99 
policies 8 28 33.73 
insurance 9 12 14.46 
insurers 8 3 3.61 
insurer 7 1 1.20 
B.3 Word Frequency Query - Keyword: Risk 















Table B.3. 2 (Nathans - Word Frequency - Keyword: Risk) 
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
risk 4 122 69.32 
risks 5 43 24.43 
chance 6 4 2.27 
danger 6 4 2.27 
dangerously 11 2 1.14 
risked 6 1 0.57 
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
risk 4 1532 71.86 
risks 5 361 16.93 
chance 6 57 2.67 
dangerous 9 28 1.31 
danger 6 25 1.17 
chances 7 21 0.98 
hazard 6 17 0.80 
gambling 8 12 0.56 
risked 6 12 0.56 
dangers 7 11 0.52 
adventures 10 9 0.42 
perils 6 9 0.42 
gamble 6 7 0.33 
hazards 7 7 0.33 
perilous 8 4 0.19 
risking 7 4 0.19 
adventure 9 3 0.14 
hazardous 9 3 0.14 
dangerously 11 2 0.09 
gambled 7 2 0.09 
jeopardy 8 2 0.09 
peril 5 2 0.09 
adventurous 11 1 0.05 
gambles 7 1 0.05 
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B.4 Word Frequency Query - Keyword: CEO 
Table B.4. 1 (Enron - Word Frequency - Keyword: CEO) 
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
Ceo 3 582 48.22 
Ceos 4 79 6.55 
chairman 8 11 0.91 
Cfo 3 9 0.75 
president 9 6 0.50 
corporation 11 5 0.41 
Table B.4. 2 (Nathans - Word Frequency - Keyword: CEO) 
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
chairman 8 74 81.32 
ceo 3 6 6.59 
chaired 7 3 3.30 
chair 5 2 2.20 
chairwoman 10 2 2.20 
president 9 2 2.20 
chairing 8 1 1.10 
presided 8 1 1.10 
B.5 Word Frequency Query - Keyword: Director 
Table B.5. 1 (Enron - Word Frequency - Keyword: Director) 
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
management 10 2738 41.25 
directors 9 1431 21.56 
managers 8 769 11.58 
director 8 745 11.22 
manager 7 334 5.03 
manage 6 230 3.46 
managing 8 194 2.92 
managed 7 128 1.93 
manages 7 43 0.65 
manageable 10 7 0.11 
managements 11 6 0.09 
conductor 9 5 0.08 
Managers 5 4 0.06 
directorates 12 2 0.03 
conductors 10 1 0.02 






Table B.5. 2 (Nathans - Word Frequency - Keyword: Director) 
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
directors 9 766 54.33 
director 8 299 21.21 
management 10 215 15.25 
manager 7 52 3.69 
managed 7 33 2.34 
managing 8 19 1.35 
manage 6 17 1.21 
managers 8 4 0.28 
manages 7 4 0.28 






































B.6 Word Frequency Query - Keyword: Performance 
Table B.6. 1 (Enron - Word Frequency - Keyword: Performance) 
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
executive 9 1051 16.30 
act 3 854 13.24 
performance 11 825 12.79 
executives 10 732 11.35 
operations 10 487 7.55 
operating 9 434 6.73 
operate 7 196 3.04 
perform 7 195 3.02 
operation 9 189 2.93 
acting 6 164 2.54 
function 8 151 2.34 
play 4 118 1.83 
acts 4 113 1.75 
played 6 94 1.46 
performing 10 83 1.29 
performed 9 75 1.16 
functions 9 67 1.04 
functioning 11 60 0.93 
acted 5 58 0.90 
execution 9 49 0.76 
operational 11 49 0.76 
operates 8 48 0.74 
operated 8 45 0.70 
executed 8 43 0.67 
execute 7 41 0.64 
functional 10 38 0.59 
operator 8 26 0.40 
plays 5 26 0.40 
playing 7 25 0.39 
executing 9 16 0.25 
functioned 10 13 0.20 
functionings 12 10 0.16 
operation 4 10 0.16 
operative 9 10 0.16 
performs 8 10 0.16 
performers 10 8 0.12 
operators 9 6 0.09 
functionalism 13 5 0.08 
performer 9 5 0.08 
functionality 13 4 0.06 
performances 12 4 0.06 
Execut?? 6 2 0.03 
functionally 12 2 0.03 
playful 7 2 0.03 
executes 8 1 0.02 
functionalities 15 1 0.02 
operant 7 1 0.02 
operationally 13 1 0.02 
performativity 14 1 0.02 
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Table B.6. 2 (Nathans - Word Frequency Query - Keyword: Performance) 
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
act 3 261 37.83 
executive 9 62 8.99 
operating 9 49 7.10 
operations 10 47 6.81 
performance 11 36 5.22 
operated 8 29 4.20 
functions 9 24 3.48 
acted 5 22 3.19 
operators 9 21 3.04 
acting 6 20 2.90 
operate 7 19 2.75 
operation 9 17 2.46 
operator 8 13 1.88 
executives 10 12 1.74 
performing 10 8 1.16 
played 6 8 1.16 
operational 11 6 0.87 
performed 9 6 0.87 
play 4 5 0.72 
acts 4 4 0.58 
operates 8 4 0.58 
perform 7 3 0.43 
playing 7 3 0.43 
executed 8 2 0.29 
execution 9 2 0.29 
function 8 2 0.29 
performs 8 2 0.29 
functioning 11 1 0.14 
operationally 13 1 0.14 
performances 12 1 0.14 


















B.7 Word Frequency Query - Keyword: Conflict 
Table B.7. 1 (Enron - Word Frequency - Keyword: Conflict) 
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
different 9 534 22.44 
conflict 8 265 11.13 
conflicts 9 263 11.05 
engage 6 216 9.08 
engaged 7 199 8.36 
differences 11 171 7.18 
difference 10 151 6.34 
engagement 10 64 2.69 
engaging 8 57 2.39 
differ 6 54 2.27 
fight 5 45 1.89 
differently 11 41 1.72 
conflicting 11 40 1.68 
struggle 8 31 1.30 
fighting 8 29 1.22 
battle 6 27 1.13 
engages 7 22 0.92 
differing 9 19 0.80 
dispute 7 17 0.71 
struggled 9 17 0.71 
contradictory 13 16 0.67 
struggles 9 13 0.55 
conflicted 10 12 0.50 
infringement 12 12 0.50 
disputed 8 10 0.42 
disputes 8 10 0.42 
struggling 10 10 0.42 
differs 7 7 0.29 
battles 7 6 0.25 
engagements 11 6 0.25 
fights 6 6 0.25 
differed 8 5 0.21 
contravened 11 2 0.08 
battling 8 1 0.04 
disputing 9 1 0.04 








Table B.7. 2 (Nathans - Word Frequency - Keyword: Conflict) 
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
different 9 28 20.90 
difference 10 19 14.18 
conflict 8 12 8.96 
differently 11 8 5.97 
dispute 7 7 5.22 
engage 6 7 5.22 
conflicts 9 6 4.48 
engaged 7 5 3.73 
struggling 10 5 3.73 
differences 11 4 2.99 
engagement 10 4 2.99 
differing 9 3 2.24 
disputes 8 3 2.24 
contradictory 13 2 1.49 
contravene 10 2 1.49 
contravened 11 2 1.49 
differ 6 2 1.49 
differed 8 2 1.49 
engaging 8 2 1.49 
struggle 8 2 1.49 
battle 6 1 0.75 
battles 7 1 0.75 
conflicting 11 1 0.75 
contravening 12 1 0.75 
differs 7 1 0.75 
disputed 8 1 0.75 
engages 7 1 0.75 
fight 5 1 0.75 











B.8 Word Frequency Query - Keyword: Resolve 
Table B.8. 1 (Enron - Word Frequency - Keyword: Resolve) 
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
purpose 7 445 23.25 
purposes 8 188 9.82 
concluded 9 166 8.67 
decided 7 114 5.96 
resolved 8 98 5.12 
conclude 8 95 4.96 
settle 6 92 4.81 
answer 6 77 4.02 
resolution 10 69 3.61 
settled 7 53 2.77 
solve 5 46 2.40 
decide 6 45 2.35 
resolutions 11 44 2.30 
solving 7 39 2.04 
concludes 9 38 1.99 
resolve 7 38 1.99 
answers 7 32 1.67 
declared 8 28 1.46 
deciding 8 24 1.25 
concluding 10 19 0.99 
firmly 6 17 0.89 
solved 6 14 0.73 
resolving 9 11 0.57 
answering 9 10 0.52 
purposeful 10 10 0.52 
purposefully 12 10 0.52 
settles 7 10 0.52 
declaration 11 9 0.47 
declare 7 9 0.47 
answered 8 8 0.42 
declaring 9 7 0.37 
decides 7 6 0.31 
dissolve 8 6 0.31 
purposely 9 6 0.31 
answerable 10 5 0.26 
dissolved 9 5 0.26 
solvent 7 5 0.26 
decidedly 9 2 0.10 
declares 8 2 0.10 
resolves 8 2 0.10 
settling 8 2 0.10 
solvable 8 2 0.10 
declarations 12 1 0.05 
declarative 11 1 0.05 
dissolves 9 1 0.05 
firmness 8 1 0.05 
solelv 4 1 0.05 
solves 6 1 0.05 
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Table B.8. 2 (Nathans - Word Frequency - Keyword: Resolve) 
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
purpose 7 41 20.60 
purposes 8 36 18.09 
decided 7 20 10.05 
concluded 9 16 8.04 
deciding 8 9 4.52 
answered 8 7 3.52 
settled 7 7 3.52 
answer 6 6 3.02 
resolved 8 6 3.02 
declared 8 5 2.51 
solvent 7 5 2.51 
decide 6 4 2.01 
declaration 11 4 2.01 
answers 7 3 1.51 
conclude 8 3 1.51 
concluding 10 3 1.51 
solve 5 3 1.51 
answering 9 2 1.01 
declarations 12 2 1.01 
declare 7 2 1.01 
declaring 9 2 1.01 
firmly 6 2 1.01 
firms 5 2 1.01 
resolution 10 2 1.01 
resolve 7 2 1.01 
adjudication 12 1 0.50 
concludes 9 1 0.50 
decidedly 9 1 0.50 
resolving 9 1 0.50 
settle 6 1 0.50 
B.9 Word Frequency Query - Keyword: Uncertainty 
Table B.9. 1 (Enron - Word Frequency - Keyword: Uncertainty) 
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
uncertainty 11 108 38.43 
doubt 5 69 24.56 
uncertain 9 40 14.23 
dubious 7 17 6.05 
uncertainties 13 16 5.69 
doubtful 8 11 3.91 
doubts 6 9 3.20 
precarious 10 6 2.14 
doubted 7 2 0.71 
precariousness 14 2 0.71 




Table B.9. 2 (Nathans - Word Frequency - Keyword: Uncertainty) 
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
doubt 5 17 60.71 
doubtful 8 6 21.43 
uncertain 9 2 7.14 
doubts 6 1 3.57 
precarious 10 1 3.57 
uncertainties 13 1 3.57 
B.10 Word Frequency Query - Keyword: Avoid 
Table B.10. 1 (Enron - Word Frequency - Keyword: Avoid)  
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
avoid 5 255 62.20 
avoidance 9 37 9.02 
avoided 7 33 8.05 
avoiding 8 29 7.07 
void 4 7 1.71 
avoids 6 6 1.46 
avert 5 5 1.22 
deflected 9 4 0.98 
nullify 7 4 0.98 
avoidable 9 3 0.73 
deflect 7 3 0.73 
dodge 5 3 0.73 
averted 7 2 0.49 
avoidant 8 2 0.49 
dodged 6 2 0.49 
nullified 9 2 0.49 
shunned 7 2 0.49 
avoider 7 1 0.24 
deflecting 10 1 0.24 
deflects 8 1 0.24 
dodging 7 1 0.24 
invalid 7 1 0.24 
invalidated 11 1 0.24 
invalidation 12 1 0.24 
quash 5 1 0.24 
shun 4 1 0.24 
shunning 8 1 0.24 





Table B.10. 2 (Nathans - Word Frequency - Keyword: Avoid) 
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
avoid 5 7 41.18 
avoided 7 4 23.53 
avoids 6 3 17.65 
avoiding 8 1 5.88 
obviate 7 1 5.88 
voiding 7 1 5.88 
B.11 Word Frequency Query - Keyword: Problem 
Table B.11. 1 (Enron - Word Frequency - Keyword: Problem) 
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
problems 8 581 35.47 
problem 7 502 30.65 
job 3 302 18.44 
jobs 4 89 5.43 
trouble 7 82 5.01 
troubled 8 47 2.87 
troubling 9 18 1.10 
troubles 8 17 1.04 
Table B.11. 2 (Nathans - Word Frequency - Keyword: Problem) 
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
problems 8 20 35.71 
problem 7 16 28.57 
troubled 8 10 17.86 
trouble 7 7 12.50 
job 3 2 3.57 










B.12 Word Frequency Query - Keyword: Solution 
Table B.12. 1 (Enron - Word Frequency - Keyword: Solution) 
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
result 6 712 32.68 
results 7 593 27.21 
resulting 9 164 7.53 
resulted 8 154 7.07 
solutions 9 123 5.64 
solution 8 89 4.08 
answer 6 77 3.53 
resolution 10 69 3.17 
resolutions 11 44 2.02 
roots 5 40 1.84 
answers 7 32 1.47 
root 4 20 0.92 
resultant 9 16 0.73 
rooted 6 16 0.73 
answering 9 10 0.46 
answered 8 8 0.37 
answerable 10 5 0.23 
solvent 7 5 0.23 
rooting 7 2 0.09 
Table B.12. 2 (Nathans - Word Frequency - Keyword: Solution) 
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
result 6 54 47.79 
results 7 16 14.16 
resulted 8 10 8.85 
answered 8 7 6.19 
answer 6 6 5.31 
solvent 7 5 4.42 
resulting 9 4 3.54 
answers 7 3 2.65 
answering 9 2 1.77 
resolution 10 2 1.77 
solutions 9 2 1.77 
root 4 1 0.88 











B.13 Word Frequency Query - Keyword: Learning 
Table B.13. 1 (Enron - Word Frequency - Keyword: Learning) 
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
See 3 1322 16.86 
Study 5 775 9.88 
Take 4 542 6.91 
learning 8 475 6.06 
Know 4 365 4.66 
knowledge 9 357 4.55 
studies 7 349 4.45 
Letter 6 284 3.62 
Taking 6 267 3.41 
conditions 10 212 2.70 
hearing 7 197 2.51 
determine 9 170 2.17 
determined 10 169 2.16 
condition 9 158 2.02 
Con 3 155 1.98 
learned 7 126 1.61 
Learn 5 122 1.56 
acquired 8 114 1.45 
takes 5 114 1.45 
acquisition 11 107 1.36 
studied 7 91 1.16 
knowing 7 85 1.08 
read 4 83 1.06 
acquisitions 12 80 1.02 
discovered 10 61 0.78 
hearings 8 56 0.71 
reading 7 54 0.69 
acquire 7 49 0.62 
knows 5 49 0.62 
checks 6 48 0.61 
letters 7 48 0.61 
determination 13 46 0.59 
seeing 6 44 0.56 
check 5 41 0.52 
determining 11 37 0.47 
discovering 11 37 0.47 
watch 5 33 0.42 
acquiring 9 30 0.38 
determinants 12 30 0.38 
teaching 8 29 0.37 
hear 4 28 0.36 
studying 8 28 0.36 
determines 10 26 0.33 
knowingly 9 25 0.32 
discover 8 23 0.29 
scholarship 11 23 0.29 
sees 4 23 0.29 
instructions 12 19 0.24 
instructed 10 17 0.22 
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instruction 11 16 0.20 
teach 5 12 0.15 
ascertain 9 11 0.14 
knowledgeable 13 11 0.14 
learns 6 11 0.14 
watched 7 11 0.14 
determinant 11 10 0.13 
conditional 11 9 0.11 
teaches 7 9 0.11 
watching 8 9 0.11 
checking 8 8 0.10 
acquires 8 7 0.09 
cons 4 7 0.09 
acquirer 8 6 0.08 
checked 7 6 0.08 
determinations 14 6 0.08 
conditioning 12 5 0.06 
instructive 11 5 0.06 
reads 5 5 0.06 
conditioned 11 4 0.05 
determinable 12 4 0.05 
determinism 11 4 0.05 
scholarships 12 4 0.05 
hears 5 3 0.04 
instructional 13 3 0.04 
readings 8 3 0.04 
teachings 9 3 0.04 
acquirers 9 2 0.03 
conditionalities 16 2 0.03 
conditionality 14 2 0.03 
conditionally 13 2 0.03 
determine 8 2 0.03 
memorably 9 2 0.03 
watches 7 2 0.03 
watchful 8 2 0.03 
ascertainable 13 1 0.01 
ascertained 11 1 0.01 
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Table B.13. 2 (Nathans - Word Frequency - Keyword: Learning) 
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
take 4 70 15.77 
knowledge 9 39 8.78 
read 4 33 7.43 
know 4 32 7.21 
taking 6 27 6.08 
hearing 7 25 5.63 
acquisition 11 24 5.41 
acquired 8 22 4.95 
acquire 7 18 4.05 
conditions 10 18 4.05 
determined 10 15 3.38 
acquisitions 12 14 3.15 
determine 9 10 2.25 
checking 8 8 1.80 
determining 11 7 1.58 
takes 5 7 1.58 
acquiring 9 6 1.35 
check 5 6 1.35 
instructions 12 6 1.35 
ascertain 9 5 1.13 
reading 7 5 1.13 
condition 9 4 0.90 
determinative 13 4 0.90 
instructed 10 4 0.90 
seeing 6 4 0.90 
determination 13 3 0.68 
learn 5 3 0.68 
studies 7 3 0.68 
ascertained 11 2 0.45 
checks 6 2 0.45 
instructing 11 2 0.45 
knows 5 2 0.45 
learning 8 2 0.45 
watch 5 2 0.45 
ascertaining 12 1 0.23 
discovered 10 1 0.23 
hear 4 1 0.23 
instruct 8 1 0.23 
instruction 11 1 0.23 
instructively 13 1 0.23 
learned 7 1 0.23 
teach 5 1 0.23 
watched 7 1 0.23 
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